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ABSTRACT 
I formulate what I believe to be a correct account of the normativity of rationality. 
I identify two opposing doctrines which I call instrumentalism and rationalism. 
Instrumentalism says there are no obligations to be rational intrinsic to rationality, 
but that being rational is instrumental to doing what ought to be done. Rationalism 
says there are intrinsically rational obligations. I give arguments for instrumentalism 
and show how a bifurcation in normativity undermines characteristic Aristotelian and 
Kantian arguments in support of rationalism. I concede that the confrontation 
between instrumentalism and rationalism cannot be settled in the thesis, since it 
depends in part on a fundamental dispute about the nature of rationality. However, 
the doctrine of instrumentalism gives a particularly clear picture of how obligation 
and rationality are related, and I believe I have shown instrumentalism to be a 
doctrine which must be taken seriously. Consequently, I believe my thesis to be a 
contribution to the Humean view of the relation of obligation and reason. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Robert Kirk was willing to think I might be able to write a philosophical thesis, and 
patiently helped me to do so. Jonardon Ganeri and Michael Clark encouraged me to 
think I might have something worthwhile to say, without which encouragement I 
might have given up. Gregory Currie thought well enough of the project to support 
my application for funding from the British Academy. Paul Noordhof was kind 
enough to read my work carefully enough to tell me what was wrong with it, without 
which it would be a much poorer work than it is. Many other people in the 
Department of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham have helped me in many 
ways. My thanks to them all.  
 
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this work to my father, Brian, my mother, Margaret Hazel, my brother, 
Julian, my sister, Francesca Jane, my daughter Eleanor Louise, to my friend, Ron 
Sutton-Jones, and to Gillian Sealby. They have been in my thoughts throughout and 
are dearly loved by me. 
 1 Ought we to be Rational?  
1.1 Instrumentalism and Rationalism 
Ought we to be rational? A simple question, answered by a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
which yet requires something more if an answer is to satisfy. In this thesis I defend 
an answer in the spirit of Hume’s opinion that ‘reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions’ (1739/1978:2.3.3/415). 
Our question can appear to be odd. If our question is asked as a challenge by a 
sceptic how can we ever satisfy him without begging the question? To offer him 
more than a blunt ‘yes’ will require justifying why we ought to be rational. To justify 
is to give reasons. Yet ‘if one is not already committed to rationality, of what 
relevance are reasons?’ (Sapontzis 1979:294). On the other hand, since the sceptic 
need not be committed to rationality prior to an answer he finds satisfying, 
presumably non-rational or irrational responses might be available and acceptable. 
Sceptical toddlers have been known to accept ‘because I told you so!’. More 
seriously, Kierkegaard turned the rationalist criticism of religious belief back on the 
rationalist. Since there could be no reason to be rational prior to accepting rationality, 
being rational required as much a leap of faith as being religious. Answering our 
question one way or another amounts to adopting a commitment for which rational 
grounds cannot be given. Therefore the rationalist is in the very same position as the 
fideist.  
One answer to the sceptic, which perhaps justifies the answer to the toddler, is that 
just by being the kind of thing which can be a sceptic, he is committed to rationality. 
Rationality is inescapable. Rationality settles what is done, whether or not it is what 
ought to be done.  Bodily motions are only (voluntary) actions if an answer to the 
question ‘Why?’ is in the offing (Anscombe 1957:24) — if they are done for reasons. 
Conforming to rational standards is inescapable because ‘It is a condition of having 
thoughts, judgements and intentions that the basic standards of rationality have 
application’ (Davidson 1985:351). But that you ought to do something implies both 
that you can do it and that it is possible for you not to, so there cannot be an 
obligation to be rational if you can’t do other than be rational. Consequently, it might 
be said that asking the question as a challenge amounts to making a category 
mistake.  
We may well accept that being a person entails a minimal degree of rationality, for 
example, at least Cherniak’s minimal rationality (1981; 1986), and certainly, if this 
much rationality is inescapable we might reject the question so far as this rationality 
is concerned. But Cherniak’s minimal rationality is only a matter of being rational in 
certain kinds of ways on at least some occasions. It does not prohibit occasions of 
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irrationality nor choosing to be irrational on occasion. Even if we strengthened the 
degree of rationality required of personhood, say to the strength entailed by 
Davidson’s interpretationism, akrasia is nevertheless possible (as Davidson 1970 
spends some time showing). So the challenge can be meaningful even if rationality is 
to some degree inescapable.  
On the other hand, if our question is a request for an explanation, perhaps as part 
of a general enquiry into rationality, we may think an answer is not needed. Whilst 
reasons may determine what ought to be done, why should there be reasons for 
following reasons? For the question asks whether you ought to be rational, and being 
rational is doing what you have reason to do; what you have reason to do is what the 
balance of reasons dictates and so is what you ought to do all things considered; so it 
asks whether you ought to do what you ought to do all things considered.  But 
perhaps there are no second order reasons to do what you ought to do. Indeed, there 
is no need of second order reasons for following the first order reasons: they suffice 
entirely on their own. On the other hand, if we take the question to be generalising 
over lots of first order questions, it asks only of each thing which ought to be done 
whether it ought to be done, a question whose answer is entirely trivial. In either 
case, when asked this question, the proper thing to do is to return, trivially, to 
whatever first order reasons there are.  
Thus our question can be met with a sceptical challenge and a challenge of 
triviality. Not until we have done much work will I be able to address these 
challenges, and so I now move on. In this thesis I concern myself with an opposition 
between two kinds of answer, between those which take rationality to be the servant 
of obligation and those which take rationality to be the master, between what I call 
instrumentalism and rationalism.  
In the context of a discussion of rationality, instrumentalism is the doctrine that the 
entirety of rationality is instrumental rationality. I am using ‘instrumentalism’ with a 
different meaning, to mean instrumentalism about the obligation to be rational. The 
instrumentalist holds that obligations to be rational are explicable in instrumental 
terms and denies that rationality itself is a source of obligations to be rational, denies 
that the ends to which rationality is a means are to be essentially characterised in 
terms of rationality, denies that rational ends as such are obliged as such, for short, 
holds that  there are no intrinsic obligations to be rational. I am using ‘rationalism’ 
as the name of the doctrine that rationality itself can be a source of obligations to be 
rational, that there are intrinsic obligations to be rational. The rationalist need not 
hold that whatever is rational is thereby intrinsically obligated, but just that some of 
what is rational is intrinsically obligated. Instrumentalism and rationalism are 
contradictory. 
Instrumentalism is clearly Humean in spirit. Instrumentalist views can be found 
quite widely in the literature:  
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we must recognise that often, reason does not command itself at all. 
(Kraenzel 1991:265) 
Rather, 
a reason for action comes into being along with a person’s ends. When 
one has ends, one has reason to act —some ways rather than others. 
Specifically, one has reason to seek means to those ends. (Schmidtz 
1995:26) 
So don’t be rational if you don’t want to. Just don’t be surprised when things don’t 
go your way. Since being rational is instrumentally effective 
to justify rationally the imperative that we ought to be rational, the only 
other imperative we must accept is that we ought to pursue our goals. 
(Brown 1978:247) 
Why ought we to pursue our goals? If an end is morally obligated we are thereby 
obligated to bring it about, and failure to use a means to that end (having intended it 
as one ought) would be a failure of instrumental rationality that was a failure to do 
what we ought. So being instrumentally rational can be obligatory because of moral 
obligation:  
the obligation to behave rationally is a moral obligation (Downie 
1984:487) 
Similar points could be made about other kinds of obligation (prudential, legal, 
aesthetic,…):  
reason commands itself for the welfare of the whole being (Kraenzel 
1991:269) 
Whilst these authors may not locate the source of moral obligation in the passions, 
provided rationality is not an originating source of obligation these views are 
recognisably instrumentalist, in that rationality is the servant of obligation.  
Showing that it is rational to be moral is often regarded as a satisfactory answer to 
Thrasymachus’ question: ‘why should I be moral?’. Such answers are rationalist in 
spirit, but can drift when, having got so far, ask ‘Why be rational?’. Cohen, for 
example, answers that ‘only by being rational do I gain admittance to the moral 
realm’, because ‘occurrent responsibility is dependent on occurrent rationality’ 
(1982:84). In the context it is unclear whether Cohen intends rather to join Prichard 
in accepting that morality primitively settles what to do, so returning from rationality 
to morality as the determinant. If so he seems merely to be pointing out that rational 
agency is generally a necessary condition for moral agency, and perhaps intimating 
the instrumental significance of rationality for moral action. If not, this use of a 
necessary condition is circular in the face of the explanatory demand. For this reason, 
it may be taken that here, our spade is turned: that rationality is primitively 
determinative of what ought to be done. 
1.1 Instrumentalism and Rationalism 
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Views which take rationality to be primitively determinative of what ought to be 
done, whether bluntly or subtly, take rationality to be the master of obligation. There 
are many distinct normative systems, from etiquette to Noh theatre, all of which 
recommend or oblige, all of which are trivially justified in their own terms. However, 
rationality is different.  
It is part of the very idea of the Rational Normative System that its 
norms are finally authoritative in settling questions of what to do. 
(Darwall 1990:215) 1 
This leads to an answer to our question which is a transposition of Prichard’s answer 
to why one ought to be moral (1912:8). We should be rational because being rational 
just is the way we ought to be. It may be that when the question is asked, what is 
really being asked is whether what is claimed to be rational really is rational, when 
the answer is to review the reasons in force. But once one has determined that 
something is rational, there is no further question. 
Classical views of rationality concur. On classical views of rationality, rationality 
has a satisfyingly self-prescribing property. Once something were determined to be 
rational, it would thereby have been determined to be among intrinsic goods of the 
world. The rational person, on the classical view, searches for truth and conducts 
themselves in an enlightened manner on basis of the outcome of that rational activity. 
Their rationality will make evident to them such intrinsic goods, and they will 
thereby be motivated to promote such goods. What is rational will, for them, be what 
ought to be done, and the only question that can be asked when it is queried why it 
ought to be done is whether it truly is rational. 
In addition to those bluntly asserting the primitive settlement by rationality of what 
to do, there are authors who espouse ethically significant relations between 
rationality and morality. For example, Baier, who intends to show that ‘the moral 
point of view is properly identified in terms of a set of demands on the method for 
determining what to do’, demands which ‘correctly express crucial requirements of 
practical reason itself’(1982:82 & 85). More interestingly, consider Nagel’s 
representation of Kant as proposing that ‘ethics…uncovers a motivational structure 
which is specifically ethical and which is explained by’ (1970:12) our conception of 
ourselves as autonomous rational agents. The rational desires may be held to 
constitute a pattern of motivation which may not be specifiable independently of that 
pattern of motivation as a whole nor specifiable independently of the ethical 
considerations which the pattern embodies. This implicitly accepts rationality as 
primitively determinative, only it is an amplified notion of rationality, of rationality 
as containing distinctively ethical features which cannot be understood in 
independent rational terms. Contrast with Hobbes, whose answer to Thrasymachus 
                                                 
1
 Emphasis as in the source unless otherwise indicated. 
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gives an explanatory priority to a non-ethical feature of rational creatures, the natural 
interest in self preservation. Even if rational deliberation on that interest develops a  
more sophisticated pattern of motivation, it is a pattern of motivation explicable in 
terms of the general pursuit of this interest. Nagel’s ethical motivational structure is 
not reducible or explainable in this way, but is rather something that grows out of 
autonomy. 
It should probably be conceded that rationalism has a richer philosophical 
hinterland than instrumentalism, perhaps especially because of the explanatory virtue 
had by appeals to rationality when attempting to answer Thrasymachus’s question. 
When I recommend something to you as rational, I exploit the friendly use of the 
term. To urge on someone an action by telling them it is rational is not prima facie to 
make a demand of them. Rather, it is to come to their aid, to speak as if on behalf of 
their concerns, to recommend what favours their interest. It need not be to speak 
purely subjectively on their behalf, that is to say, need not be to take their concerns 
and interests to be solely whatever they presently understand their concerns and 
interests to be. For we are all aware that our concerns and interests (especially our 
potential ones) are not transparent to us, and that to some degree we discover what 
they are and acquire new ones by taking opportunities to try things out. So to urge on 
someone an action by telling them it is rational may be to say that it contributes to 
what concerns and interests they would have given transparency. Consequently, 
answers to Thrasymachus which say being moral is rational make it appear that being 
moral is something you already want to be, and for that reason have considerable 
appeal. Nevertheless, I think rationalism is false, and I shall argue for 
instrumentalism. 
1.2 The argument for instrumentalism 
My argument for instrumentalism is this: 
1. Normativity has two distinct kinds: correctness and directivity. (Premiss) 
2. Obligations as such are directive. (Premiss) 
3. The intrinsic normativity of rationality as such is correctness alone. 
(Premiss) 
4. Therefore there are no intrinsic obligations to be rational. (1, 2, 3)  
5. Agents are obliged to be rational or act rationally when and only when so 
being or acting is necessary for fulfilling an obligation. (Premiss) 
6. Therefore rationality is an instrument at the service of obligations. (5) 
7. Therefore instrumentalism is true. (4, 6) 
This argument is valid and I hold it to be sound. Arguing for its premisses and 
against rationalist objections is the work of this thesis. The premiss of line 5 and the 
inference to line 6 is uncontroversial. Our focus will be on the argument to line 4. 
The nature of the distinction I am drawing in the first premiss is explained and 
justified in the next chapter. For the interim, an example of the distinction is that 
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between the normativity of the principles of constructing straight lines and of respect 
for persons. The former are not on their own legitimate determinants of what to do 
(there may be more important things to do). The latter have what the former lack: the 
property of being normative, in the sense that this term has come to have in 
philosophy, perhaps especially in philosophy of practical reason. Being normative is 
a property had by considerations, and the grounds of such considerations, which are 
properly determinative of what to do. I call this property directivity. This distinction 
is not Kant’s distinction between hypothetical and categorical reasons, which 
confuses this distinction with another within directivity; why that is so will not be 
clear for some time. 
In general, when I say that the normativity of rationality is correctness, I mean 
what is said in the third premiss. The rationalist who says that the normativity of 
rationality is directive should be understood to express only the negation of that 
premiss, not that all normativity of rationality is directive. 
The rationalist has three main kinds of objection to the argument, all directed 
against the truth of the third premiss. Since each of these objections is also sufficient 
as an argument for rationalism, I shall call them the three wins for rationalism.  
The first win is that rational requirements oblige: 
1. Reasons are rational requirements. 
2. Reasons settle what ought to be done. 
3. Therefore rationality settles what ought to be done and must for that reason 
be intrinsically obliging. 
The second win holds that the transmission of obligation from ends to means and 
in reasoning requires rationality to be intrinsically obliging. First, that you ought to 
take the necessary means to your ends is universally agreed to be a principle of 
rationality2 so it expresses an obligation to be rational. Its ability to transmit the 
obligation to pursue a worthy end to obliging the means to that end cannot be 
explained unless instrumental rationality is intrinsically obliging. Second, reason is 
obliging, since by its light we reason to what we ought to do and believe. If it is to be 
effective in bringing us to do and believe as we ought, reason must have the capacity 
to oblige us to conform to its conclusions, so reason is intrinsically obliging. 
The third win is that a rationalist metaethic of some kind is true, moral principles 
are intrinsically obliging, therefore rationality is intrinsically obliging.  
In addition to the three wins for rationalism, a fourth objection can be raised, not 
itself sufficient for rationalism: that the second premiss is false because obligations 
are merely systems of rules or natural functional facts, both of which we might 
choose to care about, but whose intrinsic normativity is therefore only correctness.  
                                                 
2
 E.g. see Korsgaard 1997:215 saying this. 
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1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis falls into two parts. In the first part I develop 
instrumentalism, and in the second I resist rationalism.  
Part 1 Instrumentalism: chapters 2 to 8 
In chapter 2 I argue for the first and second premisses of my argument for 
instrumentalism by arguing for the distinction within normativity between the 
properties of correctness and directivity. In chapter 3 I give an account of rationality 
as correctness. Provided this position about the normativity of rationality can be 
defended, it establishes the third premiss. My defence is complex. The first element, 
in chapter 3 itself, is that the normativity evident in my characterisation of rationality 
is solely correctness, and I show the first win for rationalism to be either question 
begging or equivocal. The second element, in chapters 4 and 5, is my defence to 
direct objections to the normativity of rationality being correctness. The third 
element, part of the work of chapters 6 to 8, is that taking instrumental rationality and 
reason to have intrinsic directivity confronts a serious difficulty which can be 
resolved by taking their normativity to be correctness alone. The final element, in 
chapters 9 to 10, is my resistance to arguments for rationalist metaethics. 
In chapter 4 I address the difficulty I face if what I take to be paradigmatically 
directive considerations can be made to appear to have merely correctness 
normativity. This directly threatens the truth of the second premiss, and so threatens 
the distinction I draw between the normativity of obligation and the normativity of 
rationality. For example, Foot’s early position, or naturalistic moral realism, might be 
understood to be committed to morality as just a kind of correctness about which we 
may care.  
In chapter 5 I address ways in which rationality appears to have its own directivity: 
that rational requirement may seem to be a kind of prima facie obligation (in Ross’s 
sense, now more commonly talked of as pro tanto);  for example, in practical 
rationality, in the paradoxes of rationality such as prisoners’ dilemma or Newcomb’s 
problem, rationality seems to direct one way whilst prudence directs another; in 
theoretical rationality, it may seem to intrinsically oblige rational belief and forbid 
self deception.  
In chapter 6 I will start exploring a difficulty that arises for instrumental rationality 
if we take its normativity to be directive, namely, that we find ourselves committed 
to spurious obligations. I will show that formal similarities between instrumental 
rationality and  practical and theoretical reason result in similar difficulties for the 
relation of reason and obligation in general. In chapter 7 we will examine Broome’s 
solution to the difficulty for instrumental rationality, and I generalise that solution 
leading to a formulation of what I call the general form of an obligation to be 
rational. If that general solution succeeds one might reject my notion of rationality as 
correctness. In chapter 8 I show that it succeeds at the cost of the normativity of 
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rational guidance, a price we should not pay. Consequently, I will have shown that 
taking instrumental rationality and reason to be intrinsically obliging  faces a 
dilemma: if we retain the normativity of rational guidance and what is required to 
derive obligations we think we should derive, we find ourselves committed to 
spurious obligations and spuriously justified beliefs; if we avoid the latter whilst 
retaining only the ability to derive proper obligations, we lose the normativity of 
rational guidance. Taking the normativity of rationality to be correctness, on the other 
hand, makes it possible to go between the horns. So doing we find that the 
hypothetical imperative as Kant developed it confuses distinct issues. Reformulated 
as I suggest, it is not a pure principle of rationality, but rather is one of the principles 
to do with the transmission of obligations from ends to means by instrumental 
rationality. I show how we can similarly go between the horns for the general form of 
an obligation to be rational, so articulating the relation between reason and 
directivity. I thereby refute the second win for rationalism. 
Part 2 Rationalism: chapters 9 to 10 
The second part of the thesis addresses rationalism on its home ground. The 
rationalist thought is best understood in Kantian or Aristotelean terms of rationality 
as the only possible source or ground of the intrinsically good. I concede that if the 
rationalist can show that obligations and values by which we should be moved can be 
shown to be implied by pure principles of rationality or by the nature of rationality, 
that will suffice to show that the normativity of rationality cannot be correctness 
alone. Rather, there are requirements of rationality that oblige, categorical reasons 
grounded in rationality itself. In that case a rationalist construal of the first win for 
rationalism would succeed in avoiding the charge of question begging made earlier. I 
shall consider and resist some arguments for what I call perfectionist rationalism, 
which have their origins in Aristotelean arguments that the life we ought to lead is 
grounded in the Ergon of a rational being, and some Kantian arguments that morality 
is grounded in rationality.  
 
As a whole, I show that instrumentalism is a viable position and rationalism faces 
some previously unacknowledged difficulties. Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that 
the dispute between instrumentalism and rationalism is part of a wider dispute about 
the nature and extent of rationality, and for that reason is a dispute left unsettled at 
the end of this thesis. Despite that, I think it is left a little more clearly delineated. 
 2 Two Kinds of Normativity 
2.1 Norms and normativity 
It is difficult to comprehensively represent our world, the world as it is for us in 
our inhabitation of it, in terms of the world described by material science. Our world 
is a world that has a certain enchantment— and a certain menace; it is a world with 
glamour and squalor, beauty and ugliness, right and wrong, goodness and evil. Such 
features do not seem of a kind fitted to appear in the scientist’s catalogue of natural 
properties. It may be possible to understand brute pushes and pulls in causal terms, 
but it is difficult to understand the motivational force of these features in such terms, 
and especially difficult to understand the further phenomenon that our responses can 
be apt or inapt, justified or unjustified, required or at our liberty.  
The problem is not only that these features cannot be described by use of material 
categories, but that the features seem to elude capture in terms that are purely 
descriptive. One stone may be on top of or under another, but in being on top it is 
not, despite Aristotle’s belief to the contrary, trying to be under. Yet some squalor is 
failed glamour, some ugliness failed beauty, some wrongs failed rights, some evils 
failed goods. The stones are on top or underneath and that is the end of the story, but 
these features of our world are what they are partly because they aim at something 
else. Objets trouvé are not nature’s failed attempts at art but they may be an artist’s. 
Descriptively we have only being a this such or not, but with these features it is 
possible to be a good or bad such, and being a bad such need not amount to being no 
this such at all. Rather, it is these features having a directedness towards something 
else which constitutes the possibility of certain ways of being a this such being a kind 
of success and others a kind of failure. The concept of normativity is thought to 
capture something of what is distinctive about these features of our world.  
Narrowly, normativity is the property had by norms and by things to which norms 
apply, perhaps only in so far as they are what they are in virtue of being norm 
governed. A normative domain is what it is partly or wholly in virtue of there being 
norms which apply. The normative is the whole extent of those things which are 
governed by norms.  
To be governed by norms is for something rule like to apply which should be 
conformed to. A norm may be an explicit rule, but need not be, since explicit or 
conscious following of a rule by participants in the normative domain need not occur. 
It may rather be observers who formulate the domain in terms of rules obeyed. For 
example, modus ponens is a rule of inference frequently used, but rarely knowingly 
used as such.  
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The normative and the descriptive are held apart. What makes something a 
normative account rather than a descriptive account is partly that it is given in terms 
of what is aimed at, or what is attempted for the sake of that aim, rather than what is 
achieved. It is an account given in terms of what ought to be, not necessarily what is. 
So we have Millikan speaking of normal explanations (Millikan 1989:223), by which 
she means explanations in terms of proper functions and not explanations about what 
usually happens or is prevalent. 
Conformity to a norm is a matter of success or correctness. One is in a normative 
domain if and only if conforming to its norms can constitute a success or correctness. 
One is in a normative domain if and only if not conforming to its norms can 
constitute a failure or incorrectness. It can be argued that a certain amount of 
conformity must be achieved if there are to be grounds for talk of something being a 
normative domain. Much space has been devoted to exploring the subtleties and 
complications of what does and does not count as required conformity and non-
conformity for something to be within a normative domain, and likewise to exploring 
the internal capacities and contextual supports required for taking part in or 
constituting a normative domain. We are not going to explore those problems in 
general, although I will have something to say about the case of rational norms in the 
next chapter. 
A further feature of the normative is when conforming to a rule is conceived of as 
a matter of conforming to the right rule, a doing of what ought to be done. The rule 
ought to be obeyed, or at least, there is some reason to obey the rule, and norms are 
conceived of as expressing or being reasons (Raz 1975/1999). In such cases a 
normative domain is at least in part structured by relations of justification, and gives 
rise to permissions, requirements and obligations. A normative domain involves 
deontic force, or something like it. Norms are the sort of thing which could either 
themselves direct and legitimate the conduct they propose or transmit a legitimation 
grounded elsewhere. To do this work we must accept norms as things which direct 
us, in the right direction, legitimately, and in such a way that when we see we are in 
circumstances in which they properly apply, their authority is sufficient to bring 
deliberation to an end. I sum this up by characterising norms as being rules 
legitimately in force that set some sort of an authoritative standard which we ought to 
meet. Meeting that standard is a way of being justified, either by the norm itself or by 
what lies behind the norm.  
The concept of normativity is broader than the concept of whatever is governed by 
norms taken narrowly. The normative has come to include anything that can be seen 
to share a relevant property which is had by norms. Almost anything which is rule 
governed is now liable to be included within the normative, as is almost anything to 
which the concepts of authority or standards are relevant, or which is expressed by 
use of ‘ought’. We find the inclusion of the evaluative, perhaps by extension of the 
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standard setting nature of norms, and the deontic by extension of the authoritative 
nature of norms. Consequently the extent of the normative is now very considerable.  
In making use of the broad concept of normativity authors sometimes seek to focus 
our attention on features of the world which correspond literally or analogically to 
what we see in norms. The suggestion is that the normative is some aspect of the 
world, or of our relation to the world, which is legitimately directive in the way that 
norms are, and moreover, that so far as there is a philosophically interesting aspect to 
the notion of a norm, we could reverse the direction of explanation and understand 
norms as getting their authority and legitimacy from the analogous aspect of the 
world.   
In Raz’s Practical Reason and Norms, written in the 1970s, a norm is a special sort 
of reason for action, and the normative is not the entirety of reasons. By 1999 he is 
saying that ‘aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence 
constitute reasons for persons’ (Raz 1999a:67). Now the tastiness of a banana is a 
reason to eat it, and so is a normative aspect of the world in his 1999 sense, but there 
is no sense in which the tastiness of a banana is itself a rule, or something rule-like, 
which sets an authoritative standard. So for Raz, whereas in the 1970s the normative 
was contained within the domain of reasons, by 1999 it is the other way round.3 The 
domain of reasons is part of the normative.  
As a consequence of these broadenings, talk of norms and the normative is talk 
intended to generalise systematically over what might be principles, reasons, 
obligations, and permissions, and their grounds, without always intending thereby to 
assert the existence of related rule-like entities or universal requirements (although 
frequently such entities are in the offing). 
2.2 Normativity and practical reason  
Practical reason is concerned with deciding what to do. Not uncommonly, practical 
reason is identified with morality. As Gibbard puts it: ‘in the history of moral 
philosophy….On the broadest conceptions, morality is simply practical rationality’ 
(1990:40). On this view, all practical reasons are moral reasons or proxies for moral 
reasons. Moral reasoning about action is concerned with what actions one’s duties 
oblige. Moral reasoning is not, however, the entirety of practical reasoning. The 
reason that morality and practical reason may be identified is that the remainder of 
practical reason, i.e. that concerned with action additional to what duty obliges, 
occurs within a context of moral permissions. When I am deciding what to do on a 
free weekend, my liberty is from duty, not from morality altogether. I am at liberty 
because there is no duty compelling particular actions, but I am at liberty to choose 
                                                 
3
 I appreciate that Raz’s concerns in 1975/1999 were somewhat different from his concerns 
in 1999a, but my point is only to illustrate how one important author in this area has found it 
useful to extend his earlier concept. 
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only among those things which are morally permissible. The considerations of 
prudence, for example, or desire, only come into play within an overarching 
morality.  
On this view, then, practical reason is divided into duty and liberty, morality 
determines that division, moral considerations override others, and  moral 
considerations are commensurable with all others, at least so far as setting the bounds 
of duty and of liberty. Only within the bounds of liberty do considerations other than 
moral considerations come into their own, and in effect they are moral considerations 
by proxy. Hence, for example, the tendency to formulate the legitimacy of self 
regarding considerations in terms of duties to oneself. If there is a conflict between 
what is rational to do and what is moral to do, morality should win. 
This view can sound rather grim, and accounting for morality’s overriding can be 
difficult. For this reason  a popular course has been to show that the moral is broadly 
or generally congruent with the prudential or the wanted. Morality is, in some sense, 
already something you have reason to conform to. A more sophisticated approach is 
one which maintains that morality constitutes a possibility of worthwhile life that is 
not characterisable in terms prior to the ethical. Perhaps Aristotle thinks this is 
something that the acquisition of one’s second nature inducts one into, whilst Kant 
thinks it is something one is already committed to in virtue of being rational. But the 
idea remains that moral considerations override. Prichard’s view that it is a mistake 
to ask why be moral is the apotheosis of this view. Its continuing influence is evident 
in claims such as that ‘moral considerations are, for the man who cares for them, the 
most important of all considerations’ (Phillips 1977:150) and in Sterba’s justification 
of morality, when he concludes that his defence of morality 
shows morality to be the only non-question-begging resolution of the 
conflict between self-interested and altruistic reasons from the 
standpoint of the Standard of Reasonable Conduct (1987:64)  
This view of the relation of practical reason and morality has been criticised, 
notably by Foot: ‘The exceptions to moral rules are built in to the verdictive moral 
system and so it is taught that morality is always to be obeyed’ (1978a). And 
criticised perhaps even more radically by Williams (1985), when he characterises 
morality as a peculiar institution which distorts our understanding of the proper 
concern of ethics — Socrates’ question of how we should live — which moral 
philosophy on its own must be incapable of answering.  
In the light of these criticisms more attention has been paid, and paid in their own 
terms, to the variety of considerations that enter into practical reason. As a 
consequence prudential, desirous, aesthetic and eudaemonistic considerations have 
been granted a sovereignty they did not have under the identity of practical reason 
and morality. For example, we find Wallace discussing the relation of practical 
reason and morality which considers the congruence of morality and eudaemonia 
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whilst granting them independent powers and making no assumptions about 
overriding (1997:328-30).  
Once this variety of considerations have each been granted sovereignty, the 
problems of incomparability and of resolving conflicts press hard. The rejection of 
morality as the overriding  consideration brings with it a consequent need for terms 
in which the congress of the various kinds of considerations, now taken on their own 
terms and not as proxy, can be understood. The congress has come to be understood 
in terms of normativity.  
Normative force is a notion applied generally and non-specifically to the force of 
all kinds of consideration that come into play in deciding what to do. It is the force 
had by the various kinds of considerations in their own right, the balance of which 
determines what to do. 
We rightly view the world through a framework of reasons…and we 
rightly make particular decisions by determining what these reasons 
support on balance (Scanlon 1998:136) 
The metaphor of the balance applies most happily to considerations that are 
comparable, even commensurable, so that the metaphor of weighing corresponds to a 
common ordering in which those considerations each have a place. Frequently, 
however, no common ordering of considerations in play exists. There may be no 
general answer to which ought to prevail or how in particular cases it can be 
determined which ought to prevail. They all direct us how to live forcefully and in 
their own terms, terms which cannot be taken as proxy for other terms and which 
have their own legitimacy. Yet some kind of collision of considerations leading to an 
outcome must occur, since something must in the end be done. One kind of reason 
may silence, or erase, or exclude other kinds in a particular situation. But this need 
not mean that there is any precedence between the sovereign considerations which 
settles in general their relative powers.  
The concept of normativity has come to be seen as the right concept to capture the 
sense in which there is something common had by the variety of considerations that 
bear on what to do and direct us how to live. Practical reason is properly directed by 
what they possess in common: normativity or normative force. This notion of 
normativity includes but is wider than the notion of a reason, since the normative 
includes not only reasons but also the sources or grounds of reasons. It includes 
evaluative notions to do with the goodness of states of affairs, actions and character. 
Virtues and vices are relevantly normative notions, and no less so when the concern 
with them is a matter taking attitudes of praise and blame towards the virtuous and 
the vicious. Aesthetic notions may be, but I leave that question open.  
I shall refer to this notion of normativity and normative forcefulness as directivity. 
We need a new term because this conception of normativity, namely, directivity, 
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needs now to be distinguished from another conception, with which it shares a 
common origin.  
2.3 Two kinds 
I claim there are two kinds of norms and two kinds of normativity. We are inclined 
to think that all norms impose some kind of obligation, or at the very least, provide 
some reason for conforming to the norm. More concisely, we think all norms express 
the normative force which is the general force at play in practical reason. I think that 
is a mistake.  
As I summarised my characterisation of them above, a norm is a rule which sets an 
authoritative standard which ought to be met. The authority may be no more than a 
guarantee of a standard as being genuinely a way of being correct. Alternatively, the 
authority may be such as additionally to oblige or give some reason for conforming 
to the standard. We use ‘ought’ to mark both kinds of norms, but only the latter kind 
can properly be said to have any normative force.  
Consider an engineering quality straight edge. Such a tool will be marked with its 
accuracy and may have a British Standards mark to indicate the standard it sets as 
authoritative. We will say that if you want a straight line of straightness degree x, you 
ought to use a straight edge of British Standard grade y. This use of ‘ought’ need not 
have normative force. It may mean nothing more than that to get a line of this 
straightness you ought to use the straight edge. But now consider a moral obligation 
to do safe engineering work, which work requires something to be straight to degree 
x. Exactly the same verbal formulation can be used to state a norm with normative 
force. For now, given that you are engaged upon such engineering work, to get a 
straight line with degree of straightness x, you ought to use a straight edge of British 
Standard grade y. I think this example illustrates quite nicely the way and the reason 
we systematically ambiguate. The point is that we quite often have a reason, or an 
obligation, to get something correct in a certain way. It is just that the normative 
force has its source external to the correctness, but we fail to mark this fact 
linguistically, and make use of the same expression to express two different types of 
norms.   
Consequently, we must distinguish two kinds of norms and two distinct uses of 
‘ought’. Firstly there are norms that do no more than express a way of being correct, 
which I am going to call correctness norms. In fact, these come in two types: 
constitutive norms and success norms. For example, consider the rules of chess. 
Following the rules constitutes playing chess. If a set of constitutive norms constitute 
an activity which has a goal, then in addition there may be success norms, the 
following of which is conducive to achieving the goal of the activity. For example, 
there are norms governing how to play chess well. Some constitutive norms may 
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themselves be success norms; for example, the norms governing the construction of 
functional artefacts.  
To play chess you ought to follow the constitutive rules of chess and to play chess 
well you ought to follow the success norms. All that the ‘ought’ means here is that 
following these rules is what it is to be playing chess, and following the success 
norms is what it is to play well. In neither case does it mean there is any obligation, 
or even any reason, to follow these norms. These norms express no normative force. 
They are, however, still normative, because poor following constitutes a kind of 
failure, a kind of incorrectness.  
The second kind of norm expresses normative force, and I shall call them directive 
norms. Their rule may also appear in a correctness norm, and that appearance may be 
partly explanatory of their normative force. But they do not gain their normative 
force from that correctness — that is the confusion we are unpicking here — but 
because there is some reason to bring about that correctness.  
Let me concede that there is a notion of correctness applying to directive norms. 
Directivity includes a legitimate and authoritative force applying in practical reason, 
and plainly legitimacy and authority are kinds of correctness. I do not think this fact 
need be a source of confusion, although I think it has been a source of confusion. For 
correctness norms are also subject to notions of legitimacy and authority, and sharing 
this with directing norms is perhaps one of the reasons we sometimes think mere 
correctness is directing. But the distinction in kind of legitimacy and authority 
matters. For whilst it is true that norms are not norms unless you ought to be guided 
by them, the ambiguity in ‘ought’ assails us. The legitimacy of the rules of chess 
derives from the authority of the organisation that sets them, but they still have no 
power on their own to direct our behaviour. Here, no more may be meant by ‘you 
ought to be guided by the rules of chess’ than that non-conformity entails not playing 
chess. The legitimacy of the law, on the other hand, derives in part from the authority 
of the legislature and legitimate law does have the power to direct on its own quite 
independently of its capacity to enforce that power by compulsion, penalty, or 
incentive. Illegitimate law, however, may have no more than correctness normativity, 
although no doubt the penalties it imposes supply some prudential reasons to 
conform. 
 
I do not think that this distinction between correctness and directive normativity has 
been sufficiently marked.4 I now give some justification for the distinction by 
discussing notions of normativity in the philosophical literature. 
Many accounts of norms and normativity are concerned only with directive norms 
and directivity considered in deontic terms: 
                                                 
4
 But see Midgley 1959:279, Wright, G. H. v. 1963:6-7, Searle 1969:34 and especially 
Hare’s  criticism of Searle’s ‘How to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’.’ (1964) in his 1964: 125-6. 
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This is a study in the theory of norms.…These include…rules which 
require that a certain action be performed, as well as rules granting 
permissions….The key concept for the explanation of norms is that of 
reasons for action. (Raz 1975/1999:9) 
As Dancy here records, whilst the normative has been conceived to be wider than the 
deontic, there has been a tendency to try to unite directivity under the concept of a 
reason, perhaps because of the dominance of Raz’s approach: 
normativity is a feature common to both sides of the evaluative/deontic 
distinction….I find it helpful to keep an “ought” in mind when thinking 
about normativity…. It is common to think that these sorts of oughts 
can all be understood in terms of one basic notion, that of a reason. 
(Dancy 2000a:vii-viii) 
However, directive normativity is wider than the notion of reasons, including not 
only reasons but also the sources or grounds of reasons. For example, Darwall lists 
the 
many different normative notions with which ethics has traditionally 
been concerned…we have: the morally wrong…the virtuous or 
estimable…a person’s good or welfare…. the choiceworthy…the 
personally desirable or valuable…the impersonally desirable or 
valuable…the morally desirable…the morally estimable…that which 
has dignity…and the important or significant. (Darwall 2001:§2) 
A claim that the normativity of the evaluative is directivity may appear mistaken 
when one considers certain aesthetic evaluations, such as dainty, for directivity is 
perhaps especially concerned with the grounds of and the force had by considerations 
properly determinative of what to do and how to live. It seems to me that even the 
judgement of daintiness has some directive force, but if there are some evaluations 
which altogether lack directivity, that is not a problem.  
Evaluations of rightness and wrongness are clearly directive evaluative notions. 
The precise relation of goodness and value to action is much controverted, but they 
are clearly directive evaluative notions. Some of the force of Moore’s open question 
argument for goodness being a non-natural property is contained in the fact that 
given any natural property we seem to be able to conceive of circumstances in which 
it should not be promoted. That would only have cogency provided goodness is a 
directive property. In general, such evaluative notions are internally related to what 
ought to be done, and this is why they are included by Dancy and others within the 
normative, and so in our terms, are directive. 
Teleological notions of morality may have a notion of value, of the Good, which is 
not itself given in terms of reasons to bring about. The teleological principle that 
what ought to be done is whatever is best amounts to taking it that things which have 
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value of this kind, things which are Good, are ends to be promoted.  Austere 
teleologists may insist that the order of explanation is from the Good to the practical 
reasons, and so propose notions of value whose normativity may seem furthest from 
directivity. Nevertheless, the normativity of such notions is directive since in 
deriving reasons from value teleologists locate the source of directivity within value.  
Finally, there are notions of value in which the order of explanation is entirely 
reversed, when value is explained in terms of practical reasons. For example, 
Scanlon’s buck-passing account: 
value is not a purely teleological notion….being valuable is not a 
property that provides us with reason. Rather, to call something 
valuable is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for 
behaving in certain ways with regard to it.…Judgements about what is 
good or valuable generally express practical conclusions about what 
would, at least under the right conditions, be reasons for acting or 
responding in a certain way. (Scanlon 1998:96) 
Notions of morality which make much of virtue can disagree over the ground of 
virtue’s directivity. 
On one view, sometimes attributed to Aristotle, it concerns the relation 
of dispositions to human flourishing, to a life that most benefits the 
person who leads it. On another, it concerns a trait being one we ought 
to esteem or disesteem. (Darwall 2001:§2) 
The former may amount to grounding the directivity of virtue in a teleological 
account, although one of Aristotle’s points is that the good life is not characterisable 
independently of a life in which virtues are cultivated and exercised. The latter 
grounds directivity in virtue itself, in praiseworthy character. Now were praiseworthy 
character a kind of static notion of evaluation, we might take it that this notion of 
virtue is not directive. Understood in this way, the virtuous person is a practically 
irrelevant ornament. In finding life to be enhanced by their presence we do take 
virtuous persons to be, in some sense, ornamental. Taking them only, or mainly, in 
that way, however, reduces virtue to something almost aesthetic—and that is clearly 
wrong. The virtuous are also proofs that virtue can be achieved and a reproach to our 
own lack of virtue. We take them to be people we ought to emulate.  
Gert argues that there are two dimensions of normative strength. How does that 
relate to the distinction drawn here? The dimensions he identifies are requiring and 
justifying. He gives a formal definition (2003:16-17), but the examples he uses to 
motivate the distinction are clear. He points out that altruistic reasons can justify 
even great sacrifices, including ‘risking one’s life to act on such a reason’  without 
requiring those sacrifices, and it is not plausible that ‘this altruistic reason’s 
insufficiency to require action is not a result of its being too weak to generate a 
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requirement’ (2003:9). For surely if it can justify that much, it is a strong reason. So 
we should recognise that the strength of requirement and of justification are 
orthogonal. Having said this much, I think it is clear that Gert is identifying a 
distinction within directivity. 
Many accounts of normativity, whilst focused on directivity, include passages 
which fail to make any distinction between directivity and correctness in normativity 
 ‘Normativity’ is…the chief term we philosophers... have settled upon 
for discussing some central but deeply puzzling phenomena of human 
life. We use it to mark a distinction, not between the good and the bad 
(or between the right and the wrong, the correct and the incorrect), but 
rather between the good-or-bad (or right-or-wrong, .. .), on the one 
hand, and the actual, possible, or usual, on the other. Ethics, aesthetics, 
epistemology, rationality, semantics — all these areas of philosophical 
inquiry draw us into a discussion of normativity. And they do so not 
because we…import this notion into our enquiries, but because…we 
discover it there (Railton 2000:1) 
It is not evident that the nature of the normativity of epistemology, rationality and 
semantics is the same as the normativity of ethics and practical reason, and once we 
have clearly distinguished directivity it looks as if the correctness-directivity 
distinction marks something of the difference between them.  
That human intentionality may require to be understood in normative terms has 
seemed to offer a useful conceptual link with the conception of reasons as being part 
of the normative domain. For it might be thought that whatever reasons are, they can 
only be what they are for creatures that can appreciate them as such, and hence there 
must be an important link between the normativity of reasons and the normativity of 
intentionality. Admittedly, there are serious difficulties in understanding the relations 
between the two. Important distinctions need to be made between the reasons for 
which someone acts (motivating), the reasons why they acted (explanatory), and the 
reasons that exist for them to act (normative). All three may apply on occasion whilst 
coming apart on that occasion. They may also seem to straddle the is-ought divide, in 
that the first two seem to be about intentional states had whilst the third is about 
states that ought to be had. It may be a condition on something being a motivating 
reason that it (or its contents) could be a good reason in the right circumstances. 
Dancy (2000b) gives reasons for rejecting the distinction between motivating and 
normative reasons as a distinction in kind. 
So the correct characterisation of the distinction and  relations between reasons is 
controversial. Nevertheless, the conceptual unification of reasons, features of the 
world and intentionality within normativity leads some to characterise the capacity to 
be rational as in part the capacity to take advantage of the normativity of the world in 
order to inhabit it intelligently. Hence  
2.3 Two kinds 
 
 
23
Something is said by philosophers to have ‘normativity’ when it entails 
that some action, attitude or mental state of some other kind is justified, 
an action one ought to do or a state one ought to be in. (Darwall 
2001:§1) 
But this unification is not as happy as it might appear. The notion of normativity 
exploited by philosophers who are more concerned with practical reason is 
essentially directive, bound up as it is with questions of legitimacy, the Good and the 
Right. Contrast this with the notions of normativity in play in philosophy of mind. 
Consider approaches to intentionality which take thought to be normatively governed 
by constituting logical relations between concepts; teleosemantic accounts of 
intentionality which appeal to the normativity of proper function; Sellarsian non-
naturalists who regard the capacity to access the space of reasons as something 
characterisable not descriptively but only normatively; Davidson’s theory of mind 
which appeals to norms of interpretation to determine correct patterns of intentional 
state attributions. There is some strain in bringing these notions within directive 
normativity, which is sometimes remarked upon, and sometimes used as part of an 
argument against the normativity of the mental. 
in what sense could thoughts and meaning imply any prescriptions 
about what we ought to think or do, or about what it is valuable to think 
or do, as the word “normative” seems to imply? (Engel 1999:447)5 
The strain is relieved when we bring them within correctness normativity, as Engel 
may agree, since he goes on to explain that for Davidson 
Meaning and thought are not “normative” if this…[implies] 
normativity in the sense of giving a particular value to rationality. The 
rational norms are there, whether we like them or not, and in this sense 
they are not good or bad. The normativity of meaning and thought 
pertains…to general principles of the interpretation of speech and 
thought. (1999:447) 
Admittedly some non-naturalists, perhaps McDowell is one, will say that certain 
concepts are themselves essentially directive, so that fully characterising the space of 
reasons is not a matter of pure correctness normativity, if only because some truths of 
reason are truths of directive normativity. Even if true, that does not diminish the 
general point I am making. In the philosophy of mind much concern with 
normativity is better understood in terms of correctness normativity.  
Similarly, normativity is a significant notion within philosophy of language. ‘The 
relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive.’ 
(Kripke 1982:37). Kripke mentions action, but the normativity at play in 
                                                 
5
 See also Schroeder 2003. 
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Wittgenstein and Kripke’s discussion of rule following is not best understood in 
terms of directivity. It is, however, comprehensible as a concern with explaining how 
there could be such a thing as correctness, the difficulties in explaining it on the basis 
of descriptive facts and the need to ground the distinction between seeming and 
being correct. 
The normativity of the constitution of games and of social institutions is generally 
correctness. The rules of chess and the norms of successful play require various 
things, but by themselves lack normative force. Similarly, if we look at Searle’s 
account of the creation of institutional facts by use of constitutive rules of the form 
‘X counts as Y in context C’ (Searle 1995:28 and ff.), we see correctness norms 
which constitute the possibility of various social practices. But just as clearly, these 
practices constituted by the relevant norms could be wicked practices, whilst 
directivity is determinative of what properly ought to be done. 
When it comes to rationality, to sort out correctness and directivity we have to get 
the relation of practical reasons and rationality sorted out. Kantians will take 
rationality to have some intrinsic directivity whilst Humeans will not. That argument 
will occupy us toward the end of this thesis. In the meantime, here is what, for my 
purposes, amounts to a concession from a Kantian that some requirements of 
rationality are not directive, but merely specify what is rationally correct. 
by itself, instrumental rationality cannot provide [reasons for acting]. At 
best, it provides an account of ‘relative rationality’…. By themselves, 
formal theories of decision give no practical guidance either. They 
simply say which actions are most coherent with our preferences and 
beliefs. Whether we should take those actions depends also on whether 
we should have those preferences and beliefs. Like the principle of 
instrumental rationality, these theories are impotent to guide action 
without implicitly assuming further premises about reasons for acting. 
(Darwall 2001:§4) 
Darwall also thinks there are additional, categorical, requirements of rationality 
which are directive and which supply the needed further premisses.  
Finally, in general, explaining directivity introduces a new kind of difficulty 
additional to the difficulties in explaining the notions of correctness involved in 
norms of rationality, epistemology and semantics. In explaining directivity we have 
to give some account of the settlement of conflicts between, for example, morality 
and prudence, because we can’t do contradictory things. It is not so obvious that the 
same is true given a conflict between an instrumental norm and a linguistic norm. 
Consider also explaining the sources of normativity. In the case of rationality, 
epistemology and semantics it can (at least prima facie) be more easily explained 
than in the case of directivity, and explained in terms which make evident the nature 
of the correctness but don’t make evident why their normativity might be directive. 
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For example, the normativity of truth-conducive considerations can be explained in 
terms of the aim of belief, of syntax in terms of the constitution of a vocalisation as 
belonging to a language. Granted that such explanations are controversial, it is still 
true that no such relatively simple accounts of the sources of directivity are in the 
offing. This distinction in explanatory ease is partly because 
There is…a normative ‘goal’ for belief that can itself be expressed in 
non-normative terms. Analogous points could be made about 
meaning…[whereas] In ethics,…it is not obvious how this could be 
true. What do desire, choice and action aim at, by their very nature? 
(Darwall 2001:§§6-7, my emphasis) 
Being grounded in standards which can be expressed non-normatively may be a 
mark of correctness as opposed to directive normativity. Contrast attempts to explain 
desirability, or ethically thick terms generally, in a way which grounds them outside 
the circle of directively normative concepts. As Darwall puts it 
Desire aims at the good in the sense of what we ought to desire; choice 
aims at the choiceworthy, in the sense of what we ought to choose; and 
so on. Here we seem to lack any goal, expressible in non-normative 
terms, that could serve as a source for the relevant norms of desire, 
choice and action. This makes the problem of the source of normativity 
particularly acute for ethics. (2001:§7) 
I think it is acute for directivity in general. Certainly Wittgenstein’s rule following 
discussion has by some been thought to raise sceptical difficulties for certain kinds of 
correctness (although his own position is perhaps only that correctness cannot be 
grounded in certain ways). Even if those difficulties were settled, directive 
normativity would leave us with yet further difficulties. We can understand some 
correctness as our arbitrary constructions, and also some as objective standards, such 
as the logical relations among propositions, and neither seem to cut across its nature, 
nor pose difficulties to understand how correctness might require us to be moved to 
meet it. For correctness alone makes no such requirement, and we see why what we 
make we may be moved by. But directivity seems as something yet beyond the reach 
of arbitrary construction, and essentially so, whilst requiring us to move to meet the 
objective standards it sets. It is difficult to understand how there could be such a 
feature of the world and how we could have knowledge of it. These are among the 
considerations which led Mackie (1977:35) to propose his error theory of moral 
directivity. 
 
So I claim normativity has two kinds, and there are distinctions within these kinds. 
Within correctness there is constitutive correctness and success correctness. If we 
accept Gert’s distinction, within directivity there is justifying directivity and 
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requiring directivity. Whether the two kinds are exhaustive is not something I want to 
take a position on. For example, consider the debate within philosophy of science 
over whether fundamental natural laws are descriptive or prescriptive. The 
normativity of the latter is posed as analogous to commands of law, and how they 
relate to my distinction depends on what a prescriptivist wishes to make of that 
analogy.  
I have given some argument for the distinction by surveying normativity in a 
variety of philosophical contexts. We have seen clear evidence for it when comparing 
the normativity spoken of in philosophy of mind and language, and that spoken of in 
the philosophy of practical reason, and also in the difference in explanatory 
difficulty. I think this suffices to show that this distinction must be drawn. In the 
remainder of this chapter I shall outline some consequences of the distinction and 
consider some objections.  
2.4 Normative vocabulary 
I think we have to recognise that our normative vocabulary is systematically 
ambiguous. We may be speaking in a correctness mode or a directive mode.  
‘Ought’, ‘reason’, ‘requirement’, ‘prescription’, ‘permission’ and many others have 
both modes, although they sit most happily in their directive uses. But the failure to 
mark the correctness-directivity distinction means that we use them indiscriminately 
to speak of correctness normativity. We sometimes mix the two up and there will be 
occasions when we ought to distinguish them. As we shall see, this is especially so 
when we are concerned with the normativity of rationality.  
The word ‘normative’ has come to be used to attribute directivity, as for example 
in the distinction between motivating and normative reasons, or in the locution ‘x is 
normative for y’. These uses are potentially confusing because of the distinction 
between correctness and directivity. For this reason I have been using ‘directivity’ to 
refer to, and ‘directive’ to attribute normative force. This use involves some 
discomfort, for example, when one considers Raz’s non-mandatory norms and 
normative powers (Raz 1975/1999: 85 ff. & 98 ff.), because direction is allied with 
command and doesn’t resonate with other relevant notions which are within the 
directively normative realm, such as permission, legitimacy and value, for example.  
To encompass the grounds of that discomfort we must understand ‘directive’ (and 
its cognates) as a general term ranging over what ‘normative’ has been taken to range 
over when not confused with correctness, that is, ranging over ‘obliging’ ‘reason 
giving’, ‘permitting’ (and their cognates) and whatever other terms for normative 
forces there may be, and also for those features which relate to legitimacy and value. 
So in remarks such as ‘a directive norm directs one to bring about something’, I 
intend to be understood to be generalising over things one is obliged, or has reason 
to, or merely has permission to, bring about. I concede that this is not altogether 
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happy when the forces are weaker than obligation, but I don’t know of any better 
terminology, and ‘directive’ does have weaker force in some uses, for example, when 
given directions by a policeman he may be doing no more than indicating what is 
permissible. 
From here on, unless otherwise qualified, I shall use ‘ought’, ‘reason’ and 
‘obligation’ (and cognates) in their directive senses and ‘requirement’ in its 
correctness one.  
2.5 Relations of correctness and directivity 
There are many directive norms whose existence may be partly explained by their 
directing the bringing about of particular sorts of correctness. There are two ways of 
regarding the relation between a correctness norm and a directive norm which 
contains the same rule. The first would be to regard the directive norm as entirely 
distinct from the correctness norm. The second would be to regard the directive norm 
as a normatively forceful extension of the correctness norm: the correctness norm is 
‘contained’ by the directive norm and the directive norm ‘extends’ the correctness 
norm.  
The second way of talking is appealing. For example, the correct way of sewing up 
a particular kind of wound will be a member of the relation of correct ways of 
sewing up wounds (which is a sub-relation of the correct ways of sewing). If Fred 
has such a wound then, since the attending surgeon is under a general obligation to 
help Fred, there is a directive norm that directs the surgeon to conform to the 
correctness norm governing sewing up such wounds. 
It makes sense in such a case to speak of the directive norm as being a normatively 
forceful extension of the correctness norm. That it is such is grounded in the relevant 
correctness ‘acquiring’ normative force for reasons external to that correctness, 
although the content of the correctness may be part of the reason the correctness 
norm ‘acquires’ normative force. In most circumstances the surgeon but not the 
seamstress should treat the patient, but the treatment is the correct sewing up of the 
wound.  
In an early analysis of norms by Von Wright (1963), an analysis concurred in more 
recently by Raz, four elements can be distinguished in mandatory norms:  
the deontic operator; the norm subjects, namely the persons required to 
behave in a certain way; the norm act, namely the action which is 
required of them; and the conditions of application, namely the 
circumstances in which they are required to perform the norm action 
(Raz 1975/1999:50).  
Since he is discussing mandatory norms the normative force of the deontic operator 
is one of obligation rather than permission, but clearly such analyses can be extended 
by a range of deontic operators for whatever range of normative forces should be 
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recognised. I largely concur with this analysis, saving that in place of a single kind of 
normative operator we have two kinds, and we complicate the circumstance 
specification.  
For purely heuristic reasons, I am now going to talk about reasons, norms and 
reason relations by identifying them with their extensions, which are tuples and sets 
of tuples. The reason relation is a set of tuples, and each tuple in that set is a 
particular reason type, of which there can be tokens. For the generalist, reason 
relations will contain very many reason tuples; for the particularist, very few, and 
possibly only tokens rather than types. We call the first element of each reason the 
privileged element, being what the reason is about. So reasons for action will have an 
action (type) as their privileged element, whilst valuational reasons will have objects 
or states of affairs (types) as their privileged element. 
Returning to our wound sewing example, in extensional terms we would have a 
relation of the correct way of sewing up wounds, CR, whose members would be 
tuples of the form  
฀〈way of sewing, wound, technological context, skill attributes฀〉  
where each tuple would be a correctness norm. Then we would have an obligation 
relation, OR, whose members would be tuples with the form  
฀〈way of sewing, wound, technological context, skill attributes, treating 
person type, patient type, circumstance type฀〉,  
where each tuple would be a directive norm. I distinguish skill attributes and treating 
person type since, for example, the unqualified but fully trained surgeon may not be 
licensed to treat. Evidently, CR is (extensionally) a subrelation of OR (but not the 
kind of subrelation which is a subset of OR).   
Let the extensional content of a norm be its elements (i.e. the members of the tuple 
that is the extension of the norm) and the intensional content be the rule and its 
intensional contents. We say that one norm extends another norm iff the content of 
the second norm is part of the content of the first norm and occupies the same roles 
in the first norm that it occupies in the second norm. This definition is mostly of 
interest for the meaning it gives to a directive norm extending a correctness norm. 
Such norms I shall call composite directive norms. 
With such understandings of the extensions of CR and OR, and of CR as a 
subrelation of OR, we can see what talking of the correctness norms and the directive 
norms as being distinct might amount to, but that also there is a clear meaning to the 
notion of a directive norm extending a correctness norm. So there need be no 
objection to useful locutions such as a correctness norm acquiring normative force to 
give a directive norm.  
The overlap in the content of some correctness and directive norms explains why 
we might tend to confuse correctness and directive norms: frequently it is the 
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correctness norm that contains the knowledge we make use of when following a 
directive norm. We pay little attention to the other two components, of person types 
and circumstance types, but rather, that we see a situation as belonging to those types 
activates the directive norm for us. For example, giving a warning of danger in 
grammatical English is obliged not by the norms of grammatical English but by the 
situation in which there is a need for the warning. The grammaticality of the warning 
is part of the reason the obligation to be grammatical arises, not because it is 
grammatical but just because there will be no warning unless it is (sufficiently) 
grammatical for the purpose of communication. However, in terms of successfully 
giving the warning, it is the norms of grammaticality on which our (in this case 
regulative) attention is placed. 
2.6 The Basic Mistake  
A common form of philosophical argument shows something to be constituted by 
constituting norms or to have success norms applying to it and continues by 
assuming that the normativity is directive. This amounts to assuming that correctness 
entails directivity. This assumption is not warranted. When it leads to a truth, it is not 
the correctness that entails directivity but the particular nature of the constituted or 
the success that entails directivity. This mistake appears in many arguments about 
normativity and rationality and for that reason I shall call it the Basic Mistake. There 
are many examples of this mistake I would give had I the space. I shall discuss only 
one, because of its significance for the question of the normativity of proper function.  
Gaut says that we should recognise the good and act so as to promote it. He claims 
that 
[t]he property of goodness is…not a mysterious ontological property, 
but a teleological one, and for living beings specifically a biological 
one, which has an explanatory role in the world. (1997:185) 
Need is an evaluative concept which Gaut cashes out in terms of biological 
flourishing. Objections that the evaluative component of biological flourishing can 
be explained away by microbiology and evolution are rejected by him on the grounds 
that  
[m]icrobiological explanations are incomplete unless they include not 
merely how a biological process occurs, but also what the function of 
the process is. The notion of a function possesses a certain kind of 
normativity (things can malfunction), and for familiar reasons has 
evaluative implications (if A has the function of ฀Φ-ing, we know what a 
good A is, and what is good for A). (1997:186 fn.46) 
If we now accept ‘evaluative implications’ as implying directivity, we have the Basic 
Mistake. But that is how we must take it when Gaut moves on to the human case. 
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The picture of value…offered…is that there are objective 
values…which are partly fixed by facts about us as biological entities. 
We are embodied beings, with certain physical and psychological 
needs, and these needs are correlative to the notion of human 
flourishing. What is the good life for us is thus partly determined by 
facts about our nature, including our rational nature. (1997:186-7) 
This move has a structure similar to that commented on by Hume when he said: 
of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations 
of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but it is however of the last consequence. (Hume 1739/1978:3.1.1/469) 
The slide from correctness to directivity in the notion of ‘evaluative implications’ is 
equally imperceptible, and of equal consequence.  
The problem with this ‘good A…good for A’ is that the normativity of this notion 
of goodness is that of proper function. Gaut simply does not consider the question of 
whether this notion of objective value is directive, but simply assumes that it is. But 
if Gaut’s notion of objective value gets us the directivity of practical reason, then we 
should attend to the well-being of the Ebola virus, when clearly we should not. For 
so far as the normativity of function goes, the Ebola virus is a good Ebola virus if it 
functions by invading cells and replicating, and what is good for the Ebola virus is to 
flourish. But both of these goods are thoroughly bad, so far as the directive notion of 
goodness goes.6 So I’m inclined to think that the plausibility of having achieved 
directivity can only be a consequence of the success of the Basic Mistake in helping 
us slide from correctness to directivity. 
So Gaut assumes precisely what is at issue so far as our concerns go, namely, that 
the correctness normativity of proper function is intrinsically directive. It’s possible 
that I am not being entirely fair to Gaut here, since he may feel that he has more to 
say about why human flourishing should be promoted, and is simply trying to 
establish the objectivity of the value of human flourishing. Now, of course there are 
objective facts about the well-being of humans based in our biological nature, but the 
question is whether that well-being is the kind of good that should be promoted. If he 
retreats from taking biological proper function as intrinsically a good which should 
be promoted, he is losing its benefit in providing his wanted objectivity of directive 
value, and instead retreats to a premiss that human flourishing should be promoted. 
But that is what was to be proven. 
It is worth contrasting what Gaut is saying with someone who has made extensive 
use of the same notion of objective value (the good of a being founded in biological 
                                                 
6
 See Williams 1995:236 ff. for more along these lines. 
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nature) in working out a theory of environmental ethics. Taylor similarly takes the 
good of a being to be an objective value. 
all animals…are beings that have a good of their own.…[since] it 
makes perfectly good sense…to speak of what benefits or harms them 
(Taylor 1986:60-72) 
For Taylor, the directive concept of value is the concept of inherent worth. He does 
not argue for the inherent worth of animals but simply takes as a major premiss that 
the individual organisms, species-populations, and biotic communities 
of the Earth…possess…inherent worth. (Taylor 1986:44-6) 
He then draws a sharp distinction: 
The concept of inherent worth must not be confused with the concept 
of the good of a being.….There may…be a reason against…adversely 
affecting the good of living things…but we cannot just assert this…on 
the ground that the living things…have a good of their own. (Taylor 
1986:60-72) 
Taylor is pointing out that the notion of objective value being used by Gaut is not on 
its own directive. 
Apparently many people go along with Gaut here and find that the good of a being 
is an evaluative notion that is directing. Even grant them the restrictions necessary to 
exclude the good of beings like the Ebola virus from counting as having objective 
value, why is that evaluative notion directing? Unless one is willing to assert that the 
good of some beings is primitively directing (surely an implausible position) some 
account must be available of the source of the directivity. So far as I can tell, all such 
accounts must introduce something additional to the mere good of some being in 
order to get a plausible directivity.  
The nature of proper function is what constitutes the possibility of flourishing of 
organic beings and so underpins the notion of there being a good of those beings. 
What is at issue is whether for the class of worthy beings, whose good ought to be 
promoted, the directivity is entailed by the correctness normativity of the relevant 
proper functions. We can ignore instrumental directivity. We are concerned with the 
good of worthy beings being a directive good in and of itself.  
For x to be intrinsically y is for y to be a non-relational property of x, and for x to 
be internally related to y is for it to be impossible for x to be what it is without being 
related to y. If the good of worthy beings is to be a directive good of the kind Gaut 
takes it to be, it must be related to directivity intrinsically or internally. (For if it is 
extrinsically directive, directivity is not a property of the good of worthy beings, and 
then, if it is related externally, it is possible for the good of worthy beings to be what 
it is without being directive.) In either case, we need some explanation of how proper 
function normativity alone is responsible for the directivity. It won’t do to appeal to 
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the nature of the relevant proper functions. The need for such explanation may not 
look pressing whilst the Basic Mistake blurs the boundary between correctness and 
directivity. Repudiate the Basic Mistake, and it looks obvious that if proper function 
normativity alone doesn’t supply directivity, what we have in mind when thinking 
that the good of worthy beings is directive is something about those particular 
beings, something about the particular nature of their goods, their flourishing, their 
proper functions. And that seems entirely appropriate. However, it amounts to 
entirely abandoning the thought that the normativity of proper function is supplying 
the directivity. 
So there is an ambiguity in our evaluative concept of the good. The good of a 
being, its flourishing, is a matter of abundantly fulfilling is proper functions. 
Functions are normative. What is at issue is precisely whether the good of a being is 
a good that ought to be promoted. In the case of the Ebola virus, the answer is 
clearly, no! The good of a being can be a bad thing. The good of proper function may 
have no directive value or negative directive value. So we must conclude that the 
correctness normativity of proper function does not suffice to entail directivity. Nor 
when we restrict the range of beings to those whose good we think ought to be 
promoted could we plausibly derive the directivity from the proper function 
underlying their having a good.  
2.7 Constitutive norms directive? 
Contrary to my characterisation of correctness norms as being constitutive norms 
without normative force, it might be objected that some constitutive norms have 
normative force. Take for example the case of promising. The standard form of a 
constitutive rule is: ‘Doing X counts as Y in context C’(Raz 1975/1999:108). Making 
certain utterances in certain contexts counts as making a promise. There is no way of 
constitutively characterising promising whilst omitting that element of it which is 
about incurring an obligation. So it is not at all obvious that the norms of promising 
could be constituted in terms of composite directive norms which contain distinct 
correctness norms that are constitutive of promissory acts.  
I think that is correct, yet it is not a problem for my distinction. Some directive 
norms are constitutive in this way. I do not claim that all constitutive norms are 
correctness norms, but only that constituting a way of being correct is not sufficient 
to entail normative force, and so not every constitutive norm need be a directive 
norm.  
We have, then, grounds for a pair of distinctions which usually line up but which 
need not. The first is between prime and composite directive norms, where the latter 
extend correctness norms and the former do not. The second is between directive 
norms having normative force for reasons internal or external to their content. 
Primality and internality look as if they go together, pretty much as if the internality 
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explains the primality. For example, that content of the norms of promising which is 
related internally to the directivity could not be removed whilst leaving an intact 
correctness norm. So it looks as if prime directive norms have normative force for 
reasons internal to their content. This could be because, as in the case of promising, 
their content includes obliging, or giving reason, or permitting. It might also be 
because the content has intrinsic value (irrespective of whether it has instrumental 
value as well).  
However, it may be that prime norms and internally directive norms are not co-
extensive. For presumably there could be a composite directive norm which got its 
directivity from the content additional to the content of the correctness norm it 
extends. For example, suppose in the wound treating case one were to think that 
being a surgeon is a status whose duties are intrinsically as opposed to instrumentally 
directive (not all duties of roles are directive— consider the duties of a torturer).  
2.8 Correctness is limited directivity? 
It might be objected that correctness norms are directive, but they have pro tanto 
directivity, or prima facie directivity, or conditional directivity, and that is why they 
may seem to lack directivity whilst in fact possessing it. 
Now were they to have pro tanto directivity they would all be weighed in the 
balance along with all other considerations which have normative force. This can’t 
be right. For were it true we would be under a continual pressure by all the 
correctness norms, when we are not. They just do not enter our deliberation at all 
unless there is some directive reason for their particular correctness to be relevant. 
For example, consider the wound sewing case. Our surgeon faces a continual 
pressure to heal the wounded, but not to do so in any particular way. The particular 
ways only enter deliberation when relevant. So the correctness norms of wound 
sewing do not exert a pro tanto directivity, but acquire it when they bear relevantly 
on the situation.  
A merely prima facie reason may be no reason at all, but one which merely 
appears to be a reason. In this sense correctness norms are indeed prima facie 
directive, since to many they have the appearance of directivity when in fact they 
lack it.  
There are uses of ‘prima facie reason’ which mean something similar to pro tanto 
reason and will fall to the argument of the penultimate paragraph. A prima facie 
reason may be a reason which is defeasible, but which doesn’t cease to be a reason, 
so doesn’t cease to have directivity, just because it is defeated. Ross’s prima facie 
duties are all duties worthy of some consideration without there being a general order 
of priority among them, and for that reason exert continual pressure on deliberation. 
If correctness norms were prima facie directive in these senses we would be under 
their continual pressure, and clearly we are not.  
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So neither a mere appearance sense of prima facie nor a sense in which sustained 
directivity which must be always weighed in the balance are troublesome. However, 
the sense of prima facie reason in which a reason is held to be directive, yet may be 
silenced or excluded on occasion, is more troublesome. The claim here would be that 
in saying correctness norms are not directive I am tacitly appealing to examples 
when the relevant occasions of silence or exclusion are in play and since on such 
occasions the directivity is evidently extinguished, what is left is the mere 
correctness I am talking about. 
One answer would be to accept that correctness norms are directive in this sense. 
For it is a sense in which the directivity is sufficiently external to the correctness that 
it can be extinguished without extinguishing the norm altogether. But is such an 
account really divergent from my position, in which I account for correctness norms 
acquiring directivity in terms of practical reasons for the relevant correctness to be 
instituted? For example, the norms of chess acquire directivity when one has reason 
to play, the force of which is not got from the norms of chess.  
What should be noted about the suggestion that directivity is silenced whilst the 
correctness remains is that it is not related to the standard use of silencing and 
exclusion when speaking of reasons. The standard use is to do with the relations of 
confrontation which may hold between practical reasons that are not in any very 
clear sense comparable with one another. In the case of norms of chess, it doesn’t 
seem that their directivity is present until silenced by the presence of other practical 
reasons: it seems that it is just not there at all. The present suggestion must therefore 
explain this absence in terms of their being permanently silenced or excluded except 
when practical reasons external to them and relevant to having reason to play chess 
permit the silencer to be taken off, the exclusion to be ended. I find that a very 
strained view to maintain when the simpler view (that they lack directivity until they 
acquire it from the reasons to play chess) is available.  
Perhaps at this point Dancy’s distinction between grounding and enabling 
conditions helps my opponent. The norms of chess are the ground for a reason to 
play, which reason does not exist unless the relevant enabling conditions are also in 
place. I am mistaking the absence of those enabling conditions for the absence of 
directivity in the norms of chess. When the enabling conditions are in place, the 
norms of chess are directive in their own right.  
The problem here is that the enabling conditions seem to me to be entirely the 
reasons to play chess. Contrast with the examples that Dancy uses for this distinction 
that England is not sinking beneath the waves today is a consideration 
in the absence of which what explains my actions would be incapable 
of doing so….England’s not submerging today…. is therefore an 
enabling condition (2000b:127) 
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Dancy has reasons to do things which he wouldn’t have if England were sinking, and 
in the absence of the enabling conditions the grounds of those reasons would not 
constitute reasons. The relevant analogy in the chess case is not that my pleasure in 
playing chess (for example) is an enabling condition which allows the grounds (the 
norms of chess) to constitute directive norms in their own right. The relevant analogy 
is that, for example, my not needing a life saving operation allows the grounds of 
having a reason to play chess, namely the pleasure I would get out of it, to constitute 
a reason to play, whereby the norms of chess acquire directivity. 
These replies relied on the claim that when the directivity is silenced or 
extinguished, a correctness norm remained. My opponent may now say that when the 
prima facie directivity of a correctness norm is silenced, no correctness norm 
remains, and in speaking of correctness norms I am appealing to our merely abstract 
knowledge of what the norm would be were it not silenced. Therefore insofar as 
correctness norms exist, they are prima facie directive. This seems unpersuasive to 
me, but I don’t have a short argument against it. Instead I must direct attention to the 
story I give of the relation of rationality and directivity, which extends over the next 
several chapters. In that story, existent correctness norms which lack directivity have 
explanatory work to do, whilst  the picture of prima facie directivity my opponent is 
now offering is a picture of cogs idly turning.  
Finally, we have the challenge of conditional directivity. Correctness norms, it 
might be said, are conditionally directive. My example—if you want a straight line of 
straightness degree x, you ought to use a straight edge of British Standard grade y— 
is about the correctness of that rule having conditional directivity. Wanting a straight 
line is some reason for using the straight edge, and the correctness of the straight 
edge is conditionally directive on that wanting. When you (have reason to) want such 
a straight line, the condition is fulfilled and the norm supplied by the straight edge 
directs you to use it. Likewise, if you want to play chess you ought to follow the 
rules and so the rules of chess are conditionally directive. They give you conditional 
reason to follow them and when you want to play, they become simply directive and 
direct you how to play. 
Let us consider the norms of accurate shooting, or the norms of effective 
poisoning. These also would have to be conditionally directive. We could say that  if 
you want to shoot your wealthy aunt (who has left you all her money in her will) you 
ought to shoot accurately; if you want to poison her, you ought to use cyanide. When 
the condition is fulfilled, the norms are no longer conditionally directive, but simply 
directive.  You want to shoot your aunt and so the norm of accurate shooting is now 
directive and it directs you to shoot her accurately. Broome, for example, thinks that 
the relation of means to ends is strict and so the ought here is all things considered. 
Therefore you ought, all things considered, to shoot her accurately. But plainly you 
ought not. Let us reject the Broomian thought. The directivity of the norm is merely 
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that you have some reason to shoot her accurately. Perhaps its directivity is 
overridden by other considerations. Plainly, that is no improvement. The norm of 
accurate shooting doesn’t constitute a defeasible conditional reason to shoot her 
accurately, but no reason at all. 
Why do the correctness of the straight edge or of the rules of chess seem 
conditionally directive but plainly the norms of the shooter and poisoner do not? The 
simple answer is that the conditional directivity has nothing to do with the 
correctness norms, and everything to do with the end to which they are put. 
Alternatively, it might be said they are conditionally directive, but one of their 
conditions is a standing condition, namely, that the ends in view are permissible. The 
alternative seems merely ad hoc to me. 
In fact, the conditionality of many correctness norms, perhaps especially 
constitutive correctness norms, seems more like the conditionality of some 
categorical reasons. That you ought to feed the poor is conditional on circumstance 
rather than inclination; that you ought to move bishops diagonally is likewise 
conditional on circumstance and quite independent of inclination.  
So we should distinguish the relation that correct guidance offered by correctness 
norms has to legitimate ends from genuinely conditional reasons. That Alfred 
Brendel is playing Beethoven is a conditional reason to go to his concert, if you like 
Beethoven. That the norms of correct engineering recommend using the straight edge 
is not itself a conditional reason, on pain of the norms of poisoning recommending 
cyanide being a conditional reason to give someone cyanide if you want to poison 
them. Conditional reasons for using the straight edge will be conditional reasons for 
the end to which its use contributes. 
There is a further objection to dispel, namely the objection that can be launched on 
the basis of Broome’s normative requirement relation (1999). This will be addressed 
in chapter 8. 
 3 Rationality and Correctness  
3.1 Theoretical autonomy of rationality  
It is difficult to reconcile our knowledge of rationality through our inhabitation of 
the rational order with our knowledge of the natural order. It is difficult to locate 
rationality within our naturalistic accounts of the world. Naturalistic accounts and 
explanations need to be about what is or could be, given in terms of material 
identities and causes. Rational accounts are in terms of agency and reasons. Agents 
are embodied, so subject to material causation, which seems to conflict with 
choosing acts on the basis of reasons.  
It can be argued that rational explanation and causal explanation are incompatible. 
Methodological reasons given are that natural sciences aim at explanation in terms of 
lawful regularity whilst social science aim only ‘to make individual human actions 
intelligible in their particularity’ (Antony 1989:155). Conceptual reasons given are 
that causal explanation involves empirical relations whilst rational explanation 
involves logical relations. Causal relations hold between distinct existents but 
logically related entities do not have the requisite independence. Dancy even 
proposes that rational explanation of action could be non-factive:  
It is not that we need a something to get an action going, i.e. start a 
movement off. The worry is based on the mistaken sense that whatever 
explains an action must be the case, i.e. that all explanation is factive. 
We should abandon this and allow that where someone’s reason for 
acting is something that is not the case, that is exactly what it is— 
something that is not the case. There is no need to look for something 
else that is the case. (Dancy 2000b:147) 
This sounds quite odd, but we must concede many of the points on which it is based. 
Locutions such as ‘their reason was that they believed p although not-p’ can’t be 
taken at face, since (exceptional cases aside) no one takes their belief itself to be a 
reason. It is not my belief that it’s raining that is my reason for putting my raincoat 
on, since I do not take it that it is a mental state of mine which warrants 
waterproofing, but water falling from the sky. So their reason is what they believe, 
even if what they believe is not the case. Nevertheless, even if someone’s reason for 
acting is something that is not the case, we still need something that is the case to 
explain that they acted. If, as Dancy seems to be saying, we cannot now appeal to 
their mental states to explain their action, but continue to explain their action non-
factively in terms of their reason, we seem to end in an extreme Sellarsian divorce of 
the realm of reason from the realm of natural law. I find this quite uncomfortable.  
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The problem of the relation of rational and causal explanation quickly enmeshes us 
in deep metaphysical difficulties. I think, however, they are a distraction from our 
concerns. We are engaged on understanding of rationality autonomously. By that I 
mean that theories of rationality have the same kind of autonomy that for example, 
chemistry has from both physics and molecular biology. Just as in those other 
theories, the concepts used in rational accounts are prima facie independent of other 
theories and may not be explicable in terms outside the theory or independently of 
each other. They constitute a theoretical holism of concepts. It would be desirable to 
understand how these different theories relate to one another, but difficulties in 
getting that understanding do not detract from what can be understood within the 
theory’s own terms. We here are engaged in such an autonomous study, and even 
though we must make use of some of the facts of how the rational order is related to 
the natural order, we are not trying to explain how they are compatible. I simply 
leave hanging all the metaphysical issues, such as reduction, mere supervenience, 
and emergence,  which the relation of rationality to its physical realisation raise. I 
will have to say something about the question of codifiability of rationality, but not 
because we need to concern ourselves with questions about the existence of 
psychophysical laws and the anomalism or otherwise of the mental. 
3.2 Rationality: a system of intentional states 
I think that Pollock correctly categorises rationality as being ‘in a very general 
sense…one solution to the problem of active stability’, where active stability is a 
matter of ‘interacting…with [the] immediate surroundings to make them more 
congenial to…continued survival’ (1999:390). He calls this generic rationality and 
contrasts it with features of human rationality. For example, it appears that for 
humans, ‘modus ponens is among the built in principles, but there is overwhelming 
psychological evidence that modus tollens is not’ (1999:389). I say we should 
understand this contrast as a contrast between rationality and the extent to which 
humans realize rationality, and in so doing I set aside those views which insist 
rationality is only whatever it is in humans. The full extent of the rational order may 
extend well beyond our inhabitation of it and we should allow for that possibility in 
our conceptualisation of it. A fully adequate theory of rational beings need not leave 
the concepts of folk psychology fully intact. Not surprisingly, though, our account of 
the rational order is centred on and is developed out of the region we inhabit. Our 
understanding of rationality is heavily influenced by our having  an introspective 
access to our rational agency. Our main way of making use of rational explanation is 
from the inside, that is, as rational creatures rationalising the manifestations of 
similar creatures.  
Rationality is the system of mental states which as a whole realise Pollock’s 
solution. A rational system of states achieves this solution by its composite states 
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being directed at something other than themselves; that is to say, rationality is a 
system of intentional mental states. As such it is part of what Chalmers calls the easy 
(as opposed to the hard) problem of consciousness (e.g. 2003:103).  
Aristotle took ฀λo฀γo฀ς to be something which distinguished us sharply from the rest 
of the animal kingdom. Today, and for good reason, we are less inclined to think the 
distinction so sharp. Somewhere along our disenchanted chain of being from plants 
to man, somewhere between the natural intentionality of tree rings and our 
intentionality, sufficient complexity of internal states allows the creature to realise in 
some degree, to some extent, a rational system.  
Clearly there are more or less complex rational systems, and perhaps there are 
further distinctions to be made, for example, between the degree of rationality had by 
higher mammals and the further degree of rationality we might require before a 
rational creature could be said to be a rational agent. The capacities that constitute 
rationality appear to have a modularity which may give rise to real differences in 
kind along the way. Davidson is even prepared to deny rationality to anything 
without language, based on the premiss that ‘in order to have a belief it is necessary 
to have the concept of a belief’ (1982:102). I am not concerned to identify the 
extension of ‘rational being’. 
I concur in the holism implicit in Lewis’s remark that ‘The contentful unit is the 
entire system of beliefs and desires’ (1994:324), i.e., the unit of intentionality is the 
entire system of beliefs and desires, not individual beliefs and desires. That is to say, 
intentional states are to be individuated by their contribution to the systems of 
intentional states to which they belong. The content of  individual intentional states is 
the contribution they make to the content of the whole rational states of which they 
are a part. The concepts and principles by which we characterise rationality should 
probably be understood in terms of Putnam’s notion of Law-cluster concepts. We 
have concepts which appear in many principles of rationality which collectively 
determine the identity of the concepts, and yet ‘one should always be suspicious of 
the claim that a principle whose subject term is a Law-cluster concept is analytic’ 
(1975:52).7 
Some take exception to this view, such as Fodor, who whilst also an intentional 
realist, denies holism about rational states, and the Churchlands, who are anti-realist 
about intentionality of this kind, and therefore anti-realist about rationality. I shall not 
concern myself with those views, although I think much of what I have to say is 
compatible with Fodor’s atomism. Nevertheless, I shall in places make significant 
use of the holism of rationality, and of the concomitant theoretical holism of rational 
concepts.  
                                                 
7
 See also Darwall 1978:252 
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3.3 Constituents of rationality 
Constitutive rationality is whatever makes a rational being as such, and the 
conceptual constituents of the theoretical holism of rational concepts are concepts of 
varieties of roles adequate to the very sophisticated kinds of intentionality possible 
for creatures like us. Constitutive rationality is having capacities sufficient for having 
states adequate to fulfilling those roles, or some workable subset of those roles. 
Crudely put, then, constitutive rationality is the capacity to have beliefs, desires and 
feelings, to deliberate and decide, to have intentions and to commit acts. Less crudity 
is got by listing the delicate shadings of states we recognise: inklings, impressions, 
surmises, suspicions; inclinations, affinities, attractions, aversions; sensations, 
emotions, sympathies, revulsions; wonderings, ponderings, reflections, meditations; 
preliminary, tentative, settled and irrevocable intentions; attempts, manipulations, 
performances,  accomplishments. Such is only a beginning to listing the complexity 
of rational possibilities. Nevertheless, for philosophical purposes much work is done 
by the crude distinctions taken somewhat as terms of art: belief as speaking of 
varieties of informational states available in some form to consciousness; desires and 
feelings as varieties of motivational states; feelings also as varieties of evaluative 
states; deliberations and decidings as varieties of reasonings, exercises of faculties of 
theoretical and practical reason, leading to beliefs and intentions; actions as the 
manifestations of rational beings that are correctly joined up to their rational 
capacities.  
The correct spelling out of the relations and content of the terms of art is, 
unsurprisingly, much contested. Valuings (states of valuing) are ambiguously belief 
like or desire like depending partly on the view one takes of motivation (whether 
beliefs can motivate) and for this reason are often equated to beliefs or desires. Some 
philosophers take intentions to be reducible to other states, for example, belief-desire 
pairs (Davidson), cognitive states of holding so as to make true (Velleman and 
perhaps Broome). In the case of action, the common tongue distinguishes a man’s 
thoughts, words and deeds, but all three and more may be counted by philosophers as 
actions. Where bodily motions are involved, is the action a mental event causing the 
bodily motion, or identical to the bodily motion (Davidson 1963), or a complex of a 
mental event and bodily motion (e.g. a trying that usually succeeds (O'Shaughnessy 
1973)), or no kind of event at all? Details of particular proper joinings are supposed 
to determine questions of identity — whether (for example) a bodily motion is (or is 
associated in the right way with) an action, which action it is, which of all its 
consequences are to be counted among the acts of the actor and who that actor is. 
The content of ‘properly joined up to rational capacities’ may be held to be a matter 
of control, guidance and readiness to intervene (Frankfurt 1978), or whether and how 
intended (e.g. a bodily motion under a description (Davidson 1963)), or whether and 
how done for a reason, e.g. caused by a belief-desire pair (Davidson 1963), or 
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perhaps to be accounted for by whatever is the correct account of  the nature of the 
will. 
Continuing with the spelling out of ‘action’ leads on to questions of the 
constitution of agency and agents. One might specify an agent in terms of actions and 
psychological continuities, for example, as being the possessor of a sequence of 
actions, each action joined in particular ways to the rational capacities of a given 
body at a given time, which sequence and capacities maintain a certain sort of 
psychological continuity over time. Such an agent might also be the kind of person 
spoken of by Parfit. On several occasions Parfit mentions that he is not intending an 
eliminativist account of personhood, just one in which there is no special further fact 
about identity such as, for example, would give determinate answers to whether 
someone on the psychological spectrum between himself and Napoleon is the same 
person as him (1987:231). Searle (2001), on the other hand, advances the necessity 
of positing a substantial self to deal with the gap consequent on, as he puts it, the 
causal insufficiency of reasons and intentions, by which he means that we act under 
the idea of freedom and must act on our reasons and enact our intentions. Sense 
cannot be made of these facts unless we include a notion of a substantial self, which I 
understand to be the assertion of something over and above the rational system of 
intentional states. Some spellings out of agency make ineliminable use of directive 
notions, especially as questions of agency lead on to questions of freedom and 
responsibility. For example, Korsgaard’s account of agency is directively normative, 
since choosing is committing oneself to a normative principle that choosing so 
should be a law in these circumstances. 
For my purposes  the crude terms of philosophical art will do, and I shall largely 
confine myself to speaking of beliefs, desires, reasonings, intentions, actions, and 
persons. By ‘persons’ I shall mean rational agents with our kind of rational 
capacities, although much I say would apply equally well to rational beings of 
greater or lesser rational capacities;  in so speaking I intend to speak of their 
rationality as a whole or of their constitutive rationality.  
I intend my mentioning of intentional states to stand for whatever is the right 
account of the intentional constituents of rationality. For example, on some views the 
relevant intentional entities are constituents (in some sense of constituency) of 
propositional attitudes rather than the attitudes themselves: ‘it is concepts that have 
uses or functions or roles in thought, not the possible attitudes in which those 
concepts occur’(Harman 1987:209). If that is the right account, then fine.  
As Evans’ Generality Constraint (1982:75) makes clear, for a state to be a belief 
that Fred is a tortoise requires that the believer have conceptual capacities adequate 
to judging other things of Fred and that other things are tortoises. A belief that cats 
have tails requires that its constituent concepts must play the informational roles of 
‘cat’, ‘having’ and ‘tail’ in other beliefs. But what it is for them to do that? The 
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constituents play those roles by playing a part in other beliefs, which other beliefs 
play a role in the life of the person, in combination with the other mental states, such 
as to make it that these particular constituents are about cats, havings and tails. These 
points hold quite generally for intentional states. Intentional entities such as beliefs, 
desires and actions are constituted by, and get their criteria of identity from, their 
relations with each other and from their roles, which roles cannot be specified 
independently of other intentional entities. Constitutive relations hold between those 
intentional entities, whatever those intentional entities are. 
3.4 Constitutive rationality and proper function rationality 
We now have the resources for a very abstract articulation of rationality itself. 
Being rational is having the capacities which are characterised in terms of 
intentionality and rational agency. These capacities are mostly mental, but also 
involve extensive pre-mental and sub-personal capacities. Rationality itself 
comprises  
CR (constitutive rationality): the capacities sufficient for constituting 
states adequate to playing rational roles, or workable subsets of such 
roles, that is to say, adequate for a system of intentional mental states.  
PFR (proper function rationality): the proper functioning of such 
capacities and states. 
CR licenses the distinction between rational and arational, PFR the distinction 
between rational and irrational. The distinction between CR and PFR is similar to the 
distinction sometimes made between capacity rationality and procedural rationality 
(e.g. Raz 1999b), although I don’t think that procedural rationality properly captures 
the full extent of proper functioning.  
Having capacities mentioned in CR is what being a rational being amounts to. That 
is what constitutive rationality is. Instrumental rationality, rationality of belief, sound 
practical and theoretical reasoning are examples of the proper functioning of rational 
capacities. Principles of rationality amount to specifications of the constituting 
relations of the theoretical holism of rational concepts, which specification gives us a 
specification of the capacities of constitutive rationality, and specifications of the 
proper functioning of those capacities. The normativity of such principles is 
apparently constitutive correctness and success correctness respectively.  
Rational capacities can be greater or lesser in a number of ways. First of all, they 
can be such as to allow more or fewer kinds of rational states, for example, more or 
less fine grain in kinds of informational states. Secondly, each kind of capacity can 
be of greater or lesser power, which manifests in speed of operation, degrees of 
complexity and sheer quantity of the associated kind of rational states. Thirdly, they 
can be of different orders, for example, some being concerned with commerce with 
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the world, others with the internal rational economy. The success of rational states 
achieving their ends is itself partly a matter of harmonious functioning and a certain 
sufficiency of harmonious functioning, which is a kind of success of rational states, 
is (at least partly) constitutive of a rational being.  
CR and PFR are not fully independent. In chess there are the rules which constitute 
chess (which include a single rule which stipulate that checkmate is the goal and 
achieving it constitutes winning) and there are norms of successful play which 
constitute playing well. The constitutive rules can be given quite independently of 
the goal and also of norms of good play. One might even renounce any goal (perhaps 
if the King couldn’t move out of check then the game would simply stop), and still 
have a variety of chess (call it aimless chess). Aimless chess would lack success 
correctness, but retain constitutive correctness.  
On the one hand, the distinction between being rational (constitutive correctness) 
and being successfully rational (success correctness) exists just because being 
rational is partly constituted by having the capacity to have goals. Having goals 
means having the possibility of better or worse pursuit of those goals, which is to say, 
having the possibility of success correctness. On the other hand, the constitution of 
rational capacities cannot be separated from their successful deployment and what 
they aim at in the way that aimless chess could be regarded as an independently 
existing part of or precursor to chess.  
Consider beliefs. What it is for states to be beliefs, and the criteria of identity of 
beliefs, cannot be given independently of the purpose of having beliefs and of 
playing certain roles in a rational economy. Consequently, constitutive correctness 
for belief cannot be separated neatly into criteria for being a belief and criteria for 
being a belief that achieves an aim of belief. The aim of belief cannot be added to the 
constitution of belief in the simple way that checkmate as a goal can be added to 
aimless chess. The constitutive criteria of being a belief cannot be given 
independently of criteria of successful deployment of belief. So constitutive 
correctness for belief cannot be separated neatly from success correctness.  
So we have reason to think that the relation between CR and PFR is internal, 
perhaps a matter of partial identity. Constitution of rational states is not distinct from 
achieving a certain degree of proper functioning of those states. Sufficient failure of 
proper function itself amounts to undermining constitution. This may be a matter of 
only certain kinds of proper function. For example, if it were proper functioning of 
rational relations between kinds of states rather than the proper function of kinds of 
states then perhaps if instrumental beliefs fail to play the proper role in action the 
constitution of rationality is weakened, whilst if those same beliefs are lacking in 
epistemic rationality it may have no effect on constitution. Alternatively, it may be 
that all failures of proper function weaken or undermine constitution. Consequently it 
is not always easy to distinguish constitutive and success failures of rationality. 
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Somewhere the irrational shades into the non-rational, and a sufficient deterioration 
of rational capacities leaves only a primitively animated thing. 
 
Many philosophers are inclined to take reason to be the entirety of rationality. I 
don’t think it is a mere terminological disagreement to reject that identification. For 
much of what is said about rationality does not make sense in terms of a restriction of 
rationality to reason nor is all irrationality a failure of reason. What I would contend 
is that most uses of rationality can be understood in terms of restrictions of CR+PFR 
and that consequently CR+PFR is the correct general conception. I want now to 
discuss briefly how it relates to Grice’s classification of kinds of theories of 
rationality. 
Grice discusses a distinction between flat and variable rationality and distinguishes 
two pictures of rationality.  Picture 1 presents variable rationality as ‘a dimension of  
or excellence…derivable’ from ‘flat…basic…non-valuational…[rationality] central 
to the type Rational Being’. Picture 2  holds that ‘any flat concept there may be will 
not be basic, but will…arise from a variable concept of rationality by the imposition 
thereon of one or another form of limitation’ (2001:28) as in the relation between 
largeness and large. I think my position is compatible with either of these pictures, 
but it seems to be in the spirit of picture 1. Grice poses some difficulties for picture 
1: 
[It is]…highly schematic…. [It] seems to leave undetermined…crucial 
items:…[no] specification of variable rationality;…[nor of how] to 
establish…dimensions of excellence;…[no] identification…of flat 
rationality….. Until these gaps are filled (it may be said) there is no 
thesis to discuss. (2001:29) 
His response is to suggest that  
Picture (1) is better regarded as a research project….Without 
having…any…clear idea of the proper way to characterize…variable 
rationality; we obtain, from intuition or from the standard assumptions 
made by philosophers…some set of qualities which appear to be 
intellectual excellences, and also to be of a kind which, intuitively, 
ought to be established as excellences by the method sketched in 
Picture (1), if any excellences are so attributable. (2001:30) 
I’d be prepared to accept that this is indeed part of the methodology which 
investigations into the substance of rationality must use. I am therefore happy if 
CR+PFR is understood in this kind of a way: a characterisation of the broad outline 
of rationality, better regarded as a characterisation adequate to a research programme 
rather than a completed outcome of such a programme; capturing enough truth for 
certain kinds of conclusions to be drawn, but with a continuing necessity to start 
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some kinds of investigation into CR+PFR in the middle of intuitions and 
assumptions in the way Grice is outlining, rather than now being in possession of 
basic principles as grounds for further research. 
The reason I think that CR+PFR may be compatible with picture 2 is also a reason 
which weakens the claim that it should be understood as a picture 1 type account. It 
appears to be possible to have states which are closer or further away from realising 
rational states, and that consequently realisation of constitutive rationality can itself 
be a matter of degree. For example, perhaps the right way to understand certain 
severe mental illnesses, or certain states of irrational belief, is not as failures of 
proper function but as failures of the constitutive capacities for intentional states. The 
persons concerned do not have intentional mental states, but states that are only 
quasi-mental states.  Consequently, being a rational system may be a vague property, 
a matter of degree, and rationality is constituted by being within a certain range of 
such states.  
An example of what I mean here can be got out of Ramsey’s ‘theory of 
probability…as the logic of partial belief’ (Ramsey 1926:53). I’m going to call this 
theory of probability ‘Ramsey’s decision theory’. Ramsey’s theory, says Mellor 
(1990 & 2003), is a purely descriptive rather than normative theory. Ramsey shows 
us how, given knowledge of your preferences, which preferences satisfy certain 
formal constraints (call such preferences coherent), we can calculate by use of 
probability theory both your degrees of belief and your valuations of outcomes. It 
does not, says Mellor, tell us ‘whether or not those thoughts and desires are either 
reasonable or right’ (1990:xviii). 
So in Ramsey’s theory it is a further matter whether the beliefs and desires are 
what they ought to be. But if we are to take it as a descriptive theory of mental states, 
it is expressing some kind of a constraint of rationality. What kind? Since it is not 
about whether the states are achieving their aim it is not a constraint of rational 
success but of rational constitution. Ramsey’s theory presupposes certain constitutive 
relations between beliefs desires and actions and it makes coherent preferences a 
constitutive constraint on beliefs and desires.  
If your preferences are coherent then you have beliefs and valuations. But what if 
they are not? Probably they are not!8 If your preferences are incoherent there is no 
way (within this theory) of attributing beliefs and desires to you on the basis of your 
preferences. Yet we might not want to say that you are arational. Some kind of 
system of some kind of intentional mental states is in operation.  
With a variable notion of constitutive rationality, we have a way round this. The 
distinction between rationality and arationality is itself one of degree, the intensity to 
                                                 
8
 Although see Blackburn 2000:169 for an argument that options must always be sufficiently 
fine-grained to rule out incoherence (e.g by distinguishing aspects or relations under which 
evaluated). 
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which rationality is realised. Beliefs and desires are had to certain degrees, but 
additionally, are variably constituted, have intensity of realization. Coherent 
preference implies maximal intensity. Incoherence means the intensity of beliefs and 
desire are less than maximal. So we must now be able to calculate both degrees of 
belief an desire and also intensity of belief and desire. Presented with a set of 
preferences we calculate Ramsey’s degrees of belief and desire from each different 
coherent and maximal subset of preferences.9 We would then determine degree of 
belief and intensity of belief like this.  
Degree of belief in  p = average of probabilities for p.  
Intensity of belief in p = (the measure of the coherent subsets for which 
the probability of p is greater than a half)฀÷(the measure of coherent 
subsets)  
Similar notions for desire are easily formulated. Discarding those intensities equal to 
zero and taking the average of the remainder would give us a measure of intensity of 
constitutive rationality, which would be 1 for anyone with coherent preferences.10 In 
this sense, we start from a variable notion of constitutive rationality, intensity, and 
the flat concept of being rational would be a matter of achieving a certain intensity. 
Thus we have a notion of rationality as in Grice’s picture 2 which is consistent with a 
Ramseyian way of interpreting CR+PFR.  
Clarifications 
Before we move on, I want to make a few clarifications of how I intend CR+PFR 
to be understood. When I speak of functional roles, I mean the rational roles that 
intentional mental states have in relation to each other qua constituents of a rational 
system of intentional mental states. I am committed to the teleology of their 
individual purposes,  their purposes in relation to each other and the teleology of a 
rational system being a way of achieving active stability in the world. Because of this 
I feel entitled to speak freely of beliefs aiming at the truth, for example, because a 
functional role of beliefs in relation to other mental states is informational, and is 
successfully fulfilled when beliefs are true. However, I am not trying to get out of the 
                                                 
9
 There is only one coherent and maximal subset of preference when the preferences are 
coherent, namely, the whole set of preferences. It might turn out neater not to bother with 
maximality, and simply take each coherent subset iff the whole set is incoherent, and 
otherwise take the whole coherent set alone. 
10
 Intensities of zero discarded because for the coherent person, for each p, if P(p) ฀≥1/2 then 
P(¬p)<1/2 and the intensity of rationality of ¬p = 0, when taking average = 1/2. But there 
would also be incoherent persons whose average would be close to ½. So instead by 
discarding  intensities of zero we consider only the average intensity of rationality for those p 
which have something going for them in coherent subsets that are not null in the relevant 
measure space. 
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circle of rational concepts or explain how intentional mental states and rational 
agency can be realized.  
Unfortunately, my talk of functional roles and of the proper function of rational 
capacities and states may mislead. For example, it would be natural to understand 
much of what I say in terms of functionalism about the mind. The functionalist 
proposes that mental states and their rational relations and proper functions are 
isomorphic to a structure of physical states and causal roles. That the functional roles 
of the former are fulfilled by the functional roles of the latter is his explanation of the 
realization of mentality. However, functionalism has, on some views, rejected the 
notion of beliefs aiming at truth, because aiming at truth is not needed to characterise 
their individuating causal role, a role they play whether or not they are true. Rather, it 
is merely that typically their truth conditions obtain (are present in the environment, 
if appropriate) when they obtain, and it is the typicality alone which individuates the 
belief. But I shall make use of the aim of belief, and if such a functionalism is true 
then I may have to work to reconcile what I base on that premiss with the truth.  
An influential account of intentionality in terms of proper function is that given by 
Millikan (1984). Millikan explains how intentional states have their proper functions 
by explaining intentionality in terms of biological proper function determined by 
history. Again, by proper function rationality I do not mean to commit myself to a 
variety of teleological semantics. In my terms, she is explaining how the capacities 
and proper functions of rationality can be realised by biological functions.  
In general, then, I do not intend to be committing myself to any particular theory 
that explains how a rational system of intentional mental states is realized, and most 
particularly do not intend to commit myself to these theories which make use of a 
similar vocabulary. From the point of view of the project in the philosophy of mind 
of explaining intentionality, I am relying on truths which I take to characterise the 
explanandum, not offering any explananda. I am committed to intentional realism, 
and to certain holistic relations between intentional mental states, but not, if possible, 
to any particular variety, nor to any particular position about the nature of 
representation.  
Codifiability of rationality 
Similarly, I do not intend to take a position about the codifiability of rationality. As 
Child remarks 
to say that rationality is uncodifiable is not necessarily to say that there 
can be absolutely no true, exceptionless principles of rationality 
(1993:219) 
I shall be talking about rational norms, some of which may be general or even 
universal, but this does not commit me to the notion that rationality can be 
completely codified. As I said earlier, talk of norms and the normative is talk 
3.4 Constitutive rationality and proper function rationality 
 
 
48
frequently intended to generalise systematically about principles and reasons without 
always intending thereby to assert the existence of related rule-like entities or 
principles of a universal nature. It is supposed to be available for both particularists 
and generalists, to concede where it should that ‘our discussion will be adequate if it 
has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of’ (Aristotle 19891094b12/2-3). 
McDowell is no less concerned with norms and normativity just because he says that  
however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases 
would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules 
would strike one as wrong….because one’s mind on the matter was not 
susceptible of capture in any universal formula. (1979:336) 
Freedom and accountability to norms  
A final clarification is about the relation of norms, control and accountability. For 
example, Wedgwood captures a pervasive thought when he says 
certain concepts are normative because it is a constitutive feature of 
these concepts that they play a regulative role in certain practices. 
(2002:268). 
Although proposing it only as a sufficient condition for normativity, one might well 
think that it was also a necessary condition on rational and directive norms (that they 
play such a regulative role). In the literature on reason the nature of normativity is 
much bound up with the question of control. Norms are supposed to offer guidance 
and explain varieties of criticism, capture various dimensions of responsibility and 
explain varieties of blameworthiness. If, however, our rationality or our ends are not 
things over which we have control, the relevance of rational and directive norms may 
be felt to be moot. For example, what relevance can epistemic norms have, how can 
we be held responsible for our beliefs, if what we believe is not under our control?  
Owens thinks that this very thought has misled our thinking about epistemology 
and is a significant premiss in the sceptic’s case. Freedom is a matter of what is 
subject to the control of our will, and not, says Owens, just whatever is produced by 
our will. Owens argues that something is subject to control via our will only if it is 
being ‘governed by practical norms’ (2000:80). The will is not subject to the will, so 
being in control is being reflectively motivated by forming practical judgements of 
what we ought to do. So we have a juridical responsibility for our actions.  
Owens argues that whilst a juridical theory of responsibility is correct for practical 
reason, it is not correct for theoretical reason. We are in control in practical reason by 
coming to judge that we ought to do something, and we can properly make this 
judgement even when we lack conclusive reasons to do that thing. Therefore 
reflective motivation can properly control action by reflectively motivating action. 
To fully believe, however, requires being able to claim knowledge, and ‘knowledge 
claims are rationally motivated by considerations reflection on which could not 
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rationally motivate a knowledge claim’ (Owens 2000:39 my emphasis). This sounds 
a bit odd, but the point is that inconclusive evidence can motivate a belief that one 
has conclusive grounds, and since conclusive grounds are sufficient for knowledge, 
this is sufficient for being able to claim knowledge, so sufficient for full belief. But 
since reflection on one’s evidence makes it clear that the evidence is not conclusive, 
reflection could not motivate full belief because one would have to judge that one 
had inconclusive evidence. Therefore reflective motivation is not a way one could be 
in control of belief.  
But Owens does not think this means one cannot be responsible for belief. One is 
responsible for many things which are not under even indirect control (Owens 
2000:117 ff.). Consequently,  
Some norms are not there to guide action, to govern the exercise of 
control: their function is to assess what we are….the key concept for 
any theory of responsibility should be responsiveness to reasons, not 
agency or control. (Owens 2000:126) 
I am not going to attempt any assessment of Owens’ argument here (but see 5.5). 
Whether one agrees with his general conclusions, I think Owens shows that rational 
and directive norms come to bear on an extent of life wider than is under our control, 
whilst illustrating the subtlety and various significances of the relation of norms and 
control. I am, however, going to make some remarks on the range of ways in which 
way it is possible to be accountable to a rational or directive norm.  
A norm to which we may be accountable, perhaps a norm which is constitutive of 
our rationality, or which regulates a human practice, sets a standard. Conforming to 
the norm we achieve the standard. Failing to conform to it may still be a matter of 
succeeding in participating in the relevant human practice: when I misspell a word I 
am still writing. We may conform to the norm better or worse, more or less skilfully. 
A norm may require training to learn how to conform to it, but once learnt it may be 
conformed to intentionally yet automatically: the machinery is allowed to run, but it 
is monitored. Some of this would seem to apply to the heart beating or to a 
mechanical lathe following a pattern. Correct functioning of the heart can be 
characterised in terms of conforming to a norm, but it not so clear the heart is being 
guided by or is accountable to a norm when it functions correctly. Normativity seems 
to require more than merely conforming to a rule. At least, it requires that what is 
done in conformity is done so because it is in conformity to the norm. Call that the 
Normative conformity principle: conformity to a norm is normative iff 
what is done in conformity is done so because it is in conformity to the 
norm. 
I am going to suggest that there are broadly two ways that rational norms explain 
conformity: the first is available for conscious creatures, the second only for self-
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conscious creatures. A norm may be what it is in part because some relations between 
facts or events are ways for things to go right for creatures (call such relations 
success relations) and those ways of going right for creatures can be possessed as 
information by those creatures.11 When that is the case, one way for the norm to be a 
cause is for that information to be a cause. There are many ways in which that 
information can be information for the creature and partake in causing its actions, 
and on those many ways different gradations of rationality will depend.  
Suppose first of all that the success relations between fact or events which make 
the norm what it is have not become information for that animal and yet the creature 
acts in a way that is successful because of that relation. This gives us what I think is 
the weakest possible rationality. In this case the creature is not obeying the normative 
conformity principle: what is being done is in conformity with the norm, but not 
because it is in conformity. However, one way the information might be acquired is 
by accidentally conforming and noting the success. Railton’s ‘wants/interests 
mechanism’  (1986:179) seems to depend on this possibility. 
Were the history right, so that the relations between fact or events which constitute 
part of  that success relation have become information for that animal, then it is 
possible for the success relation to be among the causes of their action. When it is I 
think we could say that the act of the creature concerned was a rational act in 
accordance with the norm, because in obeying the normative conformity principle, 
the norm was among the causes of the act. It obeyed the normative conformity 
principle because (1) the action was appropriate given the beliefs and desires which 
caused the action, (2) the relations that in part constitute the appropriacy are 
information for the creature and that information was among the causes of the action. 
I am going to call cases of this sort of normative conformity cases of being prodded 
by a norm: 
A creature is prodded by a norm N, where N is suitably related to a 
success relation C iff it obeys the normative conformity principle in 
virtue of the creature possessing information of some relevant 
constituents of C and that information is among the causes of the 
conformity to the norm 
Being prodded by a norm is as rational as most merely conscious creatures can 
manage. The norms to do with simple constitution of perceptual beliefs, memory and 
desires are possessed as information by them in virtue of their being rational 
creatures, but that information, whilst controlling the interaction of their belief, 
desires and manifestations, is not accessible to the creature. Nothing here could count 
as awareness of reasons qua reasons, and the creature’s intentional states are 
                                                 
11
 Having a true belief is sufficient but not necessary for being in possession of information. 
All that is necessary is that the information can play a role qua information. 
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therefore not properly represented as being motivated by reasons as such. Such 
creatures are only primitively rational because they lack the reflective consciousness 
that allows actions and beliefs to be motivated by practical and theoretical reasons as 
such, and so makes evaluation and criticism in terms of such norms meaningful. 
Consequently, this is where the boundary of reason is often drawn.  
To be more than prodded by a norm requires reflective consciousness and certain 
conceptual capacities. On those conceptual capacities will depend a range of 
capacities to conform to the norm. At the lowest level would be the capacities 
adequate to inductive learning and the capacities for basic practical and theoretical 
reasoning. With such capacities there need not be any appreciation of the norm as a 
norm. Nevertheless, one might reason correctly in accordance with relevant rational 
norms because one knows how to reason in accordance with those norms. We could 
call this being led by a norm. If additionally one has true beliefs about those norms, 
which true beliefs support in some extended sense the knowing how, we might call 
this following a norm. Finally, if those true beliefs support the know how in a fairly 
immediate sense, I think we have what we might call being guided by a norm. 
A person is guided a norm iff they obey the normative conformity 
principle in virtue of knowing how to conform to the norm, having a 
true belief about the norm, which true belief supports the knowing how 
by being within at least the penumbra of their reflective consciousness 
whilst conforming to the norm. 
I am deliberately leaving open the further question, addressed by Owens, of whether 
in the cases of practical and theoretical reasoning, the outcomes are motivated by 
reflective control (as he maintains for practical judgement) or (as he maintains for 
theoretical judgement) just by pondering on the matter resulting in the reasons 
possessed motivating belief independently of a reflective judgement about what 
ought to be believed. My position is only that having the capacity to be guided by 
norms is sufficient for our being fully accountable to them, even when most of the 
time we are merely prodded, led or follow them. The capacity to follow norms is 
sufficient for quite high levels of accountability. Irrationality of the kind which 
undermines accountability does so at first by attacking the support given by true 
beliefs to knowing how.  
3.5 Substantive rationality 
I need to make a point about substantive rationality. Substantive rationality is a full 
bloodedly directive notion of rationality. It presents worthiness of end as a matter of 
rationality.  
To be substantively rational, we must care about certain things, such as 
our own well-being. (Parfit 1997:101) 
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There is what I shall call a thin directive use of ‘substantive rationality’ which 
consists in making the plausible claim that practical reason should seek to bring 
about certain good or desirable ends, and then just calling those ends the rational 
ends because they are the ends which practical reason should hold in view. For 
example: 
we ordinarily think the rationality of doing A in order that E depends 
not on the likelihood of attaining E alone, but on the desirability or 
goodness of attaining E as well.…perhaps some such goods, health and 
enjoyment and knowledge and the like, have as obvious a prima facie 
practical relevance as anything, and in this need and admit of no further 
justification (Pink 2003:812). 
If we do ordinarily think like this, it is not because it is clear that rationality itself 
prescribes health, enjoyment, et cetera, but only because they seem obviously worthy 
ends. Another example of thin substantive rationality is when requirements of 
prudence, conceived in terms of the legitimate interests of a typical person, are talked 
of as rational requirements.  
Thin notions of substantive rationality are not objectionable, although they are 
partly responsible for the terminological difficulties in our discussion. A great many 
uses of the word ‘rational’ as  term of approbation or evaluation, and much talk of the 
directive norms of practical reason as rational norms, are nothing more than thin 
directive uses of the notion of rationality and should be contrasted both with what I 
called earlier the friendly uses of the term and with what is needed by the rationalist. 
The thick directive use of  ‘substantive rationality’ is one in which it is taken that a 
normatively directive substantive end or a normatively directive substantive 
principle, such as a moral principle, is given to us by rationality itself. Thick uses 
require a burden of proof to be fulfilled if they are to be warranted uses. Some 
independent characterization of rationality is required, and a demonstration that 
certain ends, or certain principles for determining ends, are directively required by 
rationality. Fulfilling that burden would amount to showing that rationality is 
intrinsically directive, and so would be sufficient to prove rationalism true.  
So we must distinguish between thin and thick substantive rationality, between 
which ‘substantively rationality’ is ambiguous. We must be on our guard against thin 
substantive rationality masquerading as thick. Mere insistence that worthy ends are 
rational requirements is insufficient to show that rationality is intrinsically directive, 
and easily becomes dogmatism. It is always a further step to show that rationality 
itself requires worthy ends. 
3.6 Normativity of rationality is correctness 
I think what I have said above makes it clear in what way CR+PFR  give us the 
bare bones of what many philosophers of mind would be willing to accept, even if it 
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has not been explicitly articulated by them. From hereon, when I speak of rationality 
itself, or of rationality unqualifiedly, and of rational motivators, I mean only what is 
licensed by CR+PFR. We have seen that the notion of substantive rationality requires 
careful handling. It is not evident that CR+PFR licences thick substantive rationality, 
and thin substantive rationality is irrelevant to our concerns.  
Being rational as opposed to arational amounts to a kind of constitutive 
correctness, namely of satisfying whatever constitutes having those capacities and 
states. Being rational as opposed to irrational amounts to a kind of proper 
functioning. The normativity of proper function is at least success correctness (a 
good heart) but need not be a kind of directive normativity (a good Ebola virus). 
Prima facie, then, the normativity of rationality is not directive but only constitutive 
correctness and success correctness. Prima facie, the third premiss of my argument 
for instrumentalism is true.  
I have allowed, however, that whilst correctness need not be directive, it is 
possible for particular kinds of correctness to be directive. The further elements in 
establishing the third premiss are as I outlined them earlier: The second element, in 
chapters 4 and 5, is my defence to direct objections to the normativity of rationality 
being correctness alone. The third element, part of the work of chapters 6 to 8, is that 
taking rationality to have intrinsic directivity confronts a serious difficulty which can 
be resolved by taking its normativity to be correctness alone. The final element, in 
chapters 9 to 10, is my resistance to rationalist arguments that some part of 
rationality is intrinsically directive. Before we set out on those further elements, I 
shall now discuss briefly how practical reason looks in the light of the distinctions I 
have drawn and show how the first win for rationalism is thereby defeated. 
3.7 Normativity, rationality and practical reason 
When we take directivity to be the force of reasons in practical reason we attribute 
to it an internal connection to rationality, if only the purely formal relation that being 
rational is in part having the capacity for features of the world to be directive 
reasons. Moreover, if directive properties are not worldly features, that internality 
must amount to rationality being the ground of directivity somehow or other. 
Consequently, when we try to address the relation of rationality and normativity we 
are set to engage with some obscurities.  
Typical in the literature are remarks such as ‘the virtuous person is someone who 
knows what one ought to do, what practical rationality requires’ (Child 1993:217). 
This way of putting the matter could be taken to express a commitment to virtue 
being a requirement of rationality, that everyone has rational motivation to be 
virtuous. But that is not a commitment which people necessarily intend to take on 
just by characterising approaches to how to live in terms of practical reason. They 
may intend only to distinguish the concerns of the faculties of practical and 
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theoretical reason. Nevertheless, the terminology subtly begs the question at issue 
between Humeans and others — the question of whether deciding how properly to 
live is subject to reason.  
Foot analyses some such difficulties when pointing out the Janus faces of 
‘ought’,12 the non-hypothetical uses which need not imply reasons for someone 
subject to the obligation versus the hypothetical uses which do. Foot thinks it might 
help to give up the non-hypothetical use of ‘ought’ which does not imply reasons (by 
which she means only desire based and interest based reasons), for the sake of 
preserving the clear link to rational motivation had by hypothetical uses. We might 
also stop talking in terms of practical reason.  But that would also mean giving up the 
uses of ‘ought’ and ‘reasons’ which imply legitimacy, and practical reason as 
including the concerns of what properly to do, restricting it to questions of rational 
motivation.  
There are good reasons why normative talk wears a Janus face. We need to recall 
the distinction drawn by Woods 
the concept of a reason for an action stands at the point of 
intersection…between the theory of the explanation of actions and the 
theory of their justification (Woods 1972:189) 
The reason you do something may explain why you did it, but need not justify that 
you did it. However, the explanation of bodily motions as rational actions is not 
independent of the notion of justification. If your action is to be rational then it is 
done for reasons. The reasons for which you acted may explain why you acted. A 
condition on this being an explanation of rational action is that were the reasons for 
which you acted good reasons, then your action would have been justified (setting 
aside deviant causation of the action by the reason). Thus Smith distinguishes ‘two 
quite different concepts of a reason for action’ (Smith 1994: 95), motivating reasons 
and normative reasons, where the former depend ‘on whether we emphasise the 
explanatory dimension and downplay the justificatory’ (Smith 1994:95) and the latter 
depend on reversing that emphasis.  
The problem is that talk of reasons and talk of ‘being normative’ is sometimes talk 
of rational motivation and sometimes talk of legitimate motivation. Because we are 
frequently concerned with the desirability of being rationally motivated by what we 
ought (directively) to be motivated by, it is natural that the terminology of oughts and 
reasons should tend to subsume both. However, for our concerns we must be careful 
to distinguish them.  
A rational motivator will motivate a person when they are rational. A legitimate 
motivator is something which ought to motivate a person. For someone who is 
rational and whose desires are as they ought to be, the legitimate motivators are their 
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 see especially Foot 1975:177ff. 
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rational motivators. Because of the last fact, the notions and vocabulary of 
normativity confuse these normativities of rationality and legitimacy and can lead us 
into difficulties when we fail to distinguish arguments about what are the rational 
motivators, the requirements of rationality, from arguments about what are the 
legitimate motivators, directive requirements.  
The sense of ‘ought’ which relates to rational motivators is only an indication of 
what you are already committed to as a consequence of being a rational creature. It is 
about the functional coherence of your beliefs, desires and actions. Adhering to a 
rational motivator is a requirement of constitution or proper function of a rational 
system of intentional mental states. Failure to adhere amounts to failure (to some 
degree) of rational constitution or rational function. That is why I said a rational 
motivator will motivate a rational person.  
The sense of ‘ought’ which relates to legitimate motivators need have nothing to 
do with what you already want, but is concerned with what you ought to want, what 
is legitimate to want, what desires are desirable. A person ought to be so motivated, 
but functional coherence of beliefs desires and actions need not result in them being 
so motivated unless their desires are as they ought to be. Failure to adhere need say 
nothing about failure of rational constitution or function, but may say a great deal 
about culpable failings of character.  
We thereby distinguish rational requirements from legitimate requirements. When 
it comes to action, rational requirements motivate and rationally motivate, whilst 
directive requirements legitimately motivate and ought to rationally motivate. A 
rational motivator is a reason only in the correctness sense and a legitimate motivator 
is a reason only in the directive sense.  
Thus can we make less obscure our discussion of practical reason. Where practical 
reason is the rational faculty engaged on deciding what to do, we are concerned with 
correctness normativity. The reasons and obligations are matters of rational 
motivators. Where practical reason is understood as the realm of deciding how 
properly to live in the broadest sense, we are concerned with directive normativity. 
The reasons and obligations are matters of legitimate motivators. For the person who 
is as they directively ought to be, their rational motivators will be the legitimate 
motivators that apply to them. Our special concern with people being as they ought 
to be leads us to talk in terms of this potential unity of rational and legitimate 
motivators by uniting our vocabulary of reasons, obligations and practical reason.  
So construed, metaethical disputes can be formulated in terms of the ground for 
ethical directivity. For example, Kantians and Humeans can  argue over whether 
rationality is the source of ethical directivity or whether the passions are, without the 
Humeans having to strain to avoid the vocabulary of practical reason. The alternative 
seems to be to construe the debate in terms of affirming or denying the existence of 
practical reason, and whilst there are contexts in which that works well enough, it 
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restricts the Humean in a way he need not accept. Hume’s notion that ‘passions can 
be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany’d with some judgement or 
opinion’ (1739/1978:416) can be maintained, whilst making some room for an 
engagement of reason in deciding what we ought to do, thereby acknowledging what 
seems to be true, that such decisions involve judgements. The Humean can offer an 
account of the faculty of practical reason as the complex deployment of sensibility 
and reason, in which practical  judgements are not pure cognitive states but complex 
states of conation and cognition, arising from complex processes of both feeling and 
rational deliberation. The grounds of ethical directivity are the passions, which are 
yet served by reason.  
Finally, the question of internalism and externalism about reasons is independent 
of the distinction between rational and legitimate motivators. Correctness reasons 
(rational motivators) may be desire based (internalism) or interest based (external). 
Directive reasons (legitimate motivators) may be internal (as both Humeans and 
Kantians can agree) or external (Hobbesians and some moral realists, e.g. Brink 
1986). 
3.8 Refuting the first win 
The argument for the first win is this: Reasons are rational requirements; reasons 
settle what ought to be done; therefore rationality settles what ought to be done and 
must for that reason be intrinsically obliging. The first premiss speaks of rational 
motivators whilst the second of legitimate motivators. But whether the latter are a 
kind of the former is exactly the issue between the instrumentalist and the rationalist, 
and so cannot simply be assumed. The argument as it stands is question begging. If 
we take the falsity of rationalist directivity as a premiss, the argument is equivocal if 
the premisses are interpreted so as to be true, and under that interpretation the 
conclusion is false. The sense in which the first premiss is true is that in which 
rational motivators are correctness reasons, whilst the sense in which the second is 
true is that in which legitimate motivators are directive reasons. Correctness reasons 
as such do not settle what ought to be done.  
The rationalist will continue the argument on the grounds that the rational 
motivators, when properly understood, do in fact determine legitimate motivation, so 
that even granting that some rational motivators may be purely correctness reasons, 
the full extent of rational motivators includes legitimate motivators, includes 
directive requirements. This is his solution to the problem of justifying morality. It is 
supposed to make being moral something you are already committed to simply in 
virtue of being a rational creature. Therefore some rational motivators are reasons in 
the directive sense. The rationalist attempts to make this argument by showing that 
undeniably moral principles are derivable from principles that are uncontroversially 
pure principles of rationality. In this way, the rationalist intends to ground practical 
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reasons in requirements of rationality. (By practical reasons I mean only the pure 
practical reasons which determine the legitimacy of ends, as opposed to instrumental 
practical reasons.)  
What is not in dispute is that practical reasons are directive, that is to say, are 
legitimate motivators, are what we ought to be motivated by. Until chapter 9 I shall 
simply assume that practical reasons are not requirements of rationality. Making this 
assumption is, of course, begging the question against the rationalist, but I shall be 
dealing with rationalist arguments on their own terms later.  
 4 Morality and Correctness 
4.1 Introduction  
A simple way to defeat my argument for instrumentalism is to prove false the 
second premiss, that obligations as such are directive. Now a dispute over the second 
premiss could easily descend into a mere terminological dispute. It might be said that 
certain obligations may not be directive, for example, legal obligations under 
wickedly illegitimate law, and therefore some obligations are not directive, so my 
premiss is false. But that would be to ignore the nature of the notion of directivity, 
namely that it generalises over legitimate considerations of whatever kinds there are. 
One could reasonably say that legal obligations under a wickedly illegitimate law are 
not merely considerations outweighed by other considerations, but are not genuine 
obligations at all. So we can explain this kind of example in terms of the two modes 
of normative vocabulary: ‘obligation’ has a correctness sense, and uses with such a 
sense do not settle whether such an obligation in that sense is genuine, but my 
premiss concerns itself only with the normativity of genuine obligations.  
What would not be a terminological dispute would be to show that ethical 
obligations are not directive. I say ethical rather than moral because I mean 
something as broad as Williams intends when he contrasts ethics with ‘morality 
as…a particular variety of ethical thought’ (1985:174). The point of the notion of 
directivity is partly to encompass Williams’ thought, to allow that moral 
considerations are not the only proper determinants of what to do, that other 
considerations are not subsumed within moral duty and whatever liberty its 
permissions provide, that their legitimacy with respect to and determinative force 
upon what to do is not merely a proxy granted them by moral considerations, but is 
had in its own right.  
For the reasons just given I think there are a wider range of directive obligations 
than ethical obligations. Nevertheless, ethical obligations are paradigmatically 
legitimate obligations, and were it shown that they are not directive then my 
distinction between correctness and directivity has collapsed in a most significant 
region. Furthermore, my strategy to support Hume’s view of the relation of ethical 
obligation and reason would thereby have collapsed. 
I have framed this discussion so far as directed at the second premiss, but clearly 
the crucial problem that arises is the danger of the collapse of the distinction between 
the normativity of rationality and the normativity of ethics, and from that point of 
view it might be a mere terminological difference whether one takes such a collapse 
to falsify the second premiss or rather the third (the normativity of rationality is 
correctness). I have phrased it in terms of the second premiss here because the two 
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positions I am going to consider immediately are best represented as threatening 
collapse by threatening the directivity of ethical obligation. The alternative collapse, 
that the normativity of rationality is directive, is dealt with partly in the next chapter, 
when we consider two areas in which it may seem to be, and also in the final 
chapters dealing with rationalists on their own grounds. As I showed in the first 
chapter, someone who wants to ground ethical obligation in rationality must take 
rationality as primitively determinative of what properly to do, and so rationalists are 
committed to rationality being directive. 
4.2 Foot 
Foot asks what it is about morality that is supposed to give reasons to all as 
opposed to giving reasons only to those who care about moral ends— in the jargon, 
that makes moral imperatives categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives. Her 
first point is that a non-hypothetical use of ‘ought’ in moral judgements explains 
nothing. Her second point is that no other explanation she has been given of the 
‘ought’ in moral judgements warrants the claim that morality provides reasons for all. 
Her final point is that this need not be a cause for alarm, that morality as a system of 
hypothetical imperatives is not the worse for being as such.  
We have hypothetical and non-hypothetical uses of ought. Hypothetical uses are 
frequently withdrawn in the face of new information about the agent’s desires, 
interests or plans. For example  
we have advised a traveller that he should take a certain train, believing 
him to be journeying to his home. If we find that he has decided to go 
elsewhere, we will most likely have to take back what we said 
(1972:159) 
In the case of moral judgements, we ‘do not have to back up what we say by 
considerations about his interests or desires’ (1972:159) and will not withdraw the 
‘ought’ just because we find out, for example, that the agent does not care about 
moral ends. But this non-hypothetical usage cannot ground  the special 
unconditionality that is asserted of moral requirements (that they are reasons for all 
irrespective of inclination). The same non-hypothetical use appears in the judgements 
of etiquette, and yet ‘considerations of etiquette do not have any automatic reason 
giving force’ (1972:160). That is to say, the imperatives of etiquette are hypothetical 
in the relevant sense, despite the presence of  non-hypothetical oughts.  
What else, then, grounds the categoricity of moral requirements? Nothing, says 
Foot. Whilst   
it is supposed that moral considerations necessarily give reason for 
acting to any man (1972:161) 
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this supposition is unexplained and unjustified, and attempts to support it either 
amount to covert appeals to non-hypothetical uses of ‘ought’ or appeal to our feelings 
about morality, neither of which can provide the support needed. Kant himself holds 
that moral rules are ‘universally valid… inescapable…that no one can contract out of 
morality’ (1972:171). This is true insofar as ‘moral epithets…do not cease to apply to 
a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality’  (1972:172). But this 
inescapability  is equally true of etiquette, so can be granted by Foot without granting 
that the categoricity of morality has been explained. Foot concludes that ‘no one who 
rejects Kant’s attempt to derive morality from reason has been given any reason to 
reject the hypothetical imperative in morals’ (1972:172). 
Foot’s moral man is moral because he cares about moral ends. His charity, honesty, 
and justice need not arise from ulterior motives, and according to Foot it is Kant’s 
psychological hedonism ‘in respect of all actions except those done for the sake of 
the moral law’ (1972:165) which prevents him from seeing this. Because the moral 
man cares about moral ends, ‘but not because he ought’ (1972:167), moral 
considerations are reasons for him. 
What about the ‘duty to adopt’ (1972:166) moral ends? Surely the point is that 
irrespective of what he cares about, ‘he ought to care’ (1972:166)? In response, Foot 
wields her fork.  
Either the ‘ought’ means ‘morally ought’ or ‘ought from a moral point 
of view’ or else it does not. If it does we have a tautological principle. 
If it does not the problem is to know what is being said. By hypothesis 
a prudential ‘ought’ is not intended here, or one related to others of the 
agent's contingent ends. Nor do we have the ‘ought’ … operating 
within …some system of institutional rules. This ‘ought’ …is supposed 
to be free floating and unsubscripted, and I have never found anyone 
who could explain the use of the word in such a context (1972:169) 
Either we have a mere reiteration of a non-hypothetical use of ought, but such uses 
‘do not carry with them the implication of reasons for acting’ (1975:177) or we have 
reliance on ‘an illusion, as if trying to give the moral ‘ought’ a magic force’ 
(1972:167).  
Why might Foot’s position be a problem for me? First of all, it may appear that the 
notion of directivity amounts to an illusory notion of a magic force. Secondly, Foot 
presents ‘moral principles as hypothetical rules of conduct’(1972:166). On pain of 
any old set of rules being able to oblige, she presents morality as a system of 
correctness norms about which one might care, suggesting that all directivity is 
hypothetical. In either case, the intrinsic directivity of ethical obligations seems to be 
in danger of evaporating. 
Foot is partly arguing about what reasons there are, and her answer is that ‘reasons 
depend either on the agent’s interest…or else on his desires’ (1978b:156). For Foot, 
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insofar as ‘ought’ judgements imply reasons for actions they imply conclusive 
reasons of these kinds. But these are hypothetical reasons, not reasons for all, and in 
the absence of some further satisfactory explanation of why moral ‘ought’s imply 
some other kind of reasons, the use of the non-hypothetical ‘ought’ in morality is a 
use which results in ‘the loss of the usual connexion between what one should do and  
what one has reason to do’ (1972:168).  
Clearly Foot’s reasons for action are standard kinds of reasons: desire based and 
interest based hypothetical reasons of instrumental rationality, which relate an agent’s 
ends of desire and interest to means to those ends. Is Foot saying that directivity is a 
matter of hypothetical reasons, and that a moral system of correctness norms might 
be adopted by agents as their ends, if they cared about the moral ends served by those 
correctness norms? If so I would have the matter entirely back to front, for then 
directivity is entirely sourced in the rationality of hypothetical reasons whilst ethical 
normativity is intrinsically correctness.  
I think the key here is the ambiguity in notions of ‘being normative’, ‘normative 
force’, ‘reasons’ and ‘ought’ which I discussed in 3.7 above. These notions are 
variously used for what motivates, for what legitimately motivates, for what 
rationally motivates and for what ought rationally to motivate. My notion of 
directivity is supposed to help disambiguate these notions so we can mark more 
accurately the relation between rationality and normativity. I distinguish rational 
requirements from directive requirements. When it comes to action, rational 
requirements are rational motivators, whilst directive requirements are legitimate 
motivators which ought to rationally motivate.  
With Foot we have returned to the use of ‘reasons’ for rational requirements. This 
is clear if we focus on the contrast between motivation and legitimacy. Only rational 
creatures can be motivated and when their rationality is functioning properly they are 
rationally motivated. Rational motivation certainly includes being motivated by 
desires and perhaps also by interests. But Foot is not saying that being rationally 
motivated is being legitimately motivated. Otherwise she would think that the 
wicked man who rationally pursues his wicked desires is not a villain, but he ‘can be 
convicted of villainy’ (1972:161). Rather, she is questioning the assumption that 
legitimacy provides rational motivation for all.  
So Foot’s hypothetical reasons do not grant legitimacy, merely rationality, and so 
are not directive (in the relevant sense) since they do not confer legitimacy on 
whatever they motivate. Their normativity is correctness alone and so I have no 
difficulty in accepting them as rational requirements. Of course, it is possible to take 
the position that desire based or interest based reasons are the source of directivity, 
but that is an entirely different question, and is not Foot’s position. It will later be 
evident why such a position would not make rationality intrinsically directive. 
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In the meantime, though, if the normativity of Foot’s hypothetical reasons is only 
correctness, and morality is merely a system of correctness norms about which one 
might care, the distinction between the normativities of rationality and morality has 
collapsed, so I am in trouble. 
I think the answer here turns on how to understand what Foot wants to say about 
unsubscripted and subscripted oughts. In arguing that moral ‘ought’s do not carry the 
implication of hypothetical reasons she is not abandoning the notion of a moral point 
of view, nor is she abandoning the importance of the moral point of view. She is 
simply objecting to the mystification implicit in unexplained claims that the moral 
point of view provides reasons for all. Finding no satisfactory explanations, and 
finding no justification for the notion of unsubscripted oughts, she abandons only the 
notion of an absolute legitimacy, in terms of which subscripted ‘ought’s might imply 
categorical reasons. Of course, if you think that moral considerations are the source 
of absolute legitimacy, you may not be happy about this. But in abandoning the 
notion of absolute legitimacy, Foot is not abandoning the notion of legitimacy. 
Actions continue to be right or wrong, and the directive force of these moral notions 
does not vanish just because Foot denies the existence of an overarching normative 
point of view from which all the others can be assessed authoritatively.  Abandoning 
absolute legitimacy does not diminish the significance of inhabiting a moral point of 
view, an aesthetic point of view, the point of view of etiquette. It is, rather, granting 
them their several legitimacies whilst denying that there is an independent point of 
view from which to sort out the conflicts that arise. This is entirely compatible with 
my notion of directivity, since it is just a particular position about the nature of 
directivity and about its relation to rationality, namely that kinds of directivity are 
radically incomparable and only those who care about a species of directivity will be 
rationally motivated by it.  
It might be objected that Foot grants this legitimacy of point of view to any view 
which gets expressed by use of non-hypothetical oughts, however whacky or 
arbitrary, so this notion of legitimacy is too cheap. It does not amount to a kind of 
directivity adequate to a significant correctness-directivity distinction. The answer to 
this objection is to consider what it is like to inhabit points of view which provide 
substantive notions of legitimacy. Foot suggests that ‘we must start from the fact that 
some people do care about [moral ends] and even devote their lives to them’ 
(1972:170). Not just any set of stipulated rules expressed by subscripted non-
hypothetical ‘ought’s can constitute a point of view we can occupy in the way of 
inhabiting a point of view having its own substantive legitimacy, a point of view we 
can commit ourselves to, care about, accept being directed by, urge on others, defend 
in the arena of competing directivities. They have to resonate with us, and ultimately 
that means resonate with our needs and possible satisfactions in some extended 
sense. Only such points of view have the legitimacy that distinguishes directivity. 
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And Foot’s point is only that more than this is not available. Only those who care 
about these points of view have reasons to do what ought to be done from that point 
of view, in the sense of reason which can be explained in terms of rational 
requirement. But that doesn’t undermine the substantive legitimacy which can be had 
by such points of view, and those which have it are directive, in a particular way, to 
some degree.  
4.3 Railton 
I now want to consider problems for my position which may appear to arise on the 
basis of naturalistic moral realism: that moral properties and normative facts either 
are identical to or at least weakly supervene upon natural properties. The distinction 
between identity and weak supervenience marks the distinction between (vindicative) 
reductive naturalism and non-reductive naturalism. Weak supervenience, such as 
proposed by Cornell realists, would seem to require accepting that the acknowledged 
conflicts between rationality and morality, the difficulties in interpreting each in 
terms of the other, makes for a prima facie distinction between their normativity, 
since these are the facts of the very kind which are appealed to in order for weak 
supervenience to justify non-reductive and non-equivalence theses. Reductive 
naturalism, however, by identifying normative facts with natural facts, tends 
immediately to undermine the claimed distinction between the normativities of 
rationality and morality. I am going to discuss Railton’s reductive naturalism about 
normative facts, as developed in his paper ‘Moral realism’ (1986). 
Railton’s naturalistic moral realism proposes ‘a synthetic identification of the 
property of moral value with a complex non-moral property’ (1993:317). Railton’s 
approach is to take what he calls 
the generic stratagem of naturalistic realism…to postulate a realm of 
facts in virtue of the contribution they would make to the a posteriori 
explanation of certain features of our experience (1986:171-2). 
He  proposes criteria of independence and feedback apply to the postulated realm of 
facts. Independence is existence independent of whether we think it exists and 
feedback is whether ‘we are able to interact with it, and this interaction’ (1986:172) 
results in it having some effect on us. Of particular interest to us are his arguments 
directed towards naturalistic realism about normativity:  
my naturalistic moral realism commits me to the view that facts about 
what ought to be the case are facts of a special kind about the way 
things are. (1986:185) 
Railton first explains why he thinks normative facts of individual rationality are 
natural facts and then extends that account to encompass moral norms. 
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I am not concerned to assess Railton’s argument for normative realism, but only to 
consider what kind of a problem his position poses me if successful. I shall therefore 
outline Railton’s argument for his normative realism about individual rationality 
because it is clearer and more defensible (as he himself acknowledges) than his 
argument for normative moral realism. I shall then say enough to make clear what his 
normative moral realism amounts to, before considering its bearing on my position. 
Railton accepts that instrumental rationality is ‘the clearest notion we have of what 
it is for an agent to have reasons to act’ (1986:166). He proposes that an individual’s 
objective interests are what a fully rational and vividly informed version of 
themselves would want for them as currently placed. He argues for the existence of a 
wants/interest mechanism by which our objective interests can influence our desires 
independently of our beliefs about our interests. (He thus fulfils his two criteria for 
the existence of objective interests.) 
Criterial explanation is explaining  
why something happened by reference to a relevant criterion, given the 
existence of a process that in effect selects for (or against) phenomena 
that more (or less) closely approximate this criterion. Although the 
criterion is defined naturalistically, it may at the same time be of a kind 
to have a regulative role in human practice. (1986:186) 
Railton uses the existence of criterial explanation of behaviour in terms of the norms 
of individual rationality to argue for normative realism about individual rationality.  
The argument for…realism about individual rationality is…the 
argument for the double claim that the relevant conception of 
instrumental individual rationality has both explanatory power and the 
sort of commendatory force a theory of reasons must possess. 
(1986:189) 
We explain individual behaviour in terms of an individual’s actual beliefs and 
desires. We can explain the relative success of an individual’s pursuit of his goals in 
terms of degree of instrumental rationality and rationality of belief. Significantly  
although we are all imperfect deliberators, our behaviour may come to 
embody habits or strategies that enable us to approximate optimal 
rationality more closely than our deliberative defects would lead one to 
expect. (1986:187) 
Selective reinforcement due to the self-defeating property of instrumental 
irrationality pushes us to more rational strategies without the change being mediated 
by beliefs about the relative rationality of the strategies. Consequently the 
explanation for the change is that the new behaviour prevails because it is more 
rational, rather than because we think it is more rational. These thoughts show how 
norms of individual rationality fulfil Railton’s criteria of independence and feedback.  
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Furthermore,  
our tendency through experience to develop rational habits and 
strategies may cooperate with the wants/interests mechanism to provide 
the basis for an extended form of criterial explanation, in which an 
individual's rationality is assessed not relative to his occurrent beliefs 
and desires, but relative to his objective interests. (1986:188) 
So Railton has put forward a naturalist realism for both subjective and objective 
norms of rationality, by which I mean, relative to the agent’s occurrent ends and 
objective interests, respectively.  
Railton accounts for ‘the normative force of these theories of individual 
rationality’ (1986:188) by tracing ‘the normative and explanatory roles of the 
instrumental conception of rationality …to their common ground: the human 
motivational system’ (1986:188-9). We have ends, act in their pursuit, are directly 
influencable by our objective interests and rational norms in the ways explained. 
Criterial explanation in terms of rational norms is thereby able to make use of ‘what 
does-in-fact or can-in-principle motivate agents’ (1986:189). Hence  
facts exist about what individuals have reason to do, facts that may be 
substantially independent of, and more normatively compelling than, an 
agent's occurrent conception of his reasons. (1986:189) 
Moral evaluation is concerned with conduct, character and outcomes when the 
interests of more than one person are at stake, where strength, prestige and prudence 
have no presumed precedence and where ‘criteria of choice…are non-indexical 
and…comprehensive’ (1986:189). Railton therefore proposes that  
moral norms reflect…rationality…from what might be called a social 
point of view. (1986:190) 
This is compatible with a variety of normative ethics. Opting for a particular 
conception of rationality will bring substantive moral content. Railton proposes  
an idealization of the notion of social rationality by considering what 
would be rationally approved of were the interests of all potentially 
affected individuals counted equally under circumstances of full and 
vivid information. (1986:190) 
Railton has accepted instrumental rationality. Consequently being rational from a 
social point of view is being instrumentally rational, the end in view being 
‘consequentialist, aggregative and maximising’(1986:190 fn. 31) of individual 
objective interests, which latter are the non-moral good. That is to say, moral 
rightness is ‘what is [instrumentally] rational from a social point of view with regard 
to the realization of intrinsic non-moral goodness’ (1986:191). 
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Railton then sets out to give an argument for normative moral realism with the 
same form as the argument from normative rational realism, by showing how moral 
norms fulfil a criterial explanatory role. For example, by showing that ‘discontent 
may arise because a society departs from social rationality, but not as a result of a 
belief that this is the case’ (1986:191), and showing how moral rightness might have 
a regulative influence, also independent of beliefs about moral rightness: ‘we may 
assign this [feedback] mechanism a role in a qualified process of moral 
learning’(1986:195). How successful his argument is depends in the end on how 
successful the use of his moral norms in criterial explanation is: ‘a very large 
question beyond my competence to answer’ (1986:197). In addition to his examples, 
he suggests some historical trends offer some support: the increased generality and 
humanization of moral discourse over time and the explanation of patterns of 
variation in what are taken to be moral principles between one society and another. 
As I said, I shall neither outline nor discuss that argument, but grant it for the sake of 
considering my position in the light of naturalistic metaethics. Likewise I shall grant 
his account of non-moral good in terms of objective interest and his 
consequentialism: that moral rightness is maximisation of aggregate intrinsic non-
moral goods of persons. 
Why might Railton’s position be a problem for me? Firstly, because his moral 
norms appear to be merely a kind of norm of instrumental rationality, whilst I want to 
distinguish the correctness of norms of rationality from the directivity of moral 
norms. More broadly, because his normative facts are just naturalistic facts of a 
complex kind, which is to say, facts of the same kind, it is less clear that we can 
make a distinction between facts of correctness normativity and facts of directive 
normativity.  
First problem 
It is sometimes claimed that an instrumental principle that is indifferent to the 
status or worthiness of the end to which it recommends means is not an instrumental 
principle properly so called. Rather, the normativity of instrumental principles 
recommending means to ends intrinsically involve the nature of the ends as well, and 
so various kind of end each have their own correlate instrumental principles. This 
‘end involving’ premiss is a necessary premiss if the point about moral norms being a 
kind of norm of instrumental rationality is to cause me difficulty. But I reject this 
premiss. My warrant for rejecting the premiss is contained in my later arguments that 
taking rationality to have intrinsic directivity confronts a serious difficulty. Here I 
shall confine myself to explaining the consequence of rejecting it.  
Rejecting the ‘end involving’ premiss means that the normativity of ends and the 
normativity of pure instrumental principles of rationality need have nothing to do 
with one another. Consequently I can say that Railton’s moral norms necessarily 
involve instrumental norms merely because instrumental rationality is required to 
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achieve what he puts forward as moral rightness: the end of maximising aggregative 
intrinsic non-moral good. But that doesn’t make the moral norms themselves a kind 
of instrumental norm, nor does it mean that instrumental norms to do with means to 
the moral good are moral norms, but is just an example of rationality as the servant 
of morality. The moral component isn’t an instrumental norm at all, but just the 
norms to do with the nature of the end, the end at which right action is directed. The 
moral norms will be to do with the proper aggregation of individual non-moral good 
and with orderings of those aggregations. The instrumental norms will be about 
means to those ends.  
The notion of maximising is especially liable to confuse the moral and 
instrumental norms by confusing the basis for the ordering of aggregations with the 
practicality of achieving particular aggregations. There are in addition what I call 
composite instrumental principles which are concerned with the transmission of the 
normativity of the end to the means. These are about rationality’s servanthood, and 
do not make rationality the source of the normativity it transmits. To say that 
Railton’s moral norms are a kind of instrumental norm amounts to confusing these 
three different kinds of norms, perhaps especially by thinking that the moral norms 
are the composite instrumental norms and that there aren’t any other norms around.  
It seems to me that Railton is very close to doing precisely this when he fails to 
distinguish  the work done by his consequentialism and the needed aggregative 
principles from the work done by instrumental rationality. The locution ‘rational 
from a social point of view’ simply muddles these up by confusing the instrumental 
pursuit of the moral good with a substantive theory of the rationality of ends. 
Furthermore, Railton does not give an account of aggregative principles, but merely 
a footnote which blurs the issue further by suggesting that assessment under 
conditions of full rationality and vivid information would play a role in determining 
aggregation.  
The root of these confusions is that Railton puts forward objective interests as an 
account of non-moral value, and then doesn’t consider carefully the question of 
whether the relation of non-moral value to legitimacy is intrinsic or extrinsic. 
Consequently Railton muddles the issues with which we are concerned because he 
fails to consider the question of the legitimacy of what I would want if I were fully 
rational and vividly informed, and for that reason his position is inconsistent.  
On the one hand, there is what I would want for myself, which determines my 
objective interests, which are supposed to be a kind of non-moral good-for-me. From 
his later remarks stating that morality overrides individual objective interest, it 
appears that we need not think that individual objective interests must turn out to be 
desirable interests, either for me or for anybody else. Good-for-me may be bad for 
everyone else. Furthermore, good-for-me need not be directively good for me either. 
There is no implication that objective interests are worthy interests because being 
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fully rational and vividly informed doesn’t entail having worthy motivations. There 
is no reason to think that Hume’s sensible knave would be any less knavish were he 
to follow his objective interests, since they are only what he would want for himself 
were he fully rational and informed. Fully rational and vividly informed means only 
having 
unqualified cognitive and imaginative powers, and full factual and 
nomological information about his physical and psychological 
constitution, capacities, circumstances, history, and so on. (1986:173-4) 
Nothing about this need result in a reform in his willingness to ‘observe the general 
rule and take advantage of all the exceptions’ (Hume 1777/1975b:IX.II/283). It 
would just make him more astute at appearing virtuous whilst taking advantage.  
So the good-for-me, my objective interests, need not be a legitimate good of any 
kind, for me or anybody else and so need not imply anything for what should be 
promoted. Something being an objective interest is neutral with respect to the 
question of its legitimacy. There is nothing wrong with this notion of objective 
interest, provide one remains clear that such objective interests do not acquire even 
so little as pro tanto legitimacy in virtue of being objective interests. But on this 
point, Railton wobbles. For Railton proposes objective interests as an account of 
non-moral value, but the notion of non-moral value is ambiguous with respect to 
legitimacy.  
The objective interests of the sensible knave have non-moral value for him, but 
being objective interests does not make them legitimate, any more than the good of 
an Ebola virus is a legitimate good. In both cases we have only correctness 
normativity in the notions of value and good in play. But in the only remark Railton 
makes about aggregative principles, he envisages a role for fully rational and vividly 
informed assessment in comparison and aggregation. Railton doesn’t discuss 
aggregative principles, but merely states in a footnote that ‘a rather strong thesis of 
interpersonal comparison is needed here for purposes of social 
aggregation’(1986:190 fn. 31), that he is not assuming a single good underlying 
comparisons but is 
assuming that when a choice is faced between satisfying interest X of A 
vs. satisfying interest Y of B, answers to the question “All else equal, 
would it matter more to me if I were A to have X satisfied than if I were 
B to have Y satisfied?” will be relatively determinate and stable across 
individuals under conditions of full and vivid information. (1986:191 
fn. 31) 
So now, fully rational and vividly informed deliberation seems to be part of a 
substantive theory of rationality, part of the basis for determining comparison and 
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legitimate aggregation. This is not consistent with the legitimacy neutral account of 
objective interests in terms of fully rational and vividly informed deliberation.  
I think we see here a very common vacillation about the nature of the normativity 
of the outcome of fully rational and informed deliberation, where to make it plausible 
that it has determinate outcome little weight is placed on the legitimacy of the 
outcome and much weight on it being a matter of it still being me, just under better 
conditions, deciding what I want. Later on, when greater weight is wanted on the 
legitimacy of the outcome, we ease into not just me deciding under better conditions, 
but a better me deciding under better conditions. Thus does this kind of account slip 
from rationality whose normativity is correctness,  to rationality determining which 
outcomes are directive, from instrumental rationality to thick substantive rationality. 
But it hasn’t been warranted. 
It is a perennial hope that objective interests of Railton’s sort would turn out to be 
desirable interests, that the immoral could be shown to be irrational on the basis of 
fully rational and vividly informed deliberation alone. But there doesn’t seem to be 
any reason to think that what Stalin wanted for himself on this basis would be less 
wicked than what he actually wanted. Equally there doesn’t seem to be much reason 
to think that Stalin would order other people’s interest in a satisfactory way either. 
We know he didn’t, and the reason he didn’t was not only because of failures of 
reasoning or lack of information. So I am unconvinced that Railton can help himself 
to the thought that outcomes of deliberation under conditions of fully rational and 
vivid information give Railton the notion of value and legitimacy he needs for his 
aggregative principles. It is a fair notion of objective interest, but whether someone’s 
objective interests as determined by this process are genuinely valuable depends not 
on fully rational and vividly informed deliberation alone but on who they are in the 
first place. If they are rightly motivated in the first place, they may well be genuinely 
valuable, but if not, they may well not. How do we now characterise ‘rightly 
motivated’ except in terms of the very legitimacy this notion of substantive 
rationality was supposed to supply? So whatever Railton’s principles of aggregation 
and comparison are, he has not established that they are principles of rationality.  
Finally, it might appear that the consequentialist notion of aggregation of outcome 
must depend on objective interests having an explanatorily prior intrinsic pro tanto 
legitimacy, for why else should ‘the interests of all potentially affected individuals 
[be] counted equally’ (1986:190)? I shall shortly be dealing with the appearance of 
pro tanto directivity for rational requirements, which might here include objective 
interests. Certainly, interests have to get counted somehow. But pro tanto legitimacy 
for Railton’s objective interests quickly runs into difficulty. Surely Stalin’s sadistic 
interest is not a legitimate interest which is merely outweighed by the interests of his 
victims, but lacks any intrinsic legitimacy at all. Railton’s slipperiness over the 
nature of non-moral value leads him to neglect this question. Nevertheless, his stated 
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desire to find only ‘plausible connections…between…what is good and right 
and…what characteristically motivates individuals’ (1986:203) can be satisfied by an 
extrinsic account of legitimacy for objective interest. For example, interests acquire 
pro tanto legitimacy in virtue of the extent of aggregations taken part in and the place 
of those aggregations in the general order of aggregations. For example, a simple 
notion of pro tanto legitimacy would be that interest A outweighs interest B iff all the 
aggregations in which A is satisfied whilst B is not come higher in the general order 
than the aggregations in which B is satisfied whilst A is not.  
Consequently, insofar as objective interests are determined by rationality, they do 
not have intrinsic legitimacy. If objective interests do have intrinsic legitimacy, then 
something additional to the rational norms at play in fully rational and vividly 
informed deliberation is constraining the motivations had by the agent so 
deliberating, and without a thick substantive account of rationality, those constraints 
are not rational constraints.  
There is therefore no reason to think that Railton’s moral norms are instrumental 
norms properly so-called, nor are they a norm of rationality unless he claims that his 
teleological principle, moral rightness maximises the intrinsic non-moral good, and 
the aggregative principles, are rational principles. But without argument that would 
be mere stipulation. He might be understood to be putting forward a substantive 
theory of rationality in terms of objective interests having non-moral value with 
intrinsic legitimacy, in which case some objective norms of rationality (the norms to 
do with bringing about objective interests that are genuine values) are among the 
moral norms. But the sensible knave and Stalin cases make that look doubtful. We 
best understand him as granting no intrinsic legitimacy to objective interests, but 
rather, he is simply putting forward the standard consequence of consequentialism: 
that right actions will be actions which are means to the moral good. The moral good 
is determined by principles of aggregation of our interests, interests whose 
legitimacy is not intrinsic but is acquired via their relation to the aggregations of 
which they are a part. 
Railton’s concerns are quite different from ours. He is not concerned with 
distinguishing the status of instrumental norms at the service of the individual non-
moral good to the same norms at the service of the moral good. He is concerned with 
the problem of the metaphysical status of moral facts and properties in particular and 
of normative facts in general. This takes us on to the broader problem, of making a 
distinction between facts of correctness normativity and facts of directive 
normativity when they are all just naturalistic facts of a complex kind.  
Second problem 
In aid of moral realism Railton is arguing that normative facts are a complex kind 
of natural fact, but he is not suggesting that normative facts being natural facts means 
that the distinction between normative facts and other natural facts is without 
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significance. Likewise, just because norms of individual rationality and moral norms 
are both kinds of natural fact doesn’t mean he thinks the distinction between them is 
without significance. This returns us to the need to distinguish uses of the notion of 
normative force between those which are about rational motivation and those which 
are about legitimate motivation. The normativity of Railton’s rational norms is to do 
with rational motivation and not legitimate motivation, and of his moral norms vice 
versa.   
In his earlier use: ‘the normative force of these theories of individual rationality’ 
(1986:188), the notion of normative force is concerned only with the rational 
motivation we have to pursue our actual ends or our individual objective interests. 
He is not granting our actual ends legitimacy just because they are ends. With 
Railton’s notion of objective interests we may think we have reached a kind of 
legitimacy, but as already explained, we haven’t. Furthermore, even if objective 
interests had intrinsic legitimacy, Railton’s objective rational norms are not norms of 
legitimate motivation for the reasons I gave earlier. On Railton’s account the intrinsic 
legitimacy is not determined by a substantive account of rationality so Railton’s 
objective rational norms are instrumental norms alone. The normativity of ends is not 
an intrinsic part of the normativity of pure instrumental norms and composite 
instrumental norms are norms about rationality’s servanthood, are about the 
transmission of legitimacy of ends to means, so not about rationality intrinsically 
determining legitimate motivation.  
In Railton’s later use of ‘normative force’, he is concerned with moral legitimacy. 
He explicitly contrasts this with rational motivation: 
on the present account rational motivation is not a precondition of 
moral obligation. For example, it could truthfully be said that I ought to 
be more generous even though greater generosity would not help me to 
promote my existing ends, or even to satisfy my objective interests. 
This could be so because what it would be morally right for me to do 
depends upon what is rational from a point of view that includes, but is 
not exhausted by, my own. (1986:201) 
He discusses the worry that if moral evaluations lack categorical force ‘the authority 
of morality would be lost’ (1986:201). His answer makes clear that he is not 
envisaging that his naturalism about rational and moral norms amounts to a loss of 
distinction in their normative status: ‘variations in personal desires cannot license 
exemption from moral obligation’ (1986:203).  
while it certainly is a limitation of the argument made here that it does 
not yield a conception of moral imperatives as categorical, that may be 
a limitation we can live with and still accord morality the scope and 
dignity it traditionally has enjoyed. Moreover, it may be a limitation we 
must live with. For how many among us can convince ourselves that 
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reason is other than hypothetical? ….morality…cannot be…“rationally 
compelling no matter what one’s ends” (1986:203-4) 
So despite his theory that all normative facts are natural facts, he is drawing a 
distinction between the normativity of rational norms and the normativity of moral 
norms identical to mine, since once we set aside his confusion about the normativity 
of non-moral value, he neither thinks that rational motivation implies legitimacy nor 
that legitimacy implies rational motivation. He has presented them as significantly 
distinct, takes morality to override, and thinks the significant question about their 
relation is 
how we might change the ways we live so that moral conduct would 
more regularly be rational given the ends we actually will have. 
(1986:204) 
That is to say, he thinks the significant question is how to make our rationality a 
better servant of obligation.  
All in all, then, I do not think that Railton’s moral realism provides grounds for 
undermining the distinction I wish to draw between the normativity of rationality and 
the normativity of ethical considerations. Once we reject the confusion he introduces 
by carelessness over the normativity of non-moral value in terms of objective 
interests, his naturalistic moral realism does not lead him to regard the normativity of 
rationality and morality as the same. For Railton, rational motivation remains on the 
side of rational norms and legitimate motivation remains on the side of moral norms. 
To say that his naturalism amounts to this distinction being a distinction within 
correctness rather than between correctness and directivity is retreat to a merely 
terminological difference with me. Consequently, Railton’s rational norms do not 
have directivity whilst his moral norms do.  
 5 Rationality and Pro Tanto Obligation 
5.1 Practical reason 
What I want to deal with in this chapter is another kind of threat to the claim that 
the normativity of rationality is only correctness, namely, the thought that rational 
motivators of an uncontroversial kind have some variety of pro tanto and intrinsic 
directivity. That alone would suffice to show the third premiss of my argument for 
instrumentalism to be false. I consider this possibility first in practical reason and 
second in theoretical reason. 
It might be claimed that when we act rationally, there is something to be said in its 
favour just because it is acting rationally. Likewise, that when we act irrationally, 
there is something to be said against it. That is to say, that acting rationally is not 
merely a matter of correctness, without further significance in its own right, but is to 
some degree a good thing in its own right. Acting in accordance with rational 
motivators is a pro tanto good, possibly overridden by other considerations, by 
ethical or prudential considerations, but nevertheless, a pro tanto good for all that. 
Likewise, acting irrationally is not merely the mistake of incorrectness, but is to 
some degree bad, even if it has a good upshot.  
Until the rationalist makes his wider case, the rational motivators of action are 
merely the requirements for action to cohere with belief and desire. So the claim we 
are presently dealing with is not that acting in accordance with your practical reasons 
has something to be said in its favour. Of course that is true. It is analytically true, 
given the stipulated directivity of practical reasons. The claim is that acting 
rationally, in the sense of  acting in accordance with instrumental requirements 
broadly construed, has something to be said in its favour just because it is rational. 
So this claim is a variety of the first win for rationalism. 
In the coming several chapters, I discuss the nature of principles of instrumental 
rationality in general. Here we come at the issue slightly differently. Briefly I shall 
make a blunt, and possibly unsatisfactory, appeal to intuitions about extreme cases. I 
shall then consider the way in which some well known paradoxes of rationality seem 
to imply pro tanto directivity for the rational principles involved. 
The extreme cases I have in mind are cases in which extremely wicked people act 
rationally or irrationally. It just seems very strained to me to represent, for example, 
Stalin’s acting rationally as a pro tanto good outweighed by the wickedness of his 
ends. Similarly, until you tell me the upshot of his irrational action I don’t have any 
intuitions about whether it was good or bad that he acted irrationally. The sense in 
which there is something to be said in favour of rational action and against irrational 
action is for me a sense which relies on a background assumption about the 
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legitimacy of the ends at which that rational action is directed. In the general case, 
acting rationally is indeed a pro tanto good and acting irrationally a pro tanto bad, but 
the pro tanto directivity is inherited from the ends in view. This, I think, is the basis 
for the thought that there is something to be said in favour of acting rationally and it 
has nothing to do with the rationality in itself.  
The simplicity of that thought can be challenged by intuitions about the nature of 
the recommendations of game theory, perhaps especially about the nature of the 
conflict in paradoxes of rationality, which may appear to be conflicts between ethical 
or prudential considerations and straightforward rational considerations. But if 
rationality can oppose prudence or ethics in this way it appears to have a 
commensurate normativity to theirs, in which case it is intrinsically directive.  
I shall discuss prisoners’ dilemma (Luce and Raiffa 1985:94ff.) and Newcomb’s 
problem (Nozick 1970). These are so well known that I shall keep exposition very 
brief and I shall not explore any of the immense ramifications that surround these 
problems. My concern is solely with the issue of whether the ways in which 
rationality is taken to recommend action in game theory and in these paradoxes is 
correctly understood as rationality having pro tanto directivity. My general point is 
that discussions of game theory are for good theoretical reasons careless of the 
distinction between ethical and axiological principles of value and the rational 
principles which are concerned with means to realizing that value. Consequently the 
directivity of the former gets attributed as an intrinsic property of the latter, when it is 
rather transmitted by the latter from ends to means.  
I suspect that some readers may continue to have an intuition that the rational 
principles involved in these paradoxes have pro tanto directivity, but what I say 
below defuses arguments they could use to back up that intuition, leaving us with the 
blunt clash of intuitions. The argument then continues in the following chapters in 
which I show that attributing intrinsic directivity to instrumental rational principles is 
objectionable.  
Principles in game theory 
The paradoxes of rationality arise in the context of theorising about decision in the 
face of uncertainty or risk, often called game theory. Risk is when the responses to a 
possible choice can be each assigned probabilities, uncertainty when they cannot. 
The general question is, what is the status of the principles and recommendations 
discussed in game theory?  
Rational decision theory is the part of game theory concerned with decision in the 
face of risk. First, we must recall what I called earlier the Mellor interpretation of 
Ramsey’s rational decision theory, which takes it to be a constitutive constraint on 
intentional mental states, a constraint by which degrees of belief and degrees of 
desire are revealed by actions chosen. Degrees of belief are modelled by probabilities 
and degrees of desire by utilities. The success correctness norm
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decision theory with which game theory is concerned operates in the opposite 
direction, from beliefs and desires to choices. 
Subjective decision theory takes it that given an agent’s degrees of belief and 
degrees of desire, expected utilities of actions constitute degrees of rational 
motivation for those actions. Objective rational decision theory takes it that there are 
rational degrees of belief and objective degrees of desirability. When the latter are 
taken to be determined by interests, we have prudential decision theory, and when 
determined by objective value, we have objective value decision theory.  
Now we address the question of rational motivators and legitimate motivators as 
they appear in rational decision theory. In subjective decision theory expected 
utilities are rational motivators. In objective value decision theory, expected utilities 
are legitimate motivators (constitute degrees of legitimate motivation). In prudential 
decision theory it can go either way. We can include objective interests among 
rational motivators without presupposing any legitimacy for those interests (they 
could be Stalin’s interests), and when that is the case the expected utilities of 
prudential decision theory are rational motivators. On the other hand, if we employ 
pro tanto legitimate interests of a typical person, the expected utilities of prudential 
decision theory are pro tanto legitimate motivators. 
Because the expected utility for an action expresses the degree of coherence of that 
action with degrees of belief and desire, the mathematical principles involved are 
undoubtedly (formal models of) pure instrumental rational principles. But this does 
not mean that the directivity, when it appears in rational decision theory, is intrinsic 
to rationality. The genius of rational decision theory is that the normative status of 
what you get out of it depends on the normative status of what you put into it. If you 
put in actual desires or objective interests, it will tell you what the desire based or 
interest based rational motivators are. If you put in legitimate interest or objective 
values, it will tell you what the legitimate motivators are. A danger of this genius, 
due especially to the fact that the normativity of prudential decision theory is 
ambiguous, is that it tempts one to attribute the directivity of the legitimate 
motivators to the rational motivators.  
The habit of interpretation among game theorists and economists is to interpret 
utilities as prudence. Regrettably, talk of the requirements of prudence as 
requirements of rationality is talk that is careless of the distinctions that matter to us 
here. Most particularly, objective interests, legitimate interests and objective values 
get rolled up into a single notion of welfarist prudence. For example, economists are 
particularly inclined to equate rationality with the promotion of pro tanto legitimate 
welfare interests of a typical person. To insist that the expected utilities of this 
welfarist prudential decision theory count as degrees of rational motivator rather than 
degrees of legitimate motivator is to engage in a merely terminological dispute. It 
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does not imply intrinsic directivity for rationality because the directivity involved is 
sourced in the prudential variety of  thin substantive rationality analysed above.  
These points generalise to the principles that apply to decisions under uncertainty. 
No more than in the case of rational decision theory is there a need for game theory 
to concern itself with the normative status of its recommendations. Consider 
principles such as maximin or dominance. Certainly, they are motivated by questions 
of how properly to realize what is valuable, and so engage us with questions about 
the principles that relate axiology to action. The disputes between the principles are 
disputes within axiology: is the security against loss of conservative principles such 
as maximin the proper pursuit of value, or should maximising value be pursued at 
risk of greater loss? Some such questions can be answered on the basis of formal 
principles of axiology. They are not answered by principles of rationality. Calling 
them rational principles is resorting to thin substantive rationality talk. 
However, despite being motivated by axiological concerns, once again, the 
normative status of what you get out of it depends on the normative status of what 
you put into it. When the utilities in question reflect objective value, the 
recommendations of principles such as maximin or dominance are directive, because 
they are recommendations about means to realising value. But when the utilities in 
question reflect actual desires or objective interests, recommendations based on 
formal principles of axiology will have the force of rational motivators. If dominance 
reflects a formal principle of axiology then dominance reasoning about utilities will 
apply just as well when they reflect degree of actual desire as when they reflect 
objective values. It is possible, however, that dominance or maximin don’t represent 
formal principles, but substantive principles, and it might then be the case that if the 
utilities reflect objective value one should prevail, whilst if they represent degrees of 
desire, the other. 
The final point I want to make is this. In the context of game theory  there is a 
widespread tendency to equate maximising with something that rationality dictates. 
But Hume is still right. 
’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowleg’d 
lesser good to my greater (Hume 1739/1978:2.3.3:416) 
In game theory all the ethical principles have been subsumed into utility 
determinations and the principle that maximising (or satisficing) utility is what 
should be aimed at. The equation of what rationality dictates with maximising is 
simply a consequence of taking rationality to be the instrument of the ethical 
principles when those principles are given expression by preference orderings with 
certain formal properties.13  Here rationality directs only as it is directed. It transmits 
directivity from ends to means, but does not originate the directivity.  
                                                 
13
 For example, complete atomless Boolean algebras. See Jeffrey 1990 chapter 9. 
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Prisoners’ dilemma 
Prisoners’ dilemma is a two person game about choice under uncertainty. Two 
criminals can either inform (D) on each other or refuse to talk (C). If they both refuse 
to talk they are can only be convicted of a lesser charge. If one informs on the other 
he benefits and the other loses greatly, but if they both inform they both do badly. 
This can be represented by the following pay-off matrix:  
 C D 
C (-3, -3) (-10,-1) 
D (-1,-10) (-5, -5) 
 
C is interpreted as cooperation and D as defection. If they both cooperate they can 
each achieve their second best outcome, but doing so risks getting their worst 
outcome. For each, if the other cooperates they are better off defecting and if the 
other defects they are better off defecting and therefore defecting dominates 
cooperating. If they both defect they will each get their third best outcome (which is 
also the maximin solution and the Nash equilibrium for this game). The conflict 
between both cooperating and both defecting can be represented as a conflict 
between ethics and rationality. But if rationality is able to oppose ethics in this way, 
then rationality is pro tanto directive.  
The dominance principle is not directly about coherence of action with beliefs and 
desires. For example, someone might care greatly about being a cooperator despite 
the risk, and in that case following dominance would not be following a rational 
motivator. The sense in which the dominance principle is related to rational 
motivation is one in which we either take for granted a desire to maximise individual 
interest or we insist that rational motivation includes being motivated by maximising 
interests. That makes the dominance principle an instrumental principle, a claim 
about how to maximise. 
Rational motivation certainly includes being motivated by desires and perhaps also 
by interests. But the associated rational motivators are not for that reason directive 
because desires and interests need have no legitimacy. It is a substantial additional 
thesis that the source of directivity is located in desires and interests. Even if that 
were granted, that alone doesn’t grant the dominance principle pro tanto directivity in 
virtue of being a rational instrumental principle, but only in virtue of maximising 
individual interest has it pro tanto directivity. We saw in the last chapter that it 
requires an additional, question begging, premiss to attribute the normativity of the 
end as an intrinsic property of a principle of rational means. 
My preferred response in the case of prisoners’ dilemma is this. The dominance 
principle is one of the composite instrumental principles which relate axiology and 
action, and is a variety of a formal instrumental principle of axiology. Suppose the 
two players are humanity and nature. The unrestricted axiological dominance 
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principle says that when nature’s response to action is outside our control, and for 
each possible  response of nature, action A results in a greater realization of what is 
valuable than  the other courses of action, then do A. A more general principle 
relating axiology to action requires doing what results in a greater realization of what 
is valuable.14  
Prisoners’ dilemma is a situation in which these two axiological principles are 
brought into conflict. The two principles are brought into conflict by isolating the 
agents (preventing coordination), so preventing a united collective agency aiming 
directly at maximising value whilst making salient a restriction of the general 
dominance principle to their individual prudential dominance principles. The conflict 
arises in two ways. In the first case, it is internal to their prudential concerns, since 
they each do individually worse by following dominance than if they both cooperate. 
Secondly, it arises between individual prudential concern and maximising aggregate 
value. The second conflict relies on their divided collective control, despite being 
divided, being nevertheless held to constitute a notion of collective agency which can 
aim at maximising aggregate value. This reliance is made clear by the contrast with 
playing prisoners’ dilemma against nature, when it looks as if there is no conflict, 
and dominance is right (unless one trivialises the risk run by C) precisely because 
humanity and nature ‘cooperating’ is not in any sense within collective control. There 
is no ‘we’ who could aim directly at maximising aggregate value.  
The formality of the axiological principles tempts one to represent this conflict as a 
conflict within rationality, and certainly I have no objection to talking in those terms, 
but to uphold this as a problem for myself for that reason is to enter into yet another a 
merely terminological dispute. Rationality is certainly involved just because the 
conflict is one in which the means to upholding a generally reasonable prudential 
principle for individuals conflicts with the means to upholding the two direct 
maximising principles (individual and aggregate value). But rational motivators 
cannot resolve these conflicts. The first one requires taking a position about 
dominance versus risking ruin for the sake of maximising value, which is an 
axiological problem, not a rational problem. The second one requires taking a 
position about the relative legitimacy of the prudential dominance principle versus 
the maximising aggregate value principle, and rational motivators have nothing to 
say about that. Because we are inclined to take rational motivators to include 
instrumental principles in service of interests and also to grant interests pro tanto 
directivity, we misrepresent pursuit of prudence as a directive requirement of 
rationality, and so misrepresent this as a conflict between rationality and morality. 
But it is actually an ethical conflict between individual and collective interests.  
                                                 
14
 I have tried to express these principles so that they do not presuppose consequentialism, 
but allow for a deontontological account of value. 
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So the prisoners’ dilemma does not rely on rationality having pro tanto directivity, 
but in the first case is a dispute between axiological principles, and in the second a 
dispute within ethics. Consequently, defining the status of the restricted dominance 
principle in prisoners’ dilemma is not a question about rationality but amounts to 
taking a position about which principles are the correct axiological and ethical 
principles given the relations and consequences of individual and collective action. 
For example, a Hobbesian approach might take individual pursuit of interest to be 
nature’s right and accept dominance over risk of ruin for the sake of maximising 
value. The existence of prisoners’ dilemma type situations would then justify giving 
up the right in order to have enforced cooperative solutions with better outcomes of 
interest which are not otherwise available. Rationality’s involvement is simply to 
transmit the directivity of prudence and ethics from ends to means. 
Newcomb’s problem 
In Newcomb’s problem a reliable predictor places £1,000,000 in one of two boxes 
iff he predicts that you will open that box alone. He also places £1000 in the other 
box. So long as the probability of the predictor predicting correctly is greater than 1/2 
+1/2000, rational decision theory says take only the first box. However, when faced 
with the situation, you know that what is done is done, and how you choose cannot 
change what is now in the boxes.15 If both boxes have money in you are better off 
taking both and if only the second box has money in you are better off taking both, 
so taking both boxes dominates taking only one.  
Lewis  claims that prisoners’ dilemma is a Newcomb’s problem. This is a natural 
claim for subjectivists about probability to make. They are inclined to deny the 
significance of the distinction classical game theory makes between decision under 
uncertainty and decision under risk because they have principles for attributing 
subjective probabilities to any range of uncertain outcomes. I prefer to maintain that 
distinction because I think it is significant, so for me Lewis demonstrates only a 
structural similarity between them (1981:300), which nevertheless demonstrates a 
correspondence between the principle of maximising value in decision under 
uncertainty and the Bayesian principle of maximising expected utility in decision 
under risk. So the two paradoxes cover the two ways in which a simple maximising 
principle comes into conflict with the dominance principle. 
What makes the one-box option more attractive than the cooperating option is that 
the ratio of risk to gain has been shifted substantially. Whereas in prisoners’ dilemma 
the cooperative act hazards great loss for substantial gain, taking one box risks only a 
substantial loss for a massive gain. One might, however, say that this difference can 
                                                 
15
 It is really this causal independence that is crucial. Fiddling about with backwards 
causation, or proposing that the predictor is really a cheat who acts after your choice on the 
basis of reliable knowledge of your choice (e.g. McKay 2004), whilst potentially diagnostic 
of why we feel one-boxing to be a powerful alternative, merely evades the problem. 
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be erased by adjusting the magnitudes of the utilities in prisoners’ dilemma whilst 
retaining the order. I think the more profound distinction between the two paradoxes 
becomes evident when prisoners’ dilemma is posed in its sharpest manner. Being a 
decision under uncertainty is a matter of the probabilities being unquantifiable. 
Additionally, the outcomes should be expressed in unquantifiable but severe terms. 
For example, Blackburn’s outcomes of Victory, Cooperation, War and Ruin 
(2000:177). When it is entirely unquantifiable, balancing the hazard of ruin against 
the benefit of cooperation is relatively imponderable compared to the clarity of the 
dominance reasoning. In Newcomb’s problem, however, the outcomes and 
probabilities being quantified allows even enormous hazards of one-boxing (say 
there is £999,999 rather than £1,000 in the second box) to be outweighed by 
sufficiently high probability of correct prediction. 
This makes clear why Newcomb’s problem poses me a different problem from 
prisoners’ dilemma. In prisoners’ dilemma I could explain away the appearance of a 
conflict between ethics and rationality as instead a conflict between two plausible 
principles about realizing value: go directly for maximising versus dominance. When 
ruin is a hazard of aiming directly at maximising value, action seems to face a kind 
of intricate self defeat, because dominance presupposes a general aim of maximising. 
But one doesn’t for that reason feel that someone arguing for dominance is exhibiting 
faulty reasoning. Nor does one feel that of a person arguing the benefit of 
cooperation despite the hazard of ruin. They are rather engaged in ethical and 
axiological theorising about means to valuable ends in specially awkward 
circumstances where coordination matters but is unavailable.  
In the case of Newcomb’s problem, however, it is quite different. The application 
of the dominance principle in this case seems to be justifiable not purely in terms of a 
formal thought relating axiology to action, but because it reflects something about 
the causal structure of the situation. It is not, as in the prisoners’ dilemma, that you 
cannot coordinate your action with the other player. It is that the state of the boxes is 
now fixed and that is all that matters. Consequently, the one-boxer seems to engage 
in faulty reasoning about the world. They know that whether they open one or both 
cannot influence the contents. In prisoners’ dilemma, the cooperator has other 
argumentative resources to draw upon, about relations with other people, about the 
kind of person they want to be, about the influence of reputation on their future 
prospects, and so on, which offer defence from the accusation of faulty reasoning. 
When these fall out of the picture, as in the case of prisoners’ dilemma against 
nature, these resources dry up and they too begin to appear irrational. 
The problem for me, here, is that the irrational one-boxer seems to do better than 
the rational two boxer. But if I think that the normativity of rationality is correctness 
alone, the one-boxer is not practically criticisable. He reasons irrationally but that is 
merely a matter of incorrectness. So far as directive considerations go, he is acting in 
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accordance with a legitimate motivator of prudence and so he is practically rational. 
If on the other hand I want to avoid this, and insist on dominance reasoning directing 
what ought to be done, I would seem to be committed to granting directivity to the 
rationality involved in criticising his reasoning. For I seem to have to say that 
although he gets the better outcome, one-boxing is irrational and that is why it ought 
not to be done.  
There are in fact two distinct problems for me here. First of all, I would prefer not 
to be committed to one or two boxing by my position about the normativity of 
rationality. So I need to be able to explain how I can condone or criticise both one 
and two boxers in a manner consistent with my position about the normativity of 
rationality. Second, I need to be able to explain away the intuitions of two-boxers 
who want to say that, even if one-boxing results in a better outcome, it is the 
irrationality of one-boxing alone which explains why it ought not to be done,  
Most one and two boxers are agreed on the end in view: maximise utility. Their 
dispute is a dispute about whether one or two boxing is the means to maximisation. 
The one boxer says the two boxer ‘is misled by a false theory of rationality’  and 
thereby ends up with ‘only the small bucks’ (Blackburn 2000:189) whereas the one 
boxer gets rich, so the two boxer is instrumentally irrational because two boxing is a 
means less than maximal. The two boxer is not conceding that the one boxer does 
better. He says that two boxing does better (for example, Lewis 1981:303) and that 
the reasoning he holds to be faulty leads the one boxer to being instrumentally 
irrational.  
I say that irrationality is generally blameworthy, not merely an incorrectness, and 
ought not to be done, only because rationality is generally a necessary condition for 
doing what ought to be done. However, there are cases in which a moral agent is 
obliged to cease to be rational. For example, the case in Parfit (1987:12) illustrating 
Schelling’s answer to armed robbery (Schelling 1960), in which to avoid being 
forced by threats to one’s family one takes a drug that makes one irrational. There is 
no fault in this irrationality and there would be fault in remaining rational. The 
blameworthiness of irrationality comes only from the ends for which rationality is 
necessary and not from rationality itself. For me, then, to explain that something 
ought not to be done because it is irrational is to presuppose the legitimacy of the 
ends that would be served by the appropriate rational behaviour. This means I can 
consistently condone or criticise both one and two boxing. Whoever is praiseworthy 
or blameworthy for their instrumental rationality or lack of it is so on the basis of the 
prudential end served by their proposed means. 
In fact it is only the second problem which poses a serious problem for me. For 
now we have a confrontation between prudence and rationality where rationality is 
supposed to defeat prudence on its own ground. It is not that one-boxing doesn’t 
maximise utility, but that despite its so maximising, it ought not to be done because it 
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is irrational. The blameworthiness of one-boxing can therefore only be based on 
rationality having directivity independent of the end served, that is to say, intrinsic 
directivity. 
I might make an argument that the directivity here is grounded in the ethical or 
prudential significance of being disposed generally to behaving rationally, and the 
tendency to weaken that disposition if exceptional irrationality were pursued. But it 
seems to me that this line of argument will get into the same difficulties that rule 
utilitarianism gets into. Rather, I think that if the two-boxer concedes that one-boxing 
maximises, then he has conceded also that his theory of rationality or understanding 
of the world is incomplete. 
Contrast this with what I would say about prisoners’ dilemma. In prisoners’ 
dilemma there are the extra considerations that the cooperator can appeal to in 
explaining why cooperation can be justified against the strictures of dominance. Yet 
the Hobbesian point does not go away. It would be irresponsible to risk ruin on this 
basis alone. The solution to prisoners’ dilemma is to get out of it. Prisoners’ dilemma 
catches real criminals because they are already playing prisoners’ dilemma against 
us, already defectors exploiting cooperators. Penalties applied to ‘grasses’ by other 
criminals are their attempt to get out of it by removing the benefit that confessing 
against a confederate confers, a benefit especially tempting to criminals because 
defection is already a live option for them. But the cooperator has a better idea when  
appealing to relations with and concerns for other people, to thoughts about the kind 
of person they want to be, about the influence of reputation on their future prospects. 
The cooperator looks to remove the risk of ruin, but is prepared to risk the occasional 
defector who extorts an extra benefit, so long as he has in place the social 
mechanisms by which the defector becomes known for who he is. He is looking for 
and recommends the attitudes which support trust and which, supported by social 
institutions such as property and law, boot strap us out of the pursuit of every last 
advantage into cooperation. 
Likewise, there can be situations where the temptation to take the last drop 
undermines the possibility of a large benefit, and it may be that the one-boxer can 
show Newcomb’s problem to be one such. If that is the case, and the two-boxer 
concedes that one-boxing maximises, we need further justification of why he says the 
one-boxer is irrational. If he cannot provide that justification, I no longer see the 
opposition of prudence by rationality, so I do not have to explain it away.  
5.2 Theoretical Reason 
Before we start, I mention a complication that I shall not address.  Some kinds of 
cognitivism in ethics hold there to be directive normative truths, and one might think 
that the directivity of their content would mean that one ought, directively, to have 
rationally correct beliefs about those truths. As will later be evident, provided that for 
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each such directive normative truth there is a directive reason to know whether it is 
true, these cases are compatible with my general account. However, even if they are 
not, they cannot show that the normativity of rational belief in general is intrinsically 
directive, but only that there are some special beliefs for which a benign circularity 
of normativity unites the good and the true.  
We now turn to the question of whether theoretical reason is pro tanto directive, 
whether the rational motivators of belief of an uncontroversial kind have some 
variety of pro tanto and intrinsic directivity.  For the duration, I shall omit ‘pro tanto’. 
I shall be offering a composite account of directivity in theoretical reason: that 
obligations to believe truly, or in accordance with the evidence, are compositions of 
obligations external to epistemic norms of rational belief with whatever is 
determined to be correct by those norms. The rationalist can succeed if he shows that 
the correctness normativity of rational belief is sufficient for an obligation to believe. 
He may also succeed if he shows it to be necessary for epistemic directivity in a way 
which is not explainable by my composite account of epistemic directivity. My 
general strategy against both of these possibilities is to show that the correctness 
normativity of rational belief is not intrinsically directive.  
We are inclined to think that there must be some intrinsically directive 
epistemological normativity; for example, that quite aside from the practical 
consequences, one just ought not to be self deceived just because irrational belief is 
something one ought (directively) not to have. Certainly, this is a strong intuition. 
The account I shall give satisfies my intuitions about what directivity there is for 
rational belief, and does so without finding the directivity in the pure rationality of 
belief. I shall be showing that many of the grounds on which intrinsic epistemic 
directivity might have been asserted can be accounted for in other terms. I am not 
putting forward a pragmatic epistemology, but locating the directivity of 
epistemology in rational agency, whilst characterising the pure rationality of belief in 
traditional epistemological terms. The combination of directive significance and 
epistemic correctness capture the kinds of accountability and criticism we might wish 
to make in the realm of belief. Epistemic norms whose normativity is correctness are 
sufficient to ground the purely epistemic criticisms we might wish to make. We do 
not need in addition purely epistemic directive norms because there is no further 
dimension of epistemological criticism for them to capture. Purely epistemic 
directivity is  therefore otiose, and for this reason I do not think that there is any pure 
epistemic directivity. 
Someone may be convinced that there is yet some kind of pure epistemic 
directivity or value. They may maintain that there is at least a pro tanto reason in 
favour of believing any truth, however trivial, or that there are some duties, some 
virtuous ways of being, that are purely epistemic in character, or that there is some 
pure epistemic value had by true or rational beliefs. Siegel is perhaps such a one, 
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when he maintains that ‘a categorical sort of normativity must be acknowledged’ for 
epistemic normativity (1996:97). Someone who takes this view may well be 
unsatisfied with what I have to say and is likely also to reject the way in which I 
implicitly ground directive normativity as a whole in practical reason. Whilst I think 
it evident that what remains of pure epistemic directivity after my account is too thin 
a notion to do any work, were that thin notion to be yet supportable and were it to be 
shown that there is work for it to do, there would be a further argument to be had.  
 
 I construe the notion of epistemic rationality in terms of correctness of belief, and 
am arguing that the correctness of a belief is not on its own sufficient for the belief to 
acquire directivity. For rational creatures of our complexity, there are many varieties 
of correctness of belief; I am not going to try to catalogue them, although in the 
section on epistemic norms below I give some of the reasons for that variety. The 
notion I am concerned with would certainly include the question of best means to 
truth,16  but also would include, or at least have a very significant overlap with, 
epistemology. For I take it that in asking the questions ‘What is knowledge? How can 
we know? What can we know? What is justification and what is its relation with 
knowledge?’ epistemology is concerned with certain kinds of correctness of belief.17 
At least, that is how it is at the beginning of the enquiry. Some answers to those 
questions are given in terms of explaining goodness of belief, where goodness 
appears to be used with directive force, or in terms of a special kind of virtue of the 
believer. I shall be explaining away such answers.  
Epistemic norms 
To start, we need to think about the nature of epistemic norms to see whether they are 
evidently directive. The role of belief in the rational economy is to allow us to 
differentially respond to the world, depending on how the world is. Whether a belief 
is true or false, a response mediated by that belief is a response to the world, and 
purports to be a response to a particular feature of the world, the feature that purports 
to be the content of the belief. When the belief is false, the response is not a response 
to the purported feature, since there need be no such purported feature. It may, of 
course, be a response to some other feature. For example, believing fool’s gold to be 
gold and melting it down to make our fortune is not a response to some gold, since 
there is none, although it is a response to the fool’s gold. We might call such a 
response a response that is merely provoked by a feature of the world. The response 
                                                 
16
 A purely instrumental construal of the notion of epistemic rationality (e.g. Foley 1987) is 
inadequate because it seems to leave out the notion of epistemic justification. For example, if 
tossing a particular coin always told me whether the stock market would be up or down on 
the next day, that might make the coin the best means to true belief about the stock market, 
but it would hardly be a source of justified belief. 
17
 Williamson (2001) will not agree with this way of putting it. 
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is flawed because the world didn’t influence the response in the way that a belief is 
supposed to bring about the world’s influence. Normally, when and only when a 
belief is true our response is not only provoked by a feature of the world but a 
response to a particular feature as the feature that it is. 18 That is the sense in which 
belief may be said to aim at the truth: its role in the rational economy is to make 
responses to the world not merely responses provoked by worldly features, but 
responses to worldly features as the features they are. This is why ‘it is part of the 
price of admission to belief as a propositional attitude that one not represent one’s 
attitude as unaccountable to truth’ (Railton 1997:57). 
What permits that differential response to depend on a much greater extent of the 
world than what is causally immediate for us is also what permits the possibility of 
error, of misrepresentation. The less directly are our beliefs under the control of the 
world, the greater the proliferation of ways in which we can come to have beliefs, 
and the greater the extent of the world we can encompass in belief, the more deeply 
and widely embedded in the world can be our responses to the world; but also, the 
greater the possibility of false beliefs. 
The tension between the desirability of responding to a wide extent of the world 
and the liability of false belief is the source of the complexity of epistemology. 
Epistemic norms are concerned with avoiding the problems and exploiting the 
opportunities that indirection and proliferation create for maximising the role success 
of belief.  
Maximising the role success of belief could perhaps have been expressed as 
maximising truth. For most contexts we do not go far wrong by speaking loosely in 
terms of maximising truth, but the indirection and proliferation mentioned above 
mean that for suitably complex rational creatures there are a variety of ways of 
maximising truth, not all of which need be available in every circumstance, and a 
variety of things related to truth which may be maximised when truth cannot be 
aimed at directly. It is an epistemological problem to determine which kinds of 
maximisation, and of exactly what, we are concerned with. Is it probability or ratio of 
truth to falsehoods that should be maximised? How should maximising the number 
of beliefs be traded off against damaging the truth ratio or average probability of 
truth? Is the maximisation to be applied belief by belief, or collectively and on 
average? Perhaps instead it should be knowledge or justified belief that should be 
maximised. Finally, since the acquisition of beliefs is not in any simple sense under 
the control of the will, epistemic norms may have a kind of indirection which norms 
of action need not. 
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 Normally, since responses mediated by peculiarly caused true beliefs are sometimes 
responses to the peculiar cause rather than to the way the world is (brainwashed truths, for 
example). Secondly, these remarks are incomplete since, sunburn, whilst not a rational 
response, is a response to a feature as the feature it is.  
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The answers to which kind of maximisation may depend on the capacities of the 
rational being concerned. Epistemological norms for some rational creature may be 
purely truth directed, and the questions of justification and non-accidental truth 
irrelevant, for reasons to do with limitations on the extent of the world they can 
encompass in belief. As the complexity of rational beings increases, so may the 
complexity and quantity of epistemological norms. Local beliefs are more important 
for daily survival than global beliefs, and the cleverer you are the more falsehood 
you may be able to get away with, trading truth ratio for the benefits of having more 
beliefs and more global beliefs.  Nor need the norms applicable to more complex 
beings be a superset of the norms for the less complex. There are more ways, and 
more interesting ways, for a more complex being to respond to the world, resulting in 
distinct and possibly incommensurable norms for maximising their role success of 
belief compared with the less complex beings.  
So when we say that epistemic norms are concerned with truth conducivity, we are 
generalising over these complex concerns of avoiding the problems and exploiting 
the opportunities that indirection and proliferation create for maximising the role 
success of belief. Being concerned with the role success of beliefs, epistemic norms 
are correctness norms. That is evidently the case, whatever the exact nature of truth 
conducivity, whether it includes some or all of the above varieties of truth 
maximisation, and whether it has some degree of relativity to kind of rational being. 
We now turn to considering whether they entail intrinsic directivity for rationality. I 
shall argue that epistemic norms do not. However, there are norms, concerned with 
belief, which are sometimes called epistemic norms, and which are directive. We will 
return to this, but in short, my position is that such norms are composite directive 
norms, norms in which the directivity is not intrinsic to the correctness norm or 
property they ‘contain’ 19 —here, the truth conducivity —and so not intrinsic to the 
correctness of belief qua belief.  
We shall be considering the question of whether normativity of rational belief can 
be intrinsically directive by considering the grounds of why we ought to believe what 
is true; by considering whether reasons to believe are directive and what is the 
bearing of directive but non-epistemic ‘reasons to believe’; and by considering 
whether practical reasons influence evidential standards. I shall be endeavouring to 
show that correctness and directivity remain distinguishable and that directive norms 
of rational belief are composite directive norms with the grounds of the directivity 
external to epistemic correctness. 
5.3 Obligations to believe truly  
Must we believe what is true? Let us take it that if the answer is yes, then 
conforming to norms of truth conducivity is both necessary and sufficient for 
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 See section 2.5 on composite norms. 
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discharging that obligation. The problem that conforming to truth conducivity need 
not bring truth is a distraction, since the possibility of false belief is the price we pay 
for extensive informational connections to the world, and truth conducivity is the 
best answer we have to minimise the cost and maximise the benefit of that power.  
I shall consider four ways in which it might be that we ought, directively, to 
believe what is true. The first is instrumental, that the truth is needed in order to do 
what we ought, directively, to do. The second is if truth has intrinsic value. The third 
is if believing what is true is a basic duty. Finally, believing truly might be a way of 
being virtuous. 
Klein (1987:83 ff.) shows how moral obligations, given consequentialist or 
deontological premisses, can oblige true belief, and I think it is widely accepted that 
there are such instrumental obligations to believe what is true. The instrumental case 
poses no problems for me. Clearly the directivity in such cases is external to the 
correctness of belief. Furthermore, instrumental obligations to believe need not even 
be truth directed, if Hume is right to suggest that  
a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, 
which…. leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious….Truths which 
are pernicious to society, if any such there be, will yield to errors which 
are salutary and advantageous. (1777/1975b:IX,II/279) 
The challenge is whether any of the other three pose a problem. 
Truth intrinsically valuable? 
If truth has intrinsic value it might be that truth-conducive norms are directive 
norms, and directive just because they are correctness norms conducive to something 
with intrinsic value. If value is a subjective feature, then something having intrinsic 
value is it being valued by us for itself as opposed to valued instrumentally. In this 
case we can confer intrinsic value on truths by valuing them for themselves rather 
than instrumentally, and in so doing the relevant correctness norms of belief acquire 
(some degree of) directivity.  But that is not a matter of the correctness entailing 
directivity. Here, intrinsic value is a relational property, and clearly it is not the 
correctness of belief that entails directivity but our valuing.  
If value is a feature of the world that is independent of us, an objective feature, 
then having intrinsic value is being something valuable in and of itself  
independently of instrumental value. 
Truth as a property doesn’t make any distinction between significant truths and 
trivial truths; I call this the problem of trivial truth, since we shall see this fact 
undermining epistemic directivity in several ways. Here, we use it thus: If truth has 
intrinsic value then all truths have value; but there are many trivial truths without any 
value, so truth does not have intrinsic value.  
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This modus tollens contains a blunt appeal to the intuition that some truths are 
without value. It might be objected that I mistake having little value for none, or that 
whilst their value is silenced for creatures like us, for ideally believing creatures, who 
lack restrictions on the number of beliefs they could believe, no truth is so trivial as 
to be valueless. It might also be objected that there is a distinction between trivial 
and significant truths which can be drawn epistemically.  
Taking the latter first, I think the epistemic distinction amounts only to this. 
Certainly some truths subsume others, and we are inclined to take the subsuming as 
more significant than the subsumed just because they contain more information. I do 
not deny that this is a real distinction in informational significance. But informational 
significance is not itself directive just because there are undoubtedly truths of great 
informational significance, which is just to say, containing a great deal of 
information, which remain trivial in the relevant sense. For example, the truth about 
the precise disposition of inter-stellar dust in a cubic light year of inter-stellar space 
which is outside our backwards or forwards light cone.  
What about informational subsumption in the sense of general laws? Surely the 
distinction between them and mere atomic truths draws an epistemic distinction 
between trivial and significant truths in the relevant sense? This may be where our 
pure directive epistemicist parts company with us. As far as I can see, if we didn’t 
care about knowing one of these laws, and ignorance of it made no difference to us 
or to the achievement of anything of value (apart from the unexplained notion of 
epistemic value which divides us), this is just another case of drawing a distinction, 
but not in the relevant sense. Of course, we value highly general truths very highly, 
just because we value knowledge. But what is there to say to rational beings who 
were utterly unmoved in this way, whose concern with scientific truth was purely 
instrumental and technological, and whose abstract intellectual desires were satisfied 
by purely aesthetic pursuits, such as poetry and music? For them there would be 
truths about, for example, the big bang which would make no difference to anything 
that mattered to them in any way at all. Who, then, are we to insist that they ought to 
know those truths? This is not analogous to failing to insist that moral sceptics ought 
to act morally, since their immorality makes our lives worse. I shall concede here, 
however, that a final break with the pure directive epistemicist may in the end 
depend on accepting that value is to be explained by our valuing, and not the other 
way around.  
Turning now to the question of value, if we consider the basis on which things are 
usually attributed intrinsic value, the truth about, for example, how many grains of 
dust are on my table, doesn’t seem to warrant such an attribution purely qua truth. 
For very good reason, when Aristotle gives as examples ‘Goods…in 
themselves….such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours’ 
(1989:1096b/9) he does not mention trivia of any kind. Intrinsic value is attributed on 
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the grounds of properties that make something considerable, of significance, perhaps 
even morally or aesthetically considerable, which provide some reason for what is 
valued to be brought about. But trivial truths are trivial precisely because they are 
inconsiderable, lacking in significance, without moral or aesthetic import. It is  not 
that the reasons not to concern ourselves with them outweigh the reasons to believe 
them. Being trivial means there is no reason whatsoever to believe them. So to say 
that a truth is trivial but intrinsically valuable is to retreat to a notion of pure 
epistemic value that is isolated from value in general and difficult to explain. It is too 
thin, a kind of value that is borne by any truth, however trivial, yet without any wider 
significance.  
Granted that truth doesn’t distinguish between significant and trivial truths, some 
truths might yet have intrinsic value. Insofar as such truths were themselves truths of 
directive normativity, moral truths, perhaps, or prudential or aesthetic truths, I can 
account for the directivity of a directive obligation to believe them in terms of their 
directive content. What would be left are non-normative truths, and truths of 
correctness normativity. The latter I can disregard provided my general arguments 
against correctness being intrinsically directive are satisfactory.  
That would leave the claim that there are non-normative truths which are 
intrinsically valuable. If that were the case, distinguishing significant and trivial 
truths would itself be an epistemic matter, and that doesn’t seem plausible. 
Furthermore, and quite aside from the difficulty in seeing how this distinction could 
be drawn in epistemic terms, if the purely epistemic distinction lines up with the 
distinction as drawn on standard evaluative grounds then we might suspect the 
epistemic distinction to be otiose or parasitic —particularly in the absence of a 
detailed account of that distinction. On the other hand, if it didn’t line up we’d be 
wondering again whether something so isolated from our other kinds of value really 
was any such thing. But if the value is not intrinsic to the truth of the non-normative 
truth then the correctness normativity of its being true and the directive normativity 
of its being intrinsically valuable are separable.  
A basic duty to believe truly?  
Those deontologists who derive all duties from one basic duty have not to my 
knowledge taken that duty to be a duty to believe the truth. Would it be a viable 
position?  If there was such a basic duty, and there were moral truths, could one 
derive the rest of the duties? I think the main difficulty would be to derive duties to 
act from a duty to believe, except duties to perform actions which were themselves to 
do with acquiring beliefs. Presumably, then, the moral truths would themselves have 
to be truths about other duties. The question then would be, what was it that made the 
duty to believe truth a basic duty, since the duties to perform actions other than those 
to do with belief acquisition would seem to be derived only in a notional sense from 
the duty to believe truly. That is to say, their dutyhood would not be derived from the 
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dutyhood of believing truly because they would not be ways of fulfilling the duty to 
believe truly (contrast that with fulfilling the duty of justice by fulfilling your duty to 
repay what you have borrowed). Rather, their dutyhood would be got just from its 
being part of the content of some true beliefs. I therefore think it is implausible that a 
duty to believe truly could be the single basic duty. 
Intuitionism is the species of deontology that proposes several basic duties. I am 
going to make use only of a locus classicus for intuitionism, Ross’s The Right and 
the Good. Ross (1930:21) lists what he thinks are the basic prima facie duties: 
fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and non-
maleficence. Believing truly is not listed. If Ross had found there was some duty to 
believe truly not derivable from his list he would have added it to his list.  
Believing truly is going to be derived as an instrumental duty from several of 
Ross’s basic duties. Instrumental duties to believe truly do not locate the source of 
the duty in the correctness of true belief but in the duty for which true belief is 
instrumental.  
Believing truly could also be derived as a non-instrumental duty from the duty to 
self-improvement – non-instrumental because believing truly is arguably partially 
constitutive of improving oneself.20 So we might take it that believing truly for this 
reason was an intrinsic duty. Nevertheless, just as in the question of intrinsic value 
for truth, this use of ‘intrinsic’ does not ground the directivity intrinsically to the 
correctness of true belief but in the directivity of the duty to improve. 
So in both cases, and in general, insofar as a duty to believe truly is derivative, the 
source of the directivity inherent in a duty is external to the correctness of the belief,  
and so no threat to my position on norms of belief. 
An example which may seem to imply the existence of a purely epistemic basic 
duty to believe truly is self deception. Clearly there is a derived duty to avoid self 
deception, since it may result in one infringing any of Ross’s basic duties, and it may 
result in bad consequences. If there is to be a purely epistemic duty to seek to believe 
truly it will have to exist quite independently of such reasons. Although I hold there 
to be a very stringent duty to believe truly, once one has excluded these reasons, I 
find myself at a loss to explain why there should be any such duty at all. The 
stringency of the duty seems to be entirely bound up with the significance of truth for 
fulfilling all the other duties. In their absence, in the absence of bad consequences, in 
the absence of caring about the truth, it no longer seems to matter at all. If that is the 
case, then there can’t be such a pure epistemic duty.  
In essence, I think that is correct, but too short. There are important truths which it 
might be much better for us not to believe, and yet there is a strong intuition that one 
ought to face the uncomfortable truth. It shows a certain strength of character to face 
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 I make this concession against myself, since anyone insisting that it is really an 
instrumental duty is conceding my point. 
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the truth about matters of import rather than believe conveniently. This cannot be 
explained away simply by the general value of strength of character, it might be said, 
because this strength of character is essentially epistemic and so there must be 
something about the fault of akratic belief which is intrinsically directive.  
This takes us on to the fourth route, that believing truly is virtuous. I shall be 
considering the relation of virtue and belief at much greater length in chapter 9, 
where I shall also discuss epistemic duties and  address whether virtue epistemology 
might help the rationalist. I concede now that whilst what I will say later on 
epistemic virtue bears on the problem posed in the last paragraph, I do not think it 
provides a fully satisfactory answer, and at present I do not have an answer I find 
satisfactory.  
5.4 Reasons to believe and what you ought to believe 
Reasons to believe appear to be directive in a manner that is independent of the 
directivity of reasons for actions. However much you might wish to believe the sun 
goes round the earth, it might be thought, you ought to believe the earth goes round 
the sun. The evidence for that being the truth is conclusive, so there is conclusive 
reason to believe it, and a conclusive reason to ฀Φ means you ought to ฀Φ, whether ฀Φ-
ing is a matter of doing something or believing something. We shall see that this is 
not incompatible with my position. 
There are two sources of confusion here. Most of the time when we are discussing 
reasons to believe, we assume the context is one in which we have a directive reason 
to enquire whether p, and so are inclined to muddle the directivity of the reason to 
enquire with the correctness norms to do with determining whether p or ¬p is correct 
to believe. Secondly, being subject to an epistemic duty may lead us to think the 
truth-conducive reasons to which we must attend in order to fulfil the duty are 
themselves directive. In fact, most philosophical talk about reasons to believe makes 
use of the correctness mode of the normative vocabulary of reasons and oughts. So 
far as its relation to the directive mode goes, talk of reasons to believe p would be 
better spoken of as reasons-in-waiting; as such because they wait on a directive 
reason to enquire whether p.  
There cannot be a purely truth-conducive reason (that is non-instrumental) to 
enquire whether p. Epistemic norms don’t specify which truths are worth pursuing, 
indeed, they couldn’t without undermining their point. Epistemic norms are 
concerned with truth conducivity. That implies a specific kind of neutrality, namely 
that all truths are equal. Were epistemic norms to determine which truths are worth 
pursuing they would have to regard some truths as more equal than others. They 
can’t do that. The role success of beliefs can’t give you reasons to choose between 
truths since role success is achieved whenever a belief is true. Maximising the role 
success of beliefs by pursuing truth conducivity is not a concern with a belief in 
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virtue purely of its particular content, but rather in virtue of how the belief (or its 
contents) is connected up with other beliefs, with other mental states such as 
perceptions, and with the world. So epistemic norms do not discriminate normatively 
between beliefs purely on the basis of their particular contents. But to supply reasons 
to enquire whether p requires discriminating normatively between beliefs purely on 
the basis of their content. So epistemic norms cannot supply a reason to enquire 
whether p (except instrumentally as, for example, when one is enquiring whether q, 
and believes p฀↔q). Even the greater coherence of one potential belief over another, 
or that if accepted it generates many additional rational beliefs, remains a reason-in-
waiting unless the fact of increasing coherence or extent of belief serves some of the 
reasons to enquire that are in play. Fruitful beliefs, of course, do this easily, and for 
this reason we are inclined to mistake fruitfulness alone for a reason rather than a 
reason-in-waiting. 
So I distinguish directive reasons to believe and correctness reasons to believe. 
Correctness reasons are truth-conducive reasons, and are only reasons-in-waiting. 
Directive reasons to believe are full-blooded reasons to believe, and I shall argue that 
all such reasons are composite, composed of directive reasons for knowing whether 
p, and truth-conducive reasons concerned with which of p and ¬p is more rational to 
believe. Such composite directive reasons to believe I shall call theoretical reasons.  
Epistemic and non-epistemic reasons to believe 
Given a directive reason for enquiring whether p, is the matter of what you ought, 
directively, to believe then settled by whatever you ought, truth-conducively, to 
believe? Or could a directive reason for wanting p to be true override it being correct 
to believe ¬p, or correct to suspend judgement? For example, Adler considers it to be 
a crucial fact that we cannot ‘believe that the number of stars is even’ (1999:267). Yet 
suppose averting a great evil required that belief, and one could believe it on taking a 
pill. One has a reason to enquire whether the stars are even (or at least, a reason to 
have a belief about it) and a reason to believe them even, but not a truth-conducive 
reason. Ought it outweigh the truth-conducive reasons which make suspending belief 
correct? 
On the one hand, if such a directive reason to believe could not override what is 
correct, we have a simple picture of the ethics of belief. What you ought to believe is 
whatever you have a directive reason to enquire about, and what you should believe 
about it is whatever the truth-conducive reasons give as the correct belief. A full 
blooded directive reason to believe p would be a composition of a directive reason to 
enquire whether p and a truth-conducive reason-in-waiting to believe p. In this case 
the norms of the ethics of belief are composite norms, and so no threat to my 
position. 
On the other hand, if such a directive reason to believe could override what is 
correct, then matters are more complex. Now we would seem to have reasons to 
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believe p which are full bloodedly directive, even if there is a sense in which they too 
await a directive reason to enquire whether p. We need to consider whether there are 
any such, and if there are, whether they threaten my position.  
A distinction in terms of which this question is sometimes addressed is that 
between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons to believe. Epistemic reasons 
correspond to what I have called truth-conducive reasons (-in-waiting). Non-
epistemic reasons considered in the literature are frequently prudential reasons, and 
hence are directive, but I think we should concede that the full spectrum of practical 
reasons might supply non-epistemic reasons to believe. How best to delineate the 
distinction is controversial. Harman, for example, contrasts ‘a reason to believe 
something that does not make it more likely that the belief is true’ with ‘epistemic 
reasons…that do make the belief more likely to be true’ (1995:17). Reisner 
(forthcoming) raises some difficulty for this with an example in which beliefs about 
chances of surviving an illness affect your chances of survival. I don’t think the 
problems posed by such cases of interference undermine the distinction. Difficulties 
with delineation are partly down to the complexities of truth conducivity, and the 
correctness-directivity distinction provides additional resources to bear on the 
delineation and on problem cases.  
A widely discussed example21 is that of the woman who has some evidence of 
infidelity on the part of her husband and who knows that if she gives it full 
cognisance it will affect her behaviour and perhaps destroy the marriage, which she 
values very highly. A contrast is drawn between her epistemic reasons to believe that 
he is having an affair and her practical reason not to believe. The question raised is 
what ought she to believe, all things considered.  
No one disputes that there are practical reasons for having particular beliefs, such 
as the wife’s reason for believing her husband faithful. What is at issue is whether 
such reasons bear on what should be believed, that is to say, whether a non-epistemic 
consideration can properly be a reason to believe as opposed to merely a reason for 
having a belief. 
Those whom Heil calls consequentialists  
tie warranted beliefs to practical reasoning…. Familiar epistemic and 
non-epistemic reasons are weighed alongside one another in the 
calculation that determines what it is most reasonable for one to 
believe. (1983:754) 
Consequentialists may well think she should not believe him unfaithful. 
Evidentialists, on the other hand, agree with Locke that we should ‘believe or 
disbelieve as Reason directs [us]…[which] Faculties…were given [us] to no other 
end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability’ 
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 e.g. Meiland 1980; Heil 1983; Adler 1999. 
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(1700/1975:IV.XVII.24/688). Clifford thinks evidentialism is very stringent: ‘it is 
wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence’ (1877:190). Even Hume says that ‘a wise man…proportions his belief to 
the evidence’ (1777/1975a:X.I/110). So evidentialists would say that her practical 
reason is irrelevant to what she ought to believe. 
We could sharpen the example against the evidentialist by making the evidence 
weak, so that her behaviour might be an over-reaction, but not one she can help 
except by the device of not giving the evidence its full cognisance. This makes it less 
easy to insist she should follow the evidence. The evidentialist will reply that the 
concern is with what is rational to believe. In the sharpening the practical reason is 
not functioning as a reason to believe but just as a practical reason. Given her 
practical reason and her practical irrationality (over-reacting to her belief) an 
adjustment is made by balancing one irrationality off against another. Fixing things 
that are broken can often involve this sort of compromise, but a carburettor with a 
matchstick propping up a faulty float is not a properly functioning carburettor, and a 
compensating irrationality of belief is not a practical reason becoming a non-
epistemic reason to believe. 
 One very short answer would be to say that given the correctness-directivity 
distinction, it is now clear that the whole problem has been misconceived. 
Correctness and directivity can’t be weighed against each other. The evidentialists 
are right because only the evidence tells you what is correct to believe, and the 
consequentialists are right because mere correctness is insufficient to determine what 
you ought to believe, which depends also on what truths matter to you, and how they 
matter.  
I don’t think that would be a satisfactory dissolution of the problem without further 
explanation. Certainly, the metaphor of weighing as standardly understood fails for 
the setting off of an epistemic reason to think him faithless and a prudential reason to 
think him faithful. Once one distinguishes (the forces of?) the former’s correctness 
and the  latter’s directivity it is clear that they are incomparable. Nevertheless, the 
epistemic and non-epistemic reasons continue to conflict and we still need to know 
what ought to be believed. Furthermore, if there is some sense in which the epistemic 
and non-epistemic reasons can be said to be directly set off against one another, that 
would tend to undermine the claim that their normativities were entirely distinct. 
That would be a problem for me since it would imply that the epistemic reasons were 
intrinsically directive. So I must show that their conflict is not direct. 
It is a misstatement of the problem to present it as if we are just confronted with an 
epistemic reason to think him faithless and a prudential reason to think him faithful, 
and the problem is just about whether and how these are to be set off. There must 
also be a directive reason to enquire whether he is faithful. One might mistake the 
appearance of the evidence as supplying that reason, but it does not. The reason to 
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enquire is the significance his fidelity has for their marriage, and this would supply a 
continuing directive reason to enquire whether p. We may think that a question can 
simply arise when some evidence appears but unless they bear on something that 
matters we ignore them just because we lack a reason to enquire. Mattering can be as 
little as provoking our curiosity, provided we have reason to afford or indulge that 
curiosity. 
My suggestion is that the nature of a directive reason to enquire whether p is 
significant. Either it is a reason to know whether p or it is a reason to have a belief 
whether p that is not a reason to know whether p.  
Suppose the reason to enquire is a reason to know. The epistemic reason is 
responsive to that directive reason, when we would have a composite directive 
reason to believe composed of the reason to enquire and the truth-conducive reason. 
The non-epistemic reason, on the other hand, being independent of the truth of the 
matter, is not responsive to that directive reason to know.  In our example, the reason 
to believe him faithful is non-responsive because it is irrelevant to the truth. If a non-
epistemic reason is not responsive to the reason for which the enquiry is raised, it 
should not be set off against the epistemic reason – not because its normativity is of a 
different kind but because when the reason to enquire is a reason to know the truth, 
its irrelevance to the truth rules it out from counting at all. This is significant, and not 
a mere restatement of the problem as a conflict between the composite directive 
reason to believe him faithless and the non-epistemic directive reason to believe him 
faithful, since that conflict is a different problem altogether. Here I need only show 
that epistemic and non-epistemic reasons cannot be directly set off. In the next 
section I shall address the conflict within directivity between composite directive 
epistemic reasons and non-epistemic reasons. 
So the plausibility of non-epistemic reasons bearing on what to believe in 
opposition to epistemic reasons seems to require that the directive reason to enquire 
be a reason to have a belief whether p that is not a reason to know whether p. The 
problem now is to understand how such a reason could be a reason to enquire at all.  
It sounds dangerously close to mistaking a non-epistemic reason to have a particular 
belief for a reason to enquire. So I am sceptical whether there are any such reasons, 
but for the sake of argument suppose there are. Now, the positions of epistemic and 
non-epistemic reasons are reversed. The latter is responsive to such a reason but, 
since the truth of the matter is irrelevant, the former is not. Once more, the notion of 
directly setting off the epistemic and non-epistemic reason against each other is 
moot, only now it is because the epistemic reason doesn’t count. In our example, if 
she has a directive reason to have a belief about her husband’s fidelity which isn’t a 
reason to know the truth, and no other directive reasons to know the truth, all that is 
left is to believe him faithful for her non-epistemic reason.  
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So whichever way we take a directive reason to enquire, we find epistemic and 
non-epistemic reasons fail to confront one another directly, just because in each case 
only one is responsive. We therefore do not need to make a possibly question 
begging appeal to the difference in their normativities to establish the failure of direct 
confrontation.  
A more subtle approach to the force of non-epistemic reasons is that taken by 
James when controverting Clifford. James distinguishes choices between hypotheses 
as options that are ‘living or dead…forced or avoidable…[and] momentous or trivial’ 
(1896:192) and regards religion as a genuine option because choosing between belief 
and atheism is a living question if it is being discussed, ‘religion offers itself as a 
momentous option’ (1896:202) and because momentous it is also forced. He objects 
to ‘a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging 
certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there’  and asserts that ‘we 
have the right  to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt 
our will’.  
Nevertheless, says James, the schoolboy’s thought that: ‘faith is when you believe 
something you know ain’t true’ (1896:203) is a misapprehension: 
the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect 
of the individual cannot by itself resolve (1896:203).  
James is not saying that one may go against the evidence, but only that one may 
reject the evidentialist’s maxim ‘better risk loss of truth than chance of error’ 
(1896:203) which would lead one neither to believe nor disbelieve. Provided the 
evidence leaves it undecided, practical considerations of moment can justify both 
deciding to believe and which way to believe, since one might then believe what is 
true anyway, and one ought to be able to rationally believe what might be true when 
the question at hand is live, momentous and forced.  
Now this offers a kind of confrontation of epistemic and non-epistemic reasons, 
but it makes non-epistemic reasons infinitely weak compared to epistemic reasons. 
For provided the truth-conducive considerations tilt the balance one way, however 
little, the non-epistemic reasons will be unable to outweigh that little. Only when 
there are no epistemic reasons to go either way can the non-epistemic reasons come 
into play. They are never both in play together bearing on what to believe, but the 
non-epistemic reasons only bear provided the epistemic reasons don’t exist, or after 
the epistemic reasons have failed to settle, however faintly, which way to believe. So 
once more this is not a case in which epistemic and non-epistemic reasons are 
directly set off against each other, but a different way in which they fail to be set off.  
Directive epistemic reasons and non-epistemic reasons 
Since I don’t think there really are reasons to enquire which are not reasons to 
know the truth, I’m not going address the proliferation of kinds of conflicts that 
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could arise if there were (four new ones). In the last section I showed that epistemic 
reasons (i.e. truth-conducive reasons) and non-epistemic reasons do not directly 
conflict. I’m going to return to the question of the confrontation between a composite 
directive reason to believe and a non-epistemic reason to believe.  
In the light of the correctness-directivity distinction it might be thought that this 
confrontation, rather than the confrontation between epistemic and non-epistemic 
reasons, is what the literature should be taken to be concerned with. I think it is 
indeterminate whether that is the case; some parts of the literature might be 
understood in those terms, but others could only be understood in terms of a 
confrontation between epistemic reasons and non-epistemic reasons. Let us just 
consider it in its own right. 
 A virtue of my account is that it exhibits why theoretical and practical reasons 
might even bear on one another at all, whilst also showing why only theoretical 
reasons are reasons to believe, properly so called. A theoretical reason is a composite 
directive reason to believe p, being a composition of a directive reason to know 
whether p with an epistemic (i.e. truth-conducive) reason to believe  p. The reason to 
know whether p is a practical reason even when the reason to know is just that we 
value knowing this truth purely for the sake of knowledge. Non-epistemic reasons to 
believe are practical reasons. So the confrontation is a confrontation that is at least in 
part a confrontation in practical reason. What should we make of this fact?  
Heil outlines the view that  
Reasonable belief, like reasonable action, is most naturally regarded as 
the result of an agent’s practical reasoning. Such reasoning takes into 
account…epistemic warrant…[and]…an agent’s nonepistemic interests. 
Where these interests are…best served by adopting beliefs solely on the 
basis of epistemic considerations, such beliefs are, for that agent, 
reasonable. If…an agent’s practical interests outweigh epistemic 
claims, then beliefs based on the latter cease to be reasonable 
(1983:753-4) 
We can read this in two ways, one in which practical reasons weigh as reasons to 
believe, the other in which they weigh merely as reasons to have a belief. I take the 
former first. 
I think the problem with taking practical reasons to be reasons to believe is that 
doing so is not compatible with the nature of belief. Beliefs are essentially 
informational, and it is significant that they are so not for theoretical reasons alone, 
but also for practical reasons. Being rational is a way of being in the world, which 
way of being depends on responding to information. A necessary condition on being 
a reason to believe is to be capable of non-accidentally causing a belief. The sense of 
non-accidental required is at least a matter of being related to the informational role 
as such of belief. For beliefs to be informational requires belief being under the sway 
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of truth-conducive causes and not under the sway of other causes. So reasons to 
believe must be in part truth-conducive, on pain of undermining belief’s proper 
subjugation to truth conducivity. The intractability of belief, in the sense that it is not 
in any simple sense amenable to the will, is not an accident, but a requirement for 
any state that is to play the informational role. ‘If in full consciousness I could will to 
acquire a ‘belief’ irrespective of its truth, it is unclear that before the event I could 
seriously think of it as a belief’ (Williams 1973:148).  
Whether non-voluntarism about belief is true or false, the relative tractability of 
belief to a consideration is an indication of whether that consideration is a reason to 
believe, since reasons to believe are what beliefs are required to be tractable to if 
they are to be beliefs. Whilst a practical reason may be a reason to want something to 
be true, it does not amount to a reason to believe it true. A reason to want something 
true is unrelated to its truth, and so not a truth-conducive consideration. 
Unsurprisingly, then, we find that beliefs are relatively intractable to practical 
reasons. The latter fact is not an accident but a requirement of the proper functioning 
of the states which realise our rationality.  
How about the example of averting a great evil if one can believe the number of 
stars even? Clearly this is not a reason to want it to be true that they are even, but a 
practical reason to believe them even. That doesn’t seem to fit with what has just 
been said. Nevertheless, what this example means is that we can have a practical 
reason to have a particular belief which is not a reason to believe it. The 
paradoxicality is only apparent, and the distinction is evident when one considers that 
one’s beliefs correctly remain immobile in the face of the practical reason. Unlike 
pondering on an epistemic reason, pondering on this practical reason doesn’t produce 
any inclination to believe it, but only the inclination to do something, namely, take 
the pill which will make one believe it. Having to resort to a cause which is unrelated 
to the informational role as such of the belief gives the game away. 
But what about the cases of wishful thinking? Surely this is easier than it ought to 
be under my account. I think the answer here is just to acknowledge the very wide 
range of representational states that are useful to us, and also certain things that are in 
our power. All sorts of suppositions and imaginings are useful to us, and are properly 
entertained along with beliefs during deliberations. Also useful are optimism, 
determination and self confidence, which states are rather complicatedly related to 
both belief and will. Finally we have the power to treat as if true and to constrain and 
direct our attention to some degree, including deliberate non-attention. We have here 
the makings for sophisticated opportunities of self deception, in which the paradox of 
self deception is dispersed by a combination of complication and limitation, most 
especially, the limitation that rules out keeping track of how one arrived at all one’s 
beliefs. Room enough here for practical reasons to feed into belief causation despite 
belief’s relative intractability to them. Furthermore, since theoretical reasons are 
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themselves composite directive reasons, containing a practical reason to know 
whether p, it seems comprehensible that other practical reasons could find their way 
into belief causation on occasion. 
The second possible reading, in which practical reasons may weigh as reasons to 
have a belief, is unobjectionable and unproblematical, as I think is illustrated by the 
aversion of evil by having an irrational belief — irrational, that is to say, in virtue of 
lacking truth-conducive reason. I think we should simply acknowledge that there can 
be circumstances in which believings can be non-standard doings and that in such 
circumstances a practical reason can defeat or silence a directive epistemic reason. 
But that does not amount to the practical reason being a reason to believe but rather 
the practical reason countering the practical reason for conforming to the general 
constitutive constraints on beliefs, the practical reason for knowing whether p. That 
just makes it another example of the general case in which it can be instrumentally 
rational to undermine one’s rational constitution.  
Admittedly, this is a way of conceding that what you ought to believe need not be 
what is correct to believe, but it concedes it in a way which gives little solace to 
anyone who thinks that non-epistemic reasons are proper. For it does not amount to 
asserting that believing against the evidence but in line with a practical reason is 
fully rational, but rather that such believing is at the cost of rationality. Sometimes 
that is a price that should be paid, and a certain amount of it can be tolerated at a 
price, but too much of it can be harmful. I think we have some empirical evidence, 
perhaps in the case of grief, or during war, that sufficiently intense conflict between 
practical reasons and directive epistemic reasons can contribute to undermining the 
coherence of a person precisely by undermining their conformity to constitutive 
constraints of belief.  
What this concession does not amount to is what Heil characterises 
consequentialists as wanting, namely to ‘tie warranted beliefs to practical reasoning’ 
(1983:754, my emphasis). On the contrary, it is merely the concession that 
sometimes what you ought to believe is completely unwarranted. Once we are 
sensitive to the correctness-directivity distinction, the latter statement loses its 
contradictory character. Warrant is to do with correctness of belief when you have a 
practical reason to know, but there can be exceptional circumstances in which your 
practical reason for knowing the truth is defeated by a practical reason to have a 
certain belief. The circumstances must be exceptional because significant 
undermining of the constitutive constraints of belief results not in lots of irrational 
beliefs, but in no longer having beliefs.  
Consequently, what ought to be believed is determined by what one has reason to 
know and what one should believe of it is whatever truth conducive considerations 
determine. Evidentialism is true. Our capacity for reflective awareness requires that 
some epistemic norms show themselves in attitudes we must take towards our own 
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beliefs. For this reason there are many arguments in favour of evidentialism that start 
from principles constraining our attitudes to our beliefs based on the nature of belief. 
For example, ‘as a believer you must represent certain of your propositional attitudes 
as accountable to truth and as disciplined by truth–orientated norms’ (Railton 
1997:59). These arguments frequently make use of a premiss of doxastic 
involuntarism. It is difficult to see how beliefs could be voluntary, but what is crucial 
to the variety of evidentialism I have defended is not their involuntary nature but 
their informational role. I have not argued from how as a believer you must regard 
your beliefs, nor have I had to assume involuntarism. I have argued from 
informational role to what can count as reasons to believe. If voluntarism is true, that 
would not undermine the evidentialism I have put forward. 
 
In summary,  whatever other roles beliefs may accidentally play, they are 
essentially informational and reasons to believe must be properly related to that 
informational role. Practical reasons cannot be so related, although they may be 
related to accidental roles of beliefs. As such they may be a reason to want something 
to be true, or to have a particular belief , and for that reason we may refer to a 
practical reason as a non-epistemic reason to believe it. But that locution is 
misleading, and it would be better to admit that strictly speaking there are no non-
epistemic reasons to believe. Strictly speaking, evidentialism (of some kind) is true. 
Consequently, the only proper reasons to believe are theoretical reasons, where the 
directivity comes from the reason to enquire, not from the normativity of correctness 
of belief. Therefore the nature of reasons to believe does not imply that the 
correctness normativity of belief is intrinsically directive, and so they do not threaten 
my position. 
5.5 Practical reasons and evidential standards 
Finally we consider whether practical reasons can determine evidential standards. 
Let us first discuss Kitcher’s animadversions to accepting evolutionary psychology 
(EP). 
given sufficient evidence for some hypothesis about humans, we should 
accept that hypothesis whatever its political implications. But…what 
counts as sufficient evidence is not independent of the political 
consequences. If the costs of being wrong are sufficiently high, then it 
is reasonable…to ask for more evidence than…where mistakes are 
relatively innocuous….These conclusions…rest…on fundamental ideas 
about rational decision….agents should act so as to maximize expected 
utility. The rationality of adopting…a scientific hypothesis thus 
depends not merely on the probability that the hypothesis is true…but 
on the costs and benefits of adopting it (or failing to adopt it) if it is true 
5.5 Practical reasons and evidential standards 
 
 
101
and…if it is false….Drug manufacturers rightly insist on higher 
standards of evidence when there are potentially dangerous 
consequences from marketing a new product. (1985:8-11) 
Since we have many good reasons for wanting to know about human nature, 
epistemic reasons join with the reasons to know to give us composite theoretical 
reasons. The early sentences imply that adverse political consequences justify 
placing higher evidential standards on accepting some hypotheses than on others, 
hence imply that non-epistemic reasons determine or influence the weight of the 
epistemic reasons.  
Because the reasons for knowing about human nature go beyond desiring 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake, placing high evidential standards does not result in 
suspending belief about human nature and does not furnish a position of neutrality. 
Insofar as whether evolutionary psychology (EP) or the standard social science 
model (SSSM) is true makes a difference to policy, policy decisions amount to tacit 
endorsements of one or other.22 Placing a higher evidential barrier on EP is not a way 
of suspending judgement about human nature, but amounts to a bias in favour of 
SSSM, purportedly justified by non-epistemic reasons furnished by 
consequentialism. The problem is that taken like that, the bias would seem to be both 
confusing the practical reasons with the epistemic reasons, and might well be 
practically irrational, since things needn’t be better if EP is true but the policy that is 
followed is the one that would only be correct if SSSM is true.  
However, once Kitcher moves on to speaking of the use of rational decision theory 
he shifts his grounds. For now he is allowing that the evidence should be given its 
evidential weight to determine the probability of EP and of SSSM, and then 
determining policy by weighting value of policy outcomes by probability of truth of 
EP and SSM. Likewise, the drug manufacturer’s example can be understood in 
purely practical terms and has nothing to do with how strongly one should believe 
the new drug to be curative.  
In Kitcher’s examples we see characteristic ways in which practical reasons can 
appear to be non-epistemic reasons when they are not. Perhaps the central point is in 
my penultimate paragraph: because most of the time we have reasons to know not 
purely for knowledge’s sake, suspension of belief may be unavailable. Because one 
must act, however tentative one’s beliefs may be one has no choice but to base action 
on them; consequently many decisions effect tacit endorsements of beliefs. This can 
seem as if the practical reasons weighed in the decision have become non-epistemic 
reasons to believe. But they are not, because you can’t infer the beliefs from the 
actions unless you know the preferences of the actor. Those tacit endorsements are 
not simple acceptances but playings of the odds relative to degrees of belief and 
                                                 
22
 In short (too short), the standard social science model is the belief that all are born with 
equal mental capacities and that differences are a consequence only of the environment.  
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values placed on outcomes, in which practical and epistemic reasons play practical 
and epistemic roles respectively. The practical reasons remain practical because they 
do not impact on belief, but impact on how evidentially correct degrees of belief 
result in action. The reason we may have the illusion that the practical reasons 
change the cognitive weighing of the epistemic reasons is evident from the EP/SSSM 
example. Any case in which cost of policy based on a falsehood is much less if the 
falsehood is SSSM than if it is EP can be misrepresented as one in which EP appears 
to face a higher evidential barrier. For in that case adopting the policy based on EP 
would require that the probability of EP proportionally outweigh the high relative 
cost of its falsehood. Only then will the expected utility of the policy following EP 
exceed the expected utility of the policy following SSSM. But that is not a non-
epistemic reason influencing the weight of an epistemic reason by raising an 
evidential barrier about what to believe, but two practical reasons (expected utilities) 
being weighed to determine what to do.  
Owens considers a possibility rather more awkward for my position. I explained 
above why he rejects the possibility of the rational motivation of belief by reflective 
judgement. In general, such judgement would have to conclude that the evidence was 
inconclusive with respect to the relevant epistemic norms and would therefore not be 
able to motivate full belief, because to fully believe requires being able to claim 
knowledge. But having judged the evidence inconclusive one would not be able to 
claim knowledge. Rather, full belief is not under reflective control, but is a result of 
being responsive to reasons, being ‘motivated by an awareness of reasons which 
would justify that state’ (Owens 2000:4).  
Owens thinks that the epistemic norms governing belief ‘invoke both evidential 
and non-evidential considerations’, which latter he calls pragmatic considerations. 
Although he denies that ‘the rationality of a belief is…determined by [its] 
…desirability’ (2000:24), so is not governed by practical norms, he nevertheless 
thinks that the rational motivation of full belief depends on pragmatic considerations, 
such as  
how important the issue is, what the consequences of having a certain 
belief on the matter would be and how much of my limited cognitive 
resources I ought to devote to it before reaching a conclusion 
(2000:27). 
Reasonable belief requires ‘sufficient evidence…to warrant belief’(2000:25). But 
the evidence possessed is generally inconclusive. Unless the evidentialist is willing 
to be confined to warranted belief only when conclusive evidence is possessed, he 
must set the level of sufficient evidence at less than conclusive evidence. The 
evidentialist must meet the challenge ‘to tell us in purely evidential terms what level 
of evidence is needed to justify belief’ (2000:26). Owens does not think that this 
challenge can be met. This may be less of a problem for externalists about 
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justification, who can ‘say that contextual factors determine’ (2000:25) sufficiency. 
For the internalist, however, ‘rational belief must be motivated by factors of which 
the subject is aware’, and it seems to be awareness of pragmatic considerations 
which determines how much evidence is sufficient for full belief. 
evidence alone can never convince a reasonable person of 
anything…because evidence alone can never determine when he has 
sufficient evidence to form a belief; other non-evidential factors are 
essential to reasonable belief....The pragmatic constraints…operate in a 
…‘subterranean’ way to produce belief in a proposition, given the 
evidence for it....To believe that p, I must be under the impression that I 
have a conclusive reason to think p true….My awareness of 
inconclusive evidence…combines with a sense of the constraints on my 
cognitive resources to produce the impression of a conclusive reason. 
(2000:34-5) 
This seems to amount to the claim that rational full belief is caused by an 
impression of (belief that you have?) a conclusive reason when you don’t, which 
sounds odd. Later Owens distinguishes ‘inconclusive evidence and…reasons’ from 
‘conclusive grounds’ (2000:39). To have conclusive grounds is to be in a state 
requiring certain relations to the world, such as, for example, perceiving snow 
requires the presence of snow. 
Reasons are what motivate and justify the subject's belief; grounds are 
what the subject needs in order to have knowledge….the subject can 
believe he has conclusive grounds for p and yet be perfectly well aware 
that his evidence for p, the reasons which motivate his belief in p, are 
inconclusive. (2000:39) 
So awareness of inconclusive evidence and awareness of pragmatic constraint on 
cognitive resources causes full belief in p by causing a belief that he has conclusive 
grounds. There is a danger of a regress here, since if the belief he has conclusive 
grounds is itself a full belief, it must presumably be caused by a further belief that he 
has conclusive grounds for it. It must therefore be a partial belief commensurate with 
the level of evidence. So now we have it that a partial belief that one has conclusive 
grounds is sufficient to motivate full belief, where the level of sufficiency required 
depends on pragmatic considerations. 
Pragmatic considerations that bear as reasons to know whether p are compatible 
with my composite directive account of theoretical reasons. The problem for me is if 
pragmatic considerations are needed to determine how much evidence is sufficient 
for reasonable belief. Owens maintains that I cannot account for the standards of 
sufficiency for full belief in purely evidential concerns, and consequently ‘the only 
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way out…is to abandon belief altogether’ (2000:27). I am left with inconclusive 
evidence leading only to states of partial belief.  
This might be acceptable to me. If partial belief does all the jobs held to be done 
by belief states in general, I don’t see being committed to such a revision as a 
reductio. It has to be conceded, however, that we certainly seem to have full beliefs 
and suspensions of beliefs as well. Also, that differing pragmatic considerations of 
the kind he adduces can result in the same evidence bringing about full belief on 
some occasions and not on others.  
There are two problems here. Firstly, whether the standards of sufficiency of 
inconclusive evidence for full belief can be evidentially grounded. Secondly, why 
these pragmatic considerations influence the formation or otherwise of full belief on 
the same evidence. 
If the first of these problems could be resolved, the second would be less pressing. 
For it might be that we make our mind up under these kinds of pressures provided 
our evidence is close enough to evidential sufficiency, but not otherwise. Both the 
pressures and our beliefs bear widely on our practical situation; we must act whether 
from full or partial belief; we can act as if something is the case and sometimes come 
to believe it to be so just because we so acted; there are limitations on the fineness of 
discriminations we can make; regions of rationality have vague borders. All this may 
make it possible for our formation of full beliefs to depart from strict correlation with 
sufficiency of evidence because of pragmatic pressures. Once the evidence is in the 
region of sufficiency, the significance of what is at issue may settle the matter, but 
does so for practical rather than epistemic reasons.  
The question of whether the standards of sufficiency of inconclusive evidence for 
full belief can be evidentially grounded is an issue worthy of a book in its own right, 
and for that reason I am not going to try to argue the matter one way or the other. I 
am instead going to suggest a way in which Owens’ challenge can be deflected in 
terms which he himself makes use of.  
Owens later on grants his full belief states a variable degree of cognitive inertia, 
the degree of which is determined by the evidence on which the full belief was 
formed. He points out that we do not generally retain the evidence, but form full 
beliefs and dispose of the evidence. A full belief is not open for reconsideration, but 
must be open to being shaken, and what it takes to shake it depends on its cognitive 
inertia.  
Once more, this has phenomenological plausibility. But it makes it less clear that 
Owens’ pragmatism and mine are really at odds. I hold that a theoretical reason is 
composed of a directive reason to know whether p, which is not itself an epistemic 
matter, with the truth conducive correctness reasons given by the evidence. The 
nature of full belief allows a certain transparency and speed of decision in the light of 
belief not had in the case of weighing the probabilities against the possible losses and 
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benefits. The having of full beliefs as opposed to partial beliefs is, in that sense, a 
practical matter. So I could allow that the pragmatic concerns Owens considers may 
legitimately interact with the directive reason to know whether p to influence 
whether the evidence is sufficient for full belief, and that need not be a problem for 
my account provided the truth conducive concerns have a level at which their 
influence is preserved unsullied by the pragmatic influences. But that is precisely 
what Owens’ notion of cognitive inertia provides. So I might conclude that the 
virtues of full belief as opposed to partial belief are in any case a practical matter, 
and so explain away the threat posed by the influence of pragmatic concerns on full 
belief. In that case, the challenge Owens poses to the evidentialist does not have to be 
met. 
 
I have now considered several significant ways in which the normativity of 
theoretical reason may appear to be intrinsically (pro tanto) directive and explained 
that appearance away on the basis of composite directive normativity. I conceded that 
some intransigent intuitions may remain despite these explanations, and I cannot 
claim to have considered every possible ground which might be given for those 
intuitions. I have at least illustrated some ways in which my argument goes. I have 
also left in abeyance the wider questions of the relation of virtue and belief which are 
to be addressed in chapter 9. We have now finished what I must concede to be only a 
preliminary defence to objections to the normativity of rationality being correctness 
alone. I now turn to making my objections to taking the normativity of rationality to 
be intrinsically directive and showing that it being correctness alone avoids the 
problems raised.  
 6 Instrumental rationality 
6.1 Introduction 
We now embark on three chapters which pursue an extended line of argument. We 
start from the second win for rationalism and find ourselves led to a dilemma which I 
claim can only be resolved by instrumentalism.  
I am going to start with my account of instrumental rationality and then consider 
why instrumental rationality may be thought to be directive. We will then explore the 
consequences of assuming that instrumental rationality is intrinsically directive. We 
will examine Kant’s hypothetical imperative, and I shall argue that there are no true 
Kantian hypothetical imperatives. I shall suggest that the problem we see for Kant’s 
hypothetical imperative appears also in pure practical reason and in theoretical 
reason. We find ourselves committed to spurious obligations and spuriously justified 
beliefs. The rationalist therefore needs a principled account which gets round these 
difficulties. Broome offers one such account for reasoning to necessary means in 
terms of his normative requirement relation. I generalise the account to cover also 
reasoning to sufficient means, and to practical and theoretical reasoning. The 
resulting general form of an obligation to be rational seems to get round the 
problems, and it may now appear that the normativity of rationality can be construed 
entirely in terms of directivity. But this doesn’t work. It avoids the problem of 
spurious normativity, but, as we shall see, does so at the cost of the normativity of 
rational guidance.  
The rationalist who thinks instrumental rationality and reason are intrinsically 
directive cannot avoid this dilemma. Taking the normativity of rationality to be 
correctness, however, makes it possible to go between the horns. So doing we find 
that the hypothetical imperative as Kant developed it confuses distinct issues. 
Reformulated as I suggest, it is not a pure principle of rationality, but a principle 
concerned with the normativity of instrumental rationality as servant of directivity. I 
show how we can similarly go between the horns for the general form of an 
obligation to be rational, so articulating the relation between the normativity of 
rationality and obligation, more broadly, the relation between the correctness 
normativity of rationality and the directive normativity of reasons. I thereby refute 
the second win whilst explaining why the premiss of line 5 of the argument for 
instrumentalism is true for the instrumentalist. 
6.2 Transmissivism 
Let’s formulate the notion to which the rationalist appeals in the second win under 
the name of ‘transmissivism’. Transmissivism says that instrumental rationality 
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transmits directivity from ends to means, and similarly that reasoning transmits 
directivity, so that if one is in mental states one ought to be in, then reasoning 
correctly on their basis leads one to what one ought to do and believe. The rationalist 
claims that transmissivism requires rationality to be intrinsically directive. Its 
normativity being correctness alone is insufficient for action to acquire the needed 
directivity: insufficient to explain what to do, why we ought to be instrumentally 
rational and how reason can oblige us by its conclusions. 
First, my position: To be instrumentally rational is to take believed necessary 
means to ends. One part of the rationality of instrumental rationality is the rationality 
of the belief about a particular action being a necessary means. Given sufficiently 
irrational beliefs about means to ends, it might be sensible to deny the instrumental 
rationality of someone who follows those irrational beliefs. Let us just acknowledge 
that there may be a necessary constraint on the quality of beliefs about necessary 
means. Somewhere along the spectrum from knowledge through beliefs that are 
justified, unjustified but rational, reasonable, not unreasonable, to beliefs that are 
unreasonable, silly, or ludicrous, someone’s instrumental rationality fails not so much 
because they fail to take believed necessary means but because their beliefs about the 
means are insufficiently rational. We shall assume that the belief  about means and 
ends passes whichever muster it must. What I am concerned with here is only that 
part of instrumental rationality which is the taking of the believed necessary means. 
Since to achieve an end it is necessary to take some sufficient means of whichever 
sufficiencies are available, dealing with necessary means includes dealing with 
sufficiency. It is wasteful to take necessary but insufficient means, for example, 
buying a train ticket but not getting on the train, so instrumental rationality also 
requires taking the collection of necessary means that constitute the sufficiency one 
has chosen to pursue. The sufficiencies, however, are sufficiencies within one’s 
power. Getting oneself onto the train discharges the requirement to take some 
sufficient means even though the success of one’s action depends also on the train 
driver doing his part. 
Not to (intend to) take believed necessary means to ends is irrational in two ways.  
Firstly, it cuts against the constitution of the mental states (and their constituent 
parts) of intending the end and believing the untaken means to be necessary. For part 
of what makes the belief the mental state that it is is that it disposes you to take those 
means when you intend that end. Part of what makes the intention the mental state 
that it is is that it disposes you to do whatever you believe necessary to achieve the 
end. The states get their identity from the roles they play and the roles played by their 
constituent parts in other states. Failures of role are weakenings of constitution. 
Although Kant overstates it, these are the relations which underlie his passage 
asserting that whoever wills the end wills the means.  
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Secondly, instrumental irrationality cuts against the success of mental states. For 
the point of having informational states about means is that ends get brought about 
because of that information. Instrumental irrationality undermines the successful 
achievement of intended ends. This is such a basic part of the rational economy that 
it is one of the reasons that constitutive and success correctness for rationality are not 
cleanly separable. Having apparently fanciful beliefs about matters of marginal 
practical importance is one thing. But for states to count as intentions and means-end 
beliefs they must bring about commensurate successful actions, and if they don’t do 
so sufficiently often then they aren’t such states at all.  
Now since the substance of rationality is given by constitutive rationality and the 
proper functioning of the rational capacities there is nothing further in rationality to 
make the normativity of instrumental rationality directive. Quite clearly, nothing 
about these considerations make it the case that you ought, directively, take believed 
necessary means to an end for the simple reason that perhaps you shouldn’t have that 
end at all.  
That is my position. The rationalist, however, is unlikely to accept this as a defeat 
of the second win for rationalism. He thinks that the necessity of means to worthy 
ends and the obligation to take means to worthy ends requires instrumental 
rationality to be intrinsically directive. If its normativity is correctness alone, we are 
left merely with the directed worthy end and a normatively correct means to that end, 
which is, he says, insufficient for means to acquire the needed directivity. But the 
means are directed. Therefore instrumental rationality must be intrinsically directive. 
The rationalist can carry this argument yet further. Korsgaard offers an argument 
based on the thought that ‘practical reason requires us to take the means to our end’ 
(1997:215). She agrees with me that the directivity here needs examining; we 
disagree on where that examination takes us.  
A normative principle of instrumental action cannot exist unless there 
are also normative principles directing the adoption of ends. (1997:233) 
For Korsgaard, that extent of action covered by the legitimate directivity of the 
instrumental principle is proof of the thick directivity of substantive rationality; the 
reason being that since the principle is a principle of rationality, since it directs one to 
take the means, and since that would be illegitimate unless the ends were proper, 
whether the ends are proper must itself be a matter of rationality. For me it is the 
proof that the instrumental principle qua a pure principle of rationality is not 
directive. Wallace comments on these divergent understandings thus:  
There are two tendencies in our thinking about instrumental rationality 
that do not…cohere…well. On the one hand, the instrumental 
principle…does not seem to apply indifferently to any end that we 
might be motivated to pursue. There is…no…requirement to take the 
[necessary] means…for…ends that one merely happens to desire. This 
6.3 Kant’s hypothetical imperative 
 
 
109
encourages what we might call a moralizing tendency in reflection 
about instrumental reason: the supposition that instrumental 
requirements come on the scene only in relation to ends that have 
themselves been endorsed in some way by the agent, as ends that it 
would be good or desirable to achieve. On the other hand, it seems 
undeniable that agents can display a kind of instrumental rationality in 
the pursuit of ends that they do not themselves endorse (Wallace 
2001:1) 
I think Wallace remains in the grip of the thought that its not really instrumentally 
rational unless the end is proper. I shall eventually show that instrumentalism offers a 
clearer understanding: instrumental rationality does not directively require you to 
take the means to your ends, it merely specifies that doing so is rational, and when 
the end is proper, then the directivity of the end is transmitted to the means by what I 
say is the composite directive norm of instrumental rationality: that ends normatively 
require means. 
6.3 Kant’s hypothetical imperative 
Suppose that instrumental rationality is intrinsically directive. Kant is committed 
to this in a very strong way. I have argued elsewhere that  
฀⎯ Kantian hypothetical imperatives have the form ‘If you want ฀Φ then you ought to 
฀Ψ’ where the scope of the ought is narrow, and in which therefore by modus 
ponens wanting ฀Φ implies you ought to ฀Ψ. 
฀⎯ For each means-end fact there is a corresponding hypothetical imperative.  
฀⎯ Kant’s attempt to weaken the force of the hypothetical imperative is not 
consistent with his explanation of the nature of commands of reason, of which 
the hypothetical imperative is one.  
฀⎯ Consequently, the nature of the obligation imposed by the hypothetical 
imperative is not distinct from that imposed by categorical imperatives.  
฀⎯ Therefore all Kantian imperatives express obligations which override and rule 
out contrary obligations. 
Kant’s hypothetical imperative quickly gets into difficulties. Suppose I want a 
drink and the necessary means is opening the fridge. Natural necessity grounds the 
truth of the hypothetical imperative ‘If I want a drink I ought to open the fridge’. I do 
want a drink, therefore I ought to open the fridge. The obligation to open the fridge is 
overriding and non-conflicting. Yet suppose opening the fridge will set off a bomb 
shortly. Clearly, I have an overriding and non-conflicting obligation not to open the 
fridge. Contradiction. 
Some will say that the contradiction can be avoided if we deny that 
(Op฀∧Oq)฀→(O(p฀∧q)), and there are arguments which pose difficulties for this 
principle and its converse (e.g. Carlson 1999). However, the significance of showing 
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the nature of the obligation expressed by Kant’s imperatives to be overriding and 
non-conflicting is that if ฀Φ and ฀Ψ are incompatible, then when ‘O’ expresses this 
obligation, ¬(O฀Φ฀∧O฀Ψ) is necessarily true, and for this reason this contradiction is 
intolerable.  
This is sufficient to show that Kantian hypothetical imperatives are not true. 
Merely wanting something is insufficient to entail an overriding non-conflicting 
obligation to adopt necessary means to achieve it. Therefore we should conclude that 
there are no true Kantian hypothetical imperatives.  
The claim that there are no true Kantian hypothetical imperatives is likely to 
provoke a number of significant reservations. Am I not being excessively 
uncharitable to Kant? What about the many subtleties in the use of ‘ought’? Might a 
distinction between moral and rational oughts be relevant? Furthermore, the 
hypothetical-categorical distinction marks a significant distinction in metaethical 
approaches. Any failures of the detail of how he first formulated that distinction are 
an irrelevance. Finally, Kant is merely expressing himself in a standard modally 
fallacious way. 
I could only answer these suggestions by going over my full arguments for Kant’s 
commitment, but we are not primarily concerned with determining what Kant is 
committed to. The point here is to show that taking the normativity of instrumental 
rationality to be intrinsically directive can cause some very serious problems.  
I want to briefly discuss the modal fallacy point, since the question of scope will 
later exercise us for some time. The point is, people often say things such as ‘if a 
shape has three sides it must be a triangle’ when they should say, ‘necessarily, if a 
shape has three sides, then it is a triangle’. Similarly, ‘if I want to survive, I must pull 
the ripcord’ is just sloppy talk for ‘necessarily, if I want to survive, I pull the ripcord’. 
Hence Blackburn’s suggestion that Kant (and Korsgaard in the argument mentioned 
above) is merely misconstruing the scope of obligation in the hypothetical 
imperative. It should be given as 
you must, if you are to be rational, obey the principle that if you intend 
the end you intend the means. (Blackburn 2000:243) 
First, even if  ‘if I want to survive, I must to pull the ripcord’ is a modally fallacious 
expression of the intended truth, ‘if a shape has three sides it must be a triangle’ is 
not, so a mere insistence that the logical form of natural language modal conditionals 
is ٪(p฀→q) won’t do the job. Nevertheless, we will see shortly the power of 
construing the form of normative principles entirely in terms of wide scope modal 
conditionals. However, I will eventually argue that the problem here cannot be fully 
resolved thus. I shall also have something more to say about the hypothetical 
imperative. Before we get there, I want to show that the problem broached here is of 
wider significance than instrumental rationality alone. 
 
6.4 Widening the problem 
 
 
111
 
6.4 Widening the problem  
We now see that this argument is valid but not sound when understood in terms of 
Kant’s hypothetical imperative: 
1. If I want a drink, I ought to open the fridge 
2. I do want a drink.  
3. Therefore I ought to open the fridge.   (฀α)23 
The problem evinced by the hypothetical imperative is of wider relevance to 
rationality than its appearance in instrumental reasoning. There are cases of 
arguments to what ought morally to be done and ought rationally to be believed 
which appear to share the modal form of (฀α) but which need not be valid. I claim 
therefore that the problem we have now encountered is a problem for both practical 
reason and theoretical reason, and hence a problem for the normativity of rationality 
in general.  
The Good Samaritan paradox (Forrester 1984) runs as follows  
4. If you are going to murder someone, you ought to murder them gently.  
5. You are going to murder Fred. 
6. Therefore you ought to murder Fred gently.  (฀β) 
Yet it does not follow that you ought to murder Fred gently. For murdering Fred 
gently entails murdering him, so if you ought to murder him gently, you ought to 
murder him —but the consequent is false and so it must also be false that you ought 
to murder Fred gently. 
In the literature addressing this paradox it has been suggested that the entailment 
from gently murdering to murdering is invalid. Other problematical derivations, such 
as that since you ought to give to beggars there ought to be beggars to give to, show 
that derivations that oblige the entailments of the propositional content of true 
obligations can easily go wrong. I am going to set aside such considerations, since 
for my purposes this paradox is illustrative of the more general problem with which I 
am concerned.  
It might be thought that (฀α) could be valid whilst (฀β) is not provided there were to 
be distinct senses of ought in play, a rational ought and a moral ought, and that the 
form of this argument 
7. P฀→OQ  
8. P  
9. therefore OQ  (฀γ) 
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 Arguments named by Greek letter on the right. 
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is valid for the rational oughts but not for moral oughts. But this problem seems also 
to arise in arguments about probable truths, as Hempel showed some time ago 
(Hempel 1965:394-403) and also in arguments about believing logical entailments. 
For example,  
10. If x is a raven x is probably black 
11. Fred is a raven 
12. Therefore Fred is probably black  (฀δ) 
Now deductive arguments are usually thought to be monotonic, that is, subject to the 
law of weakening: that if A฀⎞C then A฀∧B฀⎞C. So a test of whether an argument is a 
valid argument is to see whether the law of weakening applies to it. But if in addition 
to 11 we had ‘Fred is a white raven’ then 12 would be false. This suggests that the 
argument is not valid (since it fails the test of weakening). Yet the correlate argument 
to (฀δ) got by replacing ‘probably’ with the epistemic modal ‘ought’ gives us an 
argument with the form (฀γ). Given that it appears to be not so much a moral but a 
rational obligation to believe what is probable, this example would seem to show that 
even if there are distinct sorts of ought, the rational ought would face the same 
problem as the moral ought.  
Furthermore, much reason-based reasoning is non-monotonic (fails the test of 
weakening). Not uncommonly on the basis of reasons x1,…, xn, one ought to do or 
believe ฀δ whilst on the basis of reasons x1,…xn, xn+1, one ought not to. However, 
solving the problem by excluding non-monotonic arguments fails. Suppose ฀Ψ is a 
logical consequence of ฀Φ. Then if you believe ฀Φ you ought to believe ฀Ψ. So the 
following seems correct 
13. if you believe ฀Φ you ought to believe ฀Ψ 
14. you believe ฀Φ 
15. therefore you ought to believe ฀Ψ  (฀ε) 
If this was correct, then anyone who accepted the fallacious step in a mathematical 
fallacy would believe something which entailed that 0=1.24 So, if (฀ε) is correct, they 
ought to believe that 0=1, which, of course, they ought not. Here, however, is a 
distinguished philosopher asserting the correctness of (฀ε): 
Someone who believes that P, and that if P then Q, ought to believe 
that Q. (Jackson 2000:101) 
The problem here is that we seem to bootstrap ourselves into spuriously justified 
beliefs: my ludicrous belief that the moon is made of green cheese makes me 
justified in believing moon rock makes a good snack. 
In fact, many principles of rationality are expressed as conditionals of the form of 
the major premisses of  (฀α), (฀β), (฀δ) and (฀ε), that is to say, conditionals with modal 
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consequents. Firstly, whenever ฀Ψ is a means to ฀Φ we are inclined to hold that if you 
intend to ฀Φ then you ought to฀Ψ, so the entirety of instrumental rationality seems 
committed to such conditionals. Secondly, reasoning, whether practical or 
theoretical, typically issues in judgements that on the basis of reasons x1,…, xn, one 
ought to do or believe ฀Φ. The law of deduction states that if ฀Δ, P ฀⎞Q then ฀Δ฀⎞P฀→Q, 
and formally similar (but defeasible) laws apply in induction, so such reasoning 
would seem to entrain conditionals of the form that if ฀∧( x1,…, xn) then one ought to 
฀Φ.25  
Consequently, there would appear to be a way of accounting for obligations to be 
rational as part of a uniform account of obligations. Such obligations can be 
accounted for in terms of conditionals of the form P฀→OQ expressing the relevant 
principles, circumstances in which ฀Φ is true, and modus ponens. Of course, a full 
account would have to include the grounds for the truth of the conditionals.  
Unfortunately, we have seen that this strategy doesn’t work. The problem is that 
we have what appear to be conditionals with modal consequents for which modus 
ponens fails (because when applied to true premisses it gives false conclusions). That 
surely is a conclusive reason to think that P฀→OQ is not the logical form of the 
relevant conditionals.  
So the problem would seem to be general. Taking the normativity of rationality to 
be intrinsically directive results in reasonings to spurious obligations and 
justifications of belief. This has been a consequence of formulating the relevant 
normative principles in terms of narrow scope modal conditionals: such as that if you 
want ฀Φ then you ought to ฀Ψ. The way out already mooted might be to say the such 
principles should be formulated by giving the normative operator wide scope, 
namely, that you ought, if you want ฀Φ, to ฀Ψ (O(P ฀→Q)). That is not a conditional 
from which, given that you want ฀Φ, we can detach a spuriously normative 
consequent on the basis of the truth of its antecedent.  If we are going to allow the 
rationalist his intrinsic directivity for rationalism, we would like to see a systematic 
account along these lines. In a series of papers John Broome has developed an 
account for principles of instrumental necessity, and in the next chapter I shall 
generalise his account to the rationalist’s benefit.  
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 Take ‘P’ to be ‘฀∧(x1,…, xn)’ (the conjunction of x1,…, xn) and ‘Q’ to be ‘one ought to ฀δ’. 
 7 The Form of an Obligation to be 
Rational 
7.1 Reasoning 
Characterising reasoning correctly is not easily done.  
Reasoning is a mental act in which one judgement, decision, or 
withholding is grounded upon other judgements, decisions, or 
withholdings. (Binkley 1965:430) 
This seems right, but what is the process of grounding? Taking the process as the 
rehearsal of a sequence of thoughts seems too simple. Pondering, deliberation and 
reasoning all merge into one another, and what we actually do might be better 
described in terms of bringing to mind a range of what we take to be relevant 
considerations, allowing the pre-conscious mind to offer up additional 
considerations, maintaining the considerations in the penumbra of consciousness 
whilst we toy with various combinations of them, maintaining a willingness to 
entertain new offerings from the pre-conscious mind, even to entertain some prima 
facie irrelevant thoughts, whilst being wary of wandering off into actually irrelevant 
day-dreams. Maybe towards the end of this process there is something that resembles 
a sequence of inferences passing through the mind, some rehearsals of sequences of 
thoughts, some being premisses, others conclusions. But that may rather be a tidying 
up operation, a recapitulation or marshalling of what was already grasped.  
The decisive objection to the transition view of reasoning is that since it 
does not allow premise and conclusion to come together in the same act 
of thought, it cannot find a rational connection between apprehension 
of the one and apprehension of the other. Reasoning becomes mere 
association of ideas. (Binkley 1965:431) 
On the other hand, mentally rehearsing beliefs in a certain way, which beliefs 
logically imply a further belief, can cause one to believe the further belief because of 
and on the basis of the premiss beliefs, even if one has only tacit knowledge of the 
logical relation between them which makes it correct for beliefs to have been so 
revised or amplified.  
With these reservations noted, I shall be speaking of reasoning as a sequence of 
mental states. Practical reasoning, including instrumental, teleological and normative 
components, and theoretical reasoning, consist in such sequences. 
In much of what I shall have to say about practical reason, I shall be representing 
the mental states concerned as having the possibility of being correctly related: that 
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their relations are subject to rational evaluation, that practical reasoning can be done 
better or worse. It seems that something like that must be right, but it is nothing like 
the sense in which logic seems to specify relations of rational correctness at work in 
theoretical reason. It must rather be acknowledged that whether there is anything 
which can properly be called the logic of practical inference, and what it might be if 
there is, is highly controversial. For example, Castañeda 1963 says there is a logic of 
imperatives which Sellars 1963 rejects, but he in turn thinks intentions can imply one 
another via their contents. Rational correctness here may never be satisfactorily 
captured in even the loosest semantics or principles of proof. It may all only be 
characterisable in terms of contextual constraint, ‘the intelligibility of action for a 
purpose’ and that ‘there are sensible and less sensible ways of proceeding’ (Price 
2004). Rather than trying to discuss or resolve any such difficulties, I shall be trying 
to abstract away from them. 
7.2 Instrumental reason 
Broome distinguishes between detaching and non-detaching normative relations. 
He gives two detaching normative relations. 
If you have reason to q, there is some fact that makes this the case. 
Similarly, if you ought to q, there is some fact that makes this the case, 
too. Let p be the proposition that this fact obtains. (1999:80) 
The relations here are that p ‘reasons’ q or that p ‘oughts’ q. When these relations 
hold ‘one consequence is that p฀→Rq, where ฀→ is the material condition, [and] 
p฀→Oq’ respectively. Broome calls the conditionals the logical factors of the 
relations. The modal operators are narrow scope because the nature of these relations 
is such as to justify detachment of their modal consequents by modus ponens—hence 
detaching normative relations. 
The relational expressions are not logically equivalent to the conditionals because, 
whilst a logical factor is implied by the relation holding, the relational expression is 
the conditional ‘with determination added’ (1999:81). I take the point to be that it is 
p, and not anything else, that reasons or oughts q. If the relational and conditional 
expressions were logically equivalent then not only would p reason q, but so also 
would any r logically equivalent to p, which is unsatisfactory for standard reasons 
(for example, if r is (1=1)฀→ p).  
Broome points out a significant difference between the two relations: the oughts 
relation is strict since in this case if p is true then there is something wrong if ¬q; the 
reasons relation is slack because even if p is true, there may be a defeating reason 
such that on balance ¬q would be right. 26  
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 Some authors do not use ‘ought’ in this way. For example, ‘General ‘ought’ sentences are 
often used to assert that there is a case, which is not necessarily a conclusive one’ (Raz 
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The non-detaching relations Broome gives are normative requirement and 
normative recommendation: that p requires q or that p recommends q. These 
relations, too, have logical factors which are not logically equivalent, being O(p฀→q) 
and R(p฀→q). The strict/slack distinction marks the distinction between requirement 
and recommendation: 
Suppose p is true but q is not. Then if the requirement relation holds, 
you are definitely failing to see to something you ought to see to….if 
only the recommending relation holds, you may be failing to see to 
nothing you ought to see to. (1999:83) 
Broome holds that the way of presenting instrumental reasoning exhibited in (฀α) 
above is flawed. Practical reasoning does not issue in an act, since  
an action — at least a physical one— requires more than reasoning 
ability; it requires physical ability too. Intending to act is as close to 
acting as reasoning alone can get us, so we should take practical 
reasoning to be reasoning that concludes in an intention. (2002: 85)  
Broome distinguishes normative practical reasoning from instrumental practical 
reasoning, stating that the latter is ‘reasoning to a means you believe is necessary’ 
and that ‘the content of the beliefs and intentions that participate in the [latter] 
includes no normative propositions’ (2001:180). Broome offers a description of 
Chris’s instrumental reasoning 
writing ‘I’ for ‘you intend that’ and ‘B’ for ‘you believe that’ — both 
operators on propositions… 
I(Chris will buy a boat)  
B(For Chris to buy a boat, a necessary means is for Chris to borrow 
money)  
so I(Chris will borrow money). (2002:87) (฀ζ) 
and says that what makes such reasoning correct is that it ‘follows in a truth making 
way’(Broome 2002:89) the valid inference consisting of its contents: 
Chris will buy a boat  
For Chris to buy a boat a necessary means is for Chris to borrow money  
so Chris will borrow money. (2002:88) 
remarking that 
Even if David Hume was right that reasoning is concerned only with 
truth, he should still have recognized that reasoning can transmit the 
truth-making attitude as well as the truth-taking attitude. It can transmit 
intention as well as belief, so reasoning can be practical. (2002:89) 
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I re-express (฀ζ) as 
1. I฀Φ 
2. B(٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ))  (‘٪’ is for natural necessity) 
3. so I฀Ψ  (฀ζ) 
We have already seen why the relation between the premisses and conclusion could 
not be the oughts relation: because if it were we would have I฀Φ฀∧B(٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ))฀→OI฀Ψ 
as the logical factor and so make OI฀Ψ derivable when it could very well be that he 
ought not to ฀Ψ and so ought not to intend to ฀Ψ.27 Broome argues that the relation 
between the premisses and conclusion could not be the reasons relation because the 
relation between them is strict: if Chris intends to ฀Φ, believes ฀Ψ is a necessary means 
to ฀Φ but does not intend to ฀Ψ then Chris is not as he ought to be. Therefore the 
relation must be that the premisses normatively require the conclusion. Intending and 
believing as he does normatively requires Chris to intend to borrow money. The 
logical factor is  
O(I฀Φ฀∧B(٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ))฀→I฀Ψ)  (฀ξ) 
One might wonder whether (฀ξ) is sufficient. For example, if someone was in the 
state of I฀Φ฀∧B(٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ, it can look as if (฀ξ) says, indifferently, that they 
ought to change their belief or their intention. But arguably that is wrong. It should 
constrain the failure to intend the believed necessary means rather than permit a 
change of belief. On the other hand, given that someone is in a state 
I฀Φ฀∧B(٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ, should I฀Φ฀∧B(٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ)) normatively requiring I฀Ψ settle 
which mental state should change? I shall return to these questions later. 
 
On Broome’s account, then, Kant’s spurious obligations turn out to be because he 
mistakes normative requirements for ought relations. The solution is that the logical 
factor of the normative requirement relation is a conditional with wide rather than 
narrow scope, and consequently the mere truth of the antecedent does not permit the 
detachment of a spuriously normative conclusion. I want now to generalise his 
solution to cover spurious obligations and spuriously justified beliefs in all of 
instrumental, practical and theoretical reasoning. 
Broome is not claiming to have shown how to deal with all types of instrumental 
reasoning from ends to means, but just those from ends to necessary means. But the 
later sections of Broome 2002 give some support to the claim that (฀ζ) with suitable 
replacements of ٪(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ) (for example, ‘the best way for Chris to ฀Ψ is to ฀Φ) get the 
form of the reasoning right, and, more importantly, that for all such instrumental 
reasoning the relation of the premisses to the conclusion is normative requirement. 
However, that as it stands only amounts to covering necessary means, in a broad 
                                                 
27
 I shall disregard complications that the Toxin Paradox (Kavka 1983) induces for the 
relation between what you ought to do and what you ought to intend.  
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sense of necessary. It does not cover reasoning to instrumental sufficiency at all. I 
shall now show how to deal with all instrumental reasoning. 
We are going to introduce some apparatus in order to abstract from the 
considerable complications that partial and complete sufficiency and necessity 
produce for instrumental reasoning. We can afford to ignore them because those 
complications are a matter of determining which function or class of functions are 
acceptable for a means-end function, whilst we are concerned with the consequences 
of whichever is the correct one, and beliefs about whichever is the correct one, rather 
than the metaphysical and epistemological problems of determining which it is.  
Let the Arena (of action) be the set of all ordered pairs of circumstances and ends. 
In a circumstance, C, a sufficient means, M, is a fusion of individual means each of 
which is, relative to that sufficient means, necessary. So if there is only one sufficient 
means, its parts are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. We are only 
interested in acceptable means to ends. Unacceptability of a means would lead 
someone who intends the relevant end to abandon the end in the face of those means, 
or would be means that defeat the end. Let the AcceptableMeansToEnds relation be 
the relation of circumstantially acceptable sufficient means to ends, for simplicity 
gerrymandered by relating the empty action as means to ends when there are no 
acceptable means. Extensionally, AcceptableMeansToEnds consists of triples of 
means, circumstances and ends: ฀√M,C,E฀⋅. 
What is of interest to us is what I shall call the MeansEnd function, which maps 
each pair of circumstances and ends to a unique, sufficient, acceptable means. The 
value taken by MeansEnd for a given ฀〈C, E฀〉 satisfies a contextually circumscribed 
notion of best; for example, perhaps it’s the only sensible means in the 
circumstances. The domain of MeansEnd is the Arena, so that for every possible 
circumstance and end it delivers either a unique, circumstantially acceptable, 
sufficient best means, or the empty action. Each part of M is circumstantially 
necessary relative to the sufficiency of which it is a part. 
When we speak of seeking to improve our pursuit of rational means, or at least, to 
specify better what ideal rationality would be, we are seeking to find a (subset of a) 
means-end function in a contextually relevant part of the AcceptableMeansToEnds 
relation which is better, in some sense of better, than the (subset of the) current 
means-end function we are using. MeansEnd is the upper bound of all such means-
end functions, in the sense that for each member of the Arena, MeansEnd takes the M 
in AcceptableMeansToEnds which is the best M. Strictly speaking, MeansEnd is the 
unknown for which we seek partial solutions, solutions for the sets of circumstances 
and ends we face and care about. 
The problem of knowledge of means is the least of our philosophical difficulties. 
AcceptableMeansToEnds contains many subsets which are means-end functions. We 
have no general view of AcceptableMeansToEnds, but explore it piecemeal. 
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Consequently it matters whether our ethical concerns induce a well behaved and 
tractable ordering on the means-end functions. They may do, but I don’t see that they 
must, and if the ordering is badly enough behaved then improving our approximation 
to MeansEnd will be impossible, since there won’t be a piecemeal route from our 
current acceptable means-end function to it (or some part of it). A further 
epistemological difficulty is that varieties of contextually relevant acceptability may 
mean that AcceptableMeansToEnds is just one of a family of such relations, so our 
search will involve us in ordering in that family as well as ordering means-end 
functions within each member of that family.  
Even if the ordering is well behaved, significant problems  remain because of the 
recursive nature of our attempts at evaluating best means. The circumstances may 
include our desires, and our beliefs about the means and costs of satisfying those 
desires, and hence what costs we may incur in accomplishing the end in question. 
Furthermore, the costs and consequences of accomplishing the end in question by 
various means affect the resources available to achieve other desires. So for a given 
end, whilst there may be a determinate set of sets of individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient means, ordering that set is a non-trivial problem, because to choose 
the best set of means requires investigating for each set its effect on the achievement 
of other means.  
This may well require iteration: firstly, which set of means, M, is best given 
desires, beliefs and circumstances would have to be calculated. Then, on the 
assumption of using M, the effect on the ordering of desires in terms of expected 
utilities (for example) is calculated. Then which set of means is best would have to 
be recalculated, which may now be different. This process would have to be iterated 
until a fixed point was found, i.e., a set which, on the assumption of it being used, 
would still come top. There may be no such set and one may get a circle of mutually 
defeating winners: each one is the best if one of the others was chosen. Worse yet, 
different sets of means may incur different constraints on acceptability because they 
change the context. Finally, even when soluble, the algorithms to solve these sorts of 
problem are frequently intractable due to exponential growth in computation time as 
the number of relevant elements increases. Both as theoreticians about agents, and as 
agents ourselves, we face these algorithmic difficulties. It is hardly surprising that it 
can be very difficult to find even moderate optimality of means to ends, let alone 
have extensive knowledge of AcceptableMeansToEnds, or of MeansEnd.  
A reason for epistemological difficulties with ordering might be a metaphysical 
fact. Perhaps ethics is insufficient to make MeansEnd determinate, or worse, make 
AcceptableMeansToEnds determinate. Then there is no determinate solution we are 
searching for, and our beliefs about best means to ends are as much constructions of 
the MeansEnd function as attempts to represent it. Of course, we may still be able to 
order the means-end functions we know about, but in so doing, because our actions 
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based on so doing will change the future decision context, we may find our path 
diverging far from what it would have been had we, for example, changed the order 
of our choices when choosing between candidate means-end functions whose 
difference we hold to be small. This could be unsettling, for example, were it to 
eventually make the difference between having or rejecting capital punishment on 
the grounds of deterrence.  
Despite these difficulties, as agents our brain delivers orderings, and as 
theoreticians, we can understand that those orderings need merely be workable rather 
than optimal. When we consult our intuitions we come up with approximations to 
MeansEnd. Beliefs about the AcceptableMeansToEnds relation and which is the best 
means-end function determine the outcomes of our instrumental reasoning. There are 
many drinks in the world, so the one in my fridge is hardly necessary to satisfy my 
want, but when I want one, opening the fridge is, in some weak and contextually 
relative sense, the necessary means for me on that occasion. Intuitively, we converge 
in many of our beliefs about which ฀〈M,C,E฀〉 are members of the 
AcceptableMeansToEnds relation and even which are members of the MeansEnd 
function.  
So on the one hand we have well known difficulties for what it is to be the best 
means to an end and on the other the fact that we reason instrumentally despite them. 
The purpose of my formalism is precisely to abstract from the difficulties in order 
that we can consider the structure of instrumental reasoning. The specification of the 
MeansEnd function includes deliberately vague notions of necessity, acceptability 
and best in order to allow it to be moulded by whatever ethical story of best means is 
right. Only in this light should my further use of the MeansEnd function be 
understood.  
We now have that the general form of instrumental reasoning is 
4. I฀Φ 
5. B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ)) 
6. so I฀Ψ  (฀χ) 
Broome says 
reasoning…occurs amongst mental states…[which] have propositional 
contents….a correct process of reasoning (which is one that brings you 
to satisfy a normative requirement) is made correct…by the formal 
relations that hold between the mental states’ contents.(Broome 
2001:182) 
 Let ‘correct argument’ generalise over deductive (valid) and inductive (whether 
enumerative, to best explanation, or whatever) arguments and let ‘correct inference’ 
be their mental correlate in reasoning. Let the content principle be that a piece of 
practical or theoretical reasoning is a correct inference iff its contents constitute a 
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correct argument. By the content principle (฀χ) is correct whenever its contents 
constitute a correct argument: 
7. ฀Φ 
8. MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) 
9. therefore ฀Ψ  (฀υ) 
What will make such an argument correct is the nature of MeansEnd relation. When 
฀Ψ is a necessary (and acceptable) means to ฀Φ we can derive a material conditional 
฀Φ฀→฀Ψ from 8 and apply modus ponens to get 9.  
What we haven’t seen is how the correctness of the inference (฀χ) is justified when 
we are dealing with the sufficiency of ฀Ψ for ฀Φ. Sufficiency gives us that ฀Ψ฀→฀Φ, from 
which deriving 9 by 7 would be committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent 
(cf. Kenny 1975:70). I now show how instrumental reasoning to sufficient means can 
be correct, given the content principle and the principle I call   
Kant manqué: to intend to ฀Φ is to intend that for some acceptable 
means p which is sufficient, you will p.  
In terms of Broome’s example,  
I(Chris will buy a boat) iff I(For some p, that Chris will p is acceptable 
to Chris and (if Chris will p then Chris will buy a boat) and Chris will 
p).  
We need to check whether the contents are equivalent. First consider left to right. 
That Chris will buy a boat entails that Chris will use sufficient means. But does it 
entail that he will use means that are acceptable to him? We can certainly imagine 
circumstances in which external compulsion to buy the boat (the kidnap of his 
daughter, for example) leads him to use means which are unacceptable to him. 
However, acceptability depends on circumstance. He may find robbing a bank 
acceptable in these circumstances, but not murdering the cashier in order to do so. 
Second, right to left. That there is some p such that Chris will p and if Chris will p 
then Chris will buy a boat entails that Chris will buy a boat. So we have it that the 
contents are equivalent.  
The content principle tells us that when ฀Ψ is sufficient means to ฀Φ, the reasoning 
(฀χ) will be correct iff (฀υ) is a correct argument. So now we show (฀υ) correct. 
Premisses 10 and 12 below repeat the premisses of (฀υ) above (lines 7 & 8). Using 
‘Apq’ to express p is acceptable in circumstance q, I formalise Kant manqué and the 
correlate contents thus:28 
                                                 
28
 In these contexts ‘p’ and other symbols are frequently used with syntactic ambiguity, 
being sometimes a term for a proposition and other times a schematic letter for a sentence. I 
have been doing this above, but since there has been some controversy over reasonings to 
sufficient means, I want to avoid it here so no formal criticism can be raised of the argument 
that ensues. I have therefore specified (elsewhere) an extension of F.O.L. to avoid this 
formal incorrectness. The colons are an operator that apply to terms for a restricted class of 
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I฀Φ฀↔I(฀∃p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀∧:p:)) 
฀Φ฀↔฀∃p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀∧:p:) (premiss 11 below) 
We have specified that MeansEnd picks out a unique sufficient circumstantially 
acceptable means, so MeansEnd(฀®฀Ψ฀©,฀®C฀©,฀®฀Φ฀©) entails 
฀∀p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀↔p=฀®฀Ψ฀©),29 giving us premiss 13 below.  
 
10. ฀Φ        ฀⎫ 
11. ฀Φ฀↔฀∃p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀∧:p:)    ฀⎪ 
12. MeansEnd(฀®฀Ψ฀©,฀®C฀©,฀®฀Φ฀©)     ฀⎬Premisses 
13. MeansEnd(฀®฀Ψ฀©,฀®C฀©,฀®฀Φ฀©)฀→฀∀p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀↔p=฀®฀Ψ฀©) ฀⎭ 
14. ฀∀p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀↔p=฀®฀Ψ฀©) 12, 13, MPP 
15. ฀∃p(Ap฀®C฀©฀∧(:p:฀→฀Φ)฀∧:p:)  10, 11, MPP 
16. Aa฀®C฀©฀∧(:a:฀→฀Φ)฀∧:a:   15, EE 
17. Aa฀®C฀©฀∧(:a:฀→฀Φ)฀↔a=฀®฀Ψ฀©  14, UE 
18. Aa฀®C฀©฀∧(:a:฀→฀Φ)   16, ฀∧-E 
19. a=฀®฀Ψ฀©    17, 36, MPP 
20. :a:     16, ฀∧-E 
21. :฀®฀Ψ฀©:     19, 20, identity 
22. ฀Ψ     21, see footnote28. 
 
Thus we have justified the correctness of the reasoning of (฀χ). Consequently, 
applying Broome’s thought that you are not as you ought to be if you intend ฀Φ, 
believe MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) but do not intend ฀Ψ, we have that 
I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) normatively requires I฀Ψ, which has the following logical 
factor 
O( I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→ I฀Ψ )  (฀η)30 
                                                                                                                                          
propositions and deliver a sentence, which in the correct semantics is the sentence which 
expresses the named proposition. Corner brackets are the inverse operator which take a 
sentence and deliver a term which, in the correct semantics, is the name of the proposition 
expressed by the sentence. The following interderivations are sound under this semantics: F 
฀®:p:฀©฀〉฀฀Fp and :฀®฀Φ฀©: ฀〉฀฀฀Φ. 
29
 Continuing the example, the unique sufficient acceptable means, ฀Ψ, could be paying the 
boat yard my savings, when the universally quantified statement says, in effect, all and only 
acceptable sufficient means are payings of my savings to the boat yard. 
30
 Strictly speaking this should be ‘O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀®฀Ψ฀©,฀®C฀©,฀®฀Φ฀©))฀→I฀Ψ)’, but now that 
I have given the proof in a manner formally correct I shall return to using our customary 
ambiguities. 
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The proof just given makes the form clear. Particularly, it proves that reasoning to 
sufficient means does not affirm the consequent. The proof can also be given as a 
natural language argument: 
23. I will buy a boat         
24. I will buy a boat iff there is a circumstantially acceptable action and if I 
take that action I will buy the boat and I will take that action. 
25. Paying the boat-yard my savings is the unique circumstantially acceptable 
sufficient means to me buying a boat  
26. If paying the boat-yard my savings is the unique circumstantially 
acceptable sufficient means to buying a boat then all and only 
circumstantially acceptable actions which if I do I will buy a boat will be 
payings of my savings to the boat-yard.  
27. So there is a circumstantially acceptable action and if I take that action I 
will buy the boat and I will take that action. (23, 24, MPP)  
28. Call that action ‘boat buying’. Boat buying is circumstantially acceptable 
and if I boat buy I will buy the boat and I will boat buy. (27, EE) 
29. But all and only circumstantially acceptable actions which if I do I will buy 
a boat are payings of my savings to the boat-yard. (25, 26, MPP) 
30. So boat buying is paying the boat yard my savings. (28, 29, UE, ฀∧-E, MPP)  
31. I will boat buy. (28, ฀∧-E) 
32. Therefore I will pay the boat yard my savings. (30, 31, identity) 
Given the resources of natural language some steps in the formal proof get elided in 
this proof, and we would be inclined to pass directly from line 25 to the conclusion.  
I want to generalise the basis on which Broome says a normative relation is strict. 
Call a thought of the pattern ‘if x is in mental states ฀Δ but not in mental state ฀Φ then x 
is not as he ought to be’ the Broomian thought.  
Given the content principle and the relevant Broomian thought about the relation 
of intending necessary means to intending ends, Broome showed (฀ξ) to be correct for 
necessary means. Clearly that demonstration could be extended to apply to (฀η) for 
whenever ฀Ψ is a necessary means to ฀Φ. Given the same assumptions, I have shown 
(฀η) correct for sufficient means. Consequently I am going to call (฀η) the general form 
of the obligation to be instrumentally rational, and we can now take 
MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) to refer to either necessary or sufficient means-end relations as is 
convenient. Most of the time we will suppress the relativity to circumstance C.  
We have now seen how to generalise Broome’s account of instrumental practical 
reasoning so that it covers both reasoning to necessary and sufficient means. I now 
turn to look at what can be done for normative practical reasoning and theoretical 
reasoning. 
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7.3 Covering practical and theoretical reasoning 
Practical and theoretical reasoning at times share a first stage: that of reasoning 
from a set of beliefs to a concluding belief, where the conclusion in the case of 
practical reasoning is a belief of what you ought to do. Broome suggests that once in 
possession of such a belief, the ‘simplest type of normative practical reasoning’ is 
correctly described by 
B(Leslie ought to ฀δ) 
As a result, I (Leslie will ฀δ) (2001:181) 
If the correctness of this inference is to be accounted for by the content principle, 
since that Leslie ought to doesn’t entail that he will, we become committed to 
accepting a modal semantics of morally good worlds well beyond anything employed 
by standard deontic logic (axiom T of modal logic, Op฀→p, is not a theorem of 
standard deontic logic). Broome concedes its correctness cannot be shown to depend 
on the content principle (as instrumental reasoning can). Nevertheless, this inference 
is plausibly correct, so the belief O฀δ normatively requires the intention to ฀φ, from 
which we have the logical factor O(BO฀δ฀→I฀δ). The agent may then move on to 
instrumental reasoning from their intention to ฀δ.  
So I am going to start by looking at that first shared stage: that of reasoning from a 
set of beliefs to a further belief. Reasoning correctly is a matter of conforming to the 
logical relations that stand between the propositional contents of the thoughts. We are 
abstracting from the question of what those relations are. The content principle 
deliberately includes both deductive and inductive notions within argumentative 
correctness, and must also include whatever introduction and elimination rules 
should apply to normative operators. 
We abuse our notation by allowing ฀Δ to be a set of propositions or the conjunction 
of the members of a set of propositions (which ever is most convenient), which may 
or may not include normative propositions. The first stage of some practical 
reasoning could be moving from believing ฀Δ to believing one ought to do ฀Φ. Some 
theoretical reasoning is moving from believing ฀Δ to believing one ought to believe 
฀Φ. In Broome’s terms, these are cases where ฀Δ oughts ฀Φ. The argument with the 
contents of these reasonings is: 
33. ฀Δ 
34. therefore O฀Φ  (฀κ) 
Theoretical reasoning may also move from believing ฀Δ to believing ฀Φ, which has the 
correlate argument: 
35. ฀Δ 
36. therefore ฀Φ   (฀λ) 
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There are also the correlate weakenings: moving from believing ฀Δ to believing one 
had a reason to do ฀Φ, or a reason to believe ฀Φ. In Broome’s terms these are cases 
where ฀Δ reasons ฀Φ. The argument with the contents of such reasoning is 
37. ฀Δ 
38. therefore R฀Φ  (฀μ) 
Let ฀Θ be any of the three conclusions. The reasoning of the agent is 
39. B฀Δ 
40. As a result, B฀Θ   
which reasoning has contents 
41. ฀Δ 
42. Therefore ฀Θ     
Applying the content principle, inferences which consists in moving from a belief 
in the premisses, ฀Δ, to a belief in the conclusion, ฀Θ, will be correct provided (฀κ), (฀λ) 
or (฀μ) is a correct argument.  
Before we turned to Broome we considered cases of rational belief, i.e. cases of 
(฀λ), for which taking the correctness of (฀λ) to mean one ought to believe ฀Φ got us 
into immediate difficulty because perhaps one ought not to believe ฀Δ. That very same 
reasoning justifies why none of these inferences mean that one ought to believe the 
conclusion. Do they, as Broome puts it, reason their conclusions? No, because of the 
Broomian thought: if you believe the premisses without believing the conclusion you 
are not as you ought to be. So the relation between believing the premisses and 
believing the conclusion is strict in each case. Consequently in each case believing 
the premisses normatively requires believing the conclusion, and so they have logical 
factors with a common form of O(B฀Δ฀→B฀Θ).  
 
It is possible that these inferences, whilst correct, are so hard for us that we could 
not comprehend them. For the time being we will tolerate the idealisation consequent 
upon saying that if you believe the premisses but not the conclusion you are not as 
you ought to be. We could relax this idealisation in two ways, firstly by adding the 
requirement that whether ฀Θ should be salient for you and secondly by matching the 
difficulty of the inference with the significance of ฀Θ for you. If ฀Θ is trivial but the 
inference hard, then it is no failing to fail to believe ฀Θ. But if ฀Θ is very significant 
then the inference could be very hard and still if you fail to believe ฀Θ you are not as 
you ought to be. It may appear that these relaxations could spoil our ability to 
analyse the obligation to be rational in terms of its expression as O(P฀→Q), since it is 
irrational either to consider whether ฀Θ or to perform hard inferences to ฀Θ when ฀Θ is 
insignificant. But that insignificance is a matter of irrelevance to the individual’s 
purposes, so that the irrationality in working on whether ฀Θ is instrumental 
irrationality, just because it is sabotaging the use of means to ends by doing 
something irrelevant to those ends. So the rational obligation not to pursue whether 
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฀Θ unless whether ฀Θ matters has its source in instrumental rationality, and so falls 
within our analysis already. Therefore the necessary correction to the idealisation we 
are using will not undermine the extension of that analysis to the moderated 
rationality available to us. This argument would fail if the mere truth could somehow 
oblige us to believe it, but I have argued above that it cannot. 
Hence we have a plausible derivation that (at least some of the time) the obligation 
to be rational as it arises in the first stage of normative practical reasoning and in 
general theoretical reasoning can be expressed in the same form as the obligation that 
arises in instrumental reasoning O(P฀→Q). Let’s express it in full generality. 
Normative practical reasoning has two stages, the first as in (฀κ), and then as in the 
Broome quote above, reasoning from a belief in what is obliged to an intention. 
When these reasonings are correct we have logical factors O(B฀Δ฀→BO฀Φ) and 
O(BO฀Φ฀→I฀Φ). I shall now show how we can use these statements of the two stages 
as premisses to derive the form of the obligation to correct practical reasoning to be 
O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ).  
No system of deontic logic is regarded as satisfactory. See Forrester 1996:28-39 
for some of the difficulties that validities and inference rules of Standard Deontic 
Logic (SDL) face, and Forrester 1996:chapter 3 for further substantial criticisms of 
SDL. In particular, the fact that ‘ought to do’ and ‘ought to be’ are not equivalent 
(Forrester 1996: chapter 4) makes it look like a single operator may be inadequate. 
For this reason, then, the weaker the system needed to derive desired results, the 
better. I shall derive results using only the weakest normal deontic logic, which I call 
‘KDL’. 
The modal system got from axiom K closed under RN is called K. It is the 
common core to all normal modal systems.31 Axiom K is ٪(P฀→Q)฀→(٪P฀→٪Q) and 
RN is the rule of necessitation: if p is a theorem then ٪p is a theorem. In deontic 
logic we replace the ‘٪’ with ‘O’, and the resulting system is KDL.32 
The two principles I need are formalised in KDL as axiom K and theorem 
O(P฀∧Q)฀↔(OP฀∧OQ), 33 which latter expresses the distributivity of obligation over 
conjunction: that you ought to (P and Q) iff (you ought to P and you ought to Q). 
Regrettably there is no space to discuss Chisholm’s and Carlson’s objections to these 
principles. I concede that what I need may yet prove to be unavailable in deontic 
logic. 
                                                 
31
 Chellas 1980:115 Theorem 4.3(1) 
32
 Standard deontic logic (SDL) is equivalent to the system called D, which is got from K by 
adding the axiom D: ٪p฀→฀◊p. Hilpinen 2001:160. In deontic logic, D is the formalisation of 
the principle that ought implies permissible. See Forrester 1996:26-7 for summary of 
validities and inference rules used in standard deontic logics. 
33
 Chellas 1980:114, Theorem 4.2R 
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The following derived rules are sound in KDL, by application of RN and modus 
ponens to axiom K and O(P฀∧Q)฀↔(OP฀∧OQ). I name them as indicated on the right. 
O(P฀→Q)฀฀OP฀→OQ  K 
O(P฀∧Q)฀〉฀฀OP฀∧OQ  O-dist-฀∧ 
OP, P฀→Q฀฀OQ.  O฀→ 
Now we derive that the obligation to conduct practical reasoning correctly is 
expressed by O(B฀Δ฀→I ฀Φ): 
 
43. O(B฀Δ฀→BO฀Φ)    Premiss 
44. O(BO฀Φ฀→I฀Φ)    Premiss 
45. O(B฀Δ฀→BO฀Φ)฀∧O(BO฀Φ฀→I฀Φ)  ฀∧-I 
46. O((B฀Δ฀→BO฀Φ)฀∧(BO฀Φ฀→I฀Φ))  O-dist-฀∧ 
47. ((B฀Δ฀→BO฀Φ)฀∧(BO฀Φ฀→I฀Φ))฀→(B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ) Tautology 
48. O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ)     46, 47 O฀→ 
 
Finally, we concatenate practical reasoning  followed by instrumental reasoning to 
give us the form of complete practical reasoning.  49 is 48, and 50 is (฀η) from the 
previous section. 
 
49. O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ)       Premiss 
50. O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)   Premiss 
51. O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ)฀∧O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)  ฀∧-I 
52. O((B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ)฀∧(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ))  O-dist-฀∧ 
53. (B฀Δ฀→I฀Φ)฀∧(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)฀→ 
(B฀Δ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)   Tautology 
54. O(B฀Δ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)   52,53,O฀→ 
55. (B฀Δ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)฀→ 
(B(฀Δ฀∧MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)   DoxTaut34 
56. O(B(฀Δ฀∧MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)    54,55,O฀→ 
 
Without loss of generality, we can assume MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ)฀∈฀Δ, and so we have the 
form of complete practical reasoning to be O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Ψ).  
Given that the antecedent is belief in a set of propositions, it could be objected that 
if O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Ψ) were indeed the form of complete practical reasoning it would entail 
                                                 
34
 (BP฀∧ BQ)฀→B(P฀∧Q) is valid in doxastic logic.  
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cognitivism, but the form of practical reasoning ought not to entail cognitivism, 
therefore O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Ψ), cannot be correct.  
A difficulty I have ignored here is how non-cognitive states correctly influence the 
process. Broome’s dealing with instrumental reasoning is sufficient for dealing with 
desires the content of which have become intentions whether or not they ought to 
have. He explains the correctness of inferences involving the non-cognitive state of 
intending in terms of logical relations between the contents. We saw above that this 
use of the content principle couldn’t easily explain why inferring an intention to do 
what you believe you ought is correct reasoning. So there are some difficulties that 
non-cognitive states introduce which the content principle does not easily solve.  
We need to generalise the mental states to include distinct attitudes being held to 
distinct members of ฀Δ; I symbolise this by ‘M฀Δ’. Whether as cognitivists, ethical 
subjectivists, or non-cognitivists, we must allow non-cognitive states the bearing on 
practical reasoning they have within those theories in order that the content principle 
can license inferences on the basis of the contents of M฀Δ. Here I intend to leave the 
metaethical questions open, so if at all possible line 39 above should not commit us 
to cognitivism about either motivation or ethics. We abstract from the question of 
how complexes of cognitive and non-cognitive states license inferences in this way. 
The content principle licenses inferences from M฀Δ to M฀Θ directly for cognitivists 
and perhaps also for ethical subjectivists, since for them non-cognitive states will get 
included in the process by being the ground of some beliefs about what they have 
reason to do.  
For the non-cognitivist, I mooted earlier (3.7 above) the notion of expressive 
judgements which are complexes of cognitive and non-cognitive states. Provided the 
expressivist can make out his case for his earnt notion of truth in metaethics (or some 
other semantics which is isomorphic to truth conditional semantics), I think he is 
entitled to a notion of expressive judgements with normative contents of the kind 
required here. M฀Δ may be the ground of such expressive judgements, which 
judgements are judgements about what ought to be or be done and which supplement 
M฀Δ with a set of expressive judgements, J, giving us an amplified set of mental 
states, M฀ΔJ . In this way the reasoning modelled here does not enter till after the 
complex feeling-deliberative process of amplification from M฀Δ to M฀ΔJ , but this 
simply parallels the cognitivist’s acquisition of beliefs about normative truths. For 
the non-cognitivist, the content principle licenses the inference from M฀Δ to M฀Θ only 
indirectly, via the inference from M฀ΔJ   to M฀Θ, which will be correct if the argument 
from ฀ΔJ  to ฀Θ is. This would allow M฀Δ to include, for example, Williams’ ‘subjective 
motivational set…the agent’s S’ (Williams 1980:102). Then the reasoning of (฀κ) 
would conceal a two-stage process, first a combination of sentimental pondering on 
attitudes and stances to an amplified mental state to M฀ΔJ in which they are expressed 
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by expressive normative judgements, and then the step justified by content principle 
from M฀ΔJ   to M฀Θ.  
The ‘B’ in ‘O(B฀Δ฀→I฀Ψ)’ is a consequence of how I couched line 39 above. That is 
fine for cognitivists, but we can now generalise further and take M฀Δ as the basis. To 
include both cognitivists and non-cognitivists, 43 could have been O(M฀Δ฀→BO฀Φ), 
when the form of practical reasoning would be O(M฀Δ฀→I฀Φ), of complete practical 
reasoning would be O(M฀Δ฀→I฀Ψ), and we already saw the form of theoretical 
reasoning was O(B฀Δ฀→B฀Θ). These, and the form of instrumental reasoning (฀η), all 
share a common form. 
Instrumental, practical and theoretical reasoning share the following form: 
57.  M฀Δ 
58. As a result, M฀Θ  (฀ω) 
Reasoning from M฀Δ to M฀Θ will be correct, by the content principle (and the 
expressive content step for non-cognitivists), iff ฀Δ therefore ฀Θ is a correct argument, 
supplemented along the way, if necessary, by the principle that believing you ought 
to ฀χ normatively requires intending to ฀χ (formalised in 44 above). Then, mental 
states M฀Δ normatively require mental state M฀Θ, which relation has logical factor: 
O(M฀Δ฀→M฀Θ)     (฀Ω) 
7.4 The General Form 
To sum up, we have taken practical reasoning to have three stages, from mental 
states to what one ought to do, from what one ought to do to intending to do it and 
from intending to do it to intending the means. We have shown each of those stages, 
and their concatenations, to have the form (฀Ω). We have shown (฀Ω) to be the form of 
theoretical reasoning.  
Of course, all the difficulties of reasoning have been concealed in the details of 
what it is for contents of reasonings, (฀κ), (฀λ) and (฀μ), to be correct. Some of the 
problems of reasoning are problems of what entailments there are from normative 
premisses. When, therefore, I wish to use (฀Ω) to discuss the relation of obligation and 
rationality, the impression (฀Ω) gives of a clean separation of obligation outside the 
bracket from rationality inside the bracket is misleading. In general, a rejection of 
any derivation of ‘ought’ from ‘is’ will mean that whenever ฀Θ contains normative 
propositions so too must ฀Δ, as also it must whenever (฀Ω) is the form of normative or 
complete practical reasoning. So there are concealed normativities which should not 
be forgotten. 
However, in each of (฀η) and (฀Ω), conforming to the sentence in the scope of the 
obligation operator is (a way of) being rational for the following reasons. The 
premisses of (฀χ) and (฀ω) (the antecedents of (฀η) and (฀Ω) respectively) normatively 
require the conclusions of (฀χ) and (฀ω) (the consequents of (฀η) and (฀Ω) respectively). 
The source of that normative requirement was that the contents of (฀χ) and (฀ω) 
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constitute correct arguments, whether deductively or inductively correct 
(remembering that for the non-cognitivist, these remarks apply to ฀ΔJ  to ฀Θ). So the 
harmony of states is a rational requirement, and hence given an obligation operator 
outside the bracket, what we have in (฀η) and (฀Ω) are expressions of an obligation to 
be instrumentally rational and to be instrumentally, practically and theoretically 
rational, respectively. I shall call (฀Ω)the General Form of (perhaps all, but at least a 
substantial proportion of) obligations to be rational.  
 
One objection to this characterisation is that the following would appear to be 
consistent with the General Form. That if one intended ฀Φ, believed 
MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) but didn’t intend ฀Ψ then one is at liberty to conform to the 
General Form by renouncing one’s belief rather than changing one’s intention. Yet if 
the General Form is correct, it ought to dictate that it is the failure to intend the 
means rather than the belief that should change.  
Call I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ the irrational state. It is true that only it is 
excluded by the General Form. If one is in the irrational state it is consistent with the 
General Form to revise one’s state in any of these seven ways: 
I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧I฀Ψ 
¬I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧I฀Ψ 
I฀Φ฀∧¬B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧I฀Ψ 
¬I฀Φ฀∧¬B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧I฀Ψ 
¬I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ 
I฀Φ฀∧¬B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ 
¬I฀Φ฀∧¬B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ 
These are the seven lines of the truth table for which I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ 
is true. At first sight some may seem a bit odd, but a little thought shows none need 
be irrational. For example, in the second one intends a means which one believes is 
an acceptable means to an end, but do not intend the end. But consider that I may 
intend to eat some chocolate, and believe chocolate to be an acceptable means to 
raising my blood sugar, but not be intending to raise my blood sugar. 
The objection that a correct General Form would pick out the first of these seven 
and reject the others is similar to a claim about correct belief revision which we 
know to be mistaken: that if one believes p, believes p฀→q, and believes ¬q, then it is 
the last belief rather than any of the others that should change. Broome explicitly 
asserts that O(P฀→Q) is not logically equivalent but only the logical factor of the 
normative requirement that stands between P and Q, and that it is P that requires Q. 
So the force of the requirement can only be felt by Q, although whatever must be 
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meant by that must avoid permitting the detachment of OQ given P (for the necessity 
of avoiding that detachment is what drives us to recognising the existence of the 
normative requirement relation in the first place). So the thought expressed by this 
objection could perhaps be answered by appealing to the normative requirement that 
lies behind the General Form: perhaps the nature of the normative requirement 
implies that it is the intention that should change, not the belief. I would not wish to 
resort to that answer. I wish to separate the questions of irrationality, what is the 
rational correction to a piece of irrationality, and the way obligation attaches to 
rationality. Thinking that the normative requirement relation implies which should 
change only muddles them up. 
First of all, I think the objection is easily mistaken for another objection, which is 
that if you ought to intend the end and you ought to believe MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) then, 
if you are in the irrational state, the failure to intend the means must change. But the 
General Form is not vulnerable to that objection. For that you ought to intend the end 
and you ought to believe MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ), with the General Form, suffices to 
derive that you ought to intend the means (see next section).  
Setting that aside, we are left an objection which takes it as obvious that if the 
General Form was correctly expressing the relation of obligation and rationality, it 
would pick out the first way of being rational and reject the rest. That would amount 
to intending the end and believing MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) on their own requiring 
intending the means, that is, sufficing to derive that you ought to intend the means. 
But now we have permitted detachment of spurious normative conclusions again. 
Secondly, the objection is equating that you should not be irrational with which way 
you should now be rational; but why should the General Form suffice for specifying 
the latter? Perhaps one’s failure to intend ฀Ψ indicates a hitherto concealed reservation 
about the acceptability of ฀Ψ as a means to ฀Φ, and we have acknowledged that 
acceptability of means is required for the truth of MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ). If one 
discovers that reservation it may indeed be correct to withdraw one’s assent to 
MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ). So perhaps neither the General Form nor the normative 
requirement relation should imply which change is right. It is enough that they imply 
one ought not to fail to intend believed necessary means to intended ends, but if one 
does so fail then what ought to be done to correct that failure depends on other things 
in addition.  
One might wonder about the philosophical benefits of this analysis. Worse, might 
not the philosophical problems that were skirted along the way be such as to vitiate 
all benefits? In addition to those problems, there are also good reasons for wondering 
whether there is anything that could properly be called a logic of ‘ought’, or a logic 
of obligation.  
I think that Broome is right so far as he goes and that his account can be extended 
as I have extended it. It is plausible, if one accepts Broome’s account of instrumental 
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reasoning as giving rise to normative requirements and not reasons or obligations, 
that a unified expression of obligations to be rational can be given by the General 
Form. I concede that there may be some complications which cannot be 
encompassed in the complete generality at which the General Form aims. 
Nevertheless, despite my later criticism of Broome, I think it will be clear that the 
General Form gets enough right for the purpose it serves in my broader argument. I 
now conclude this chapter with a couple of illustrations of the theoretical virtues 
exhibited by the General Form — virtues that consist in shedding light on the 
relation of rationality and normativity.  
7.5 Virtues of the General Form 
Avoiding spurious obligations. 
We have seen reason to recognise more than the two normative relations of 
‘oughts’ and ‘reasons’. In addition there is Broome’s normative requirement. In the 
case of instrumental reasoning, intending ฀Φ and believing that ฀Ψ is the means to ฀Φ 
normatively requires intending to ฀Ψ; in the case of practical or theoretical reasoning 
having some mental attitudes M to ฀Δ normatively requires having some mental 
attitude M to ฀Θ. The logical factors of these normative requirements  
O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)   (฀η) 
O(M฀Δ฀→M฀Θ)     (฀Ω)   
express the fact that the normativity lies external to the reasoning and so avoids the 
problem of apparently valid reasoning giving rise to spurious obligations. One might 
at this point think a concession to the complication of normative propositions in ฀Δ or 
฀Θ must be made, but I think not. For this is how the General Form avoids false 
beliefs and false normative beliefs in ฀Δ generating spurious normative forces. That 
you believe you ought to ฀Φ does indeed make it correct to intend to ฀Φ, and that that 
is true is expressed inside the scope of the ought operator of the General Form (as we 
saw above). But the wide scope ensures that without something additional, the 
genuine normative force of the ought operator cannot spuriously be attached to the 
intention to ฀Φ, however correct it is for you to intend to ฀Φ given your beliefs. That is 
exactly what we wanted. And given the generality of the General Form, this point 
carries over to all of instrumental, practical and theoretical reasoning. 
That Broome’s account can be generalised in this manner goes some way to 
justifying his remarks that 
a large part of rationality consists in conforming to normative 
requirements, and is not concerned with reasons at all. For instance, 
one part of rationality is doing what you believe you ought to do, and 
this does not necessarily mean acting for reasons. Another part is 
reasoning correctly. Correct reasoning will lead you to have beliefs and 
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intentions that you are normatively required to have by others of your 
beliefs and intentions. But it may not lead you to beliefs and intentions 
you have reason to have. (Broome 1999:90) 
The last two sentences can appear faintly paradoxical. Broome is speaking of reasons 
as directive reasons, legitimate motivators, and in this sense, you can reason correctly 
without coming to conclusions for which you have reason, just because you may lack 
reason for your premisses. But that is not to say you could have done better. So being 
rational need not result in doing what you ought.  
That being said, there is a sense in which Broome’s remark could mislead. It can 
appear that normative requirements express a way in which there are intrinsic 
obligations to be rational, just because it sounds as if normative requirements are 
normatively required because conforming to them is being rational. That, I think, is a 
mistake. Why I think so will be clearer later.  
Transmitting genuine obligations. 
We have just seen how being rational need not mean you do what you have reason to 
do. A second virtue of the General Form is that it shows how, despite that fact, 
rationality remains poised to respond to obligations. Given (฀η), if I ought to ฀Φ, and 
so ought to intend to ฀Φ, and if I ought to believe that ฀Ψ is the means to ฀Φ, then we 
can derive that I ought to intend to ฀Ψ.  
59. OI฀Φ      Premiss 
60. OB(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,฀Φ))   Premiss 
61. O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)  Premiss (฀η) 
62. OI฀Φ฀∧OB(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,฀Φ))  59,60,by฀∧-I 
63. O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,฀Φ)))  62,O-dist-฀∧ 
64. O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,฀Φ)))฀→OI฀Ψ  61,K 
65. OI฀Ψ      63,64,MPP   (฀θ) 
 
Clearly, a similar proof to (฀θ) could be given showing that given the General Form, if 
I ought to be in mental states M฀Δ then I ought to be in mental state M฀Θ. So the 
General form shows how rationality is poised to transmit obligations external to 
rationality.  
Transmissivism could be true without that truth being reflected in formal features 
of reasoning about the relations of obligation and rationality. Nevertheless, if formal 
features of normative reasoning exhibit formal transmission, that is a reason to think 
that the corresponding semantic values of those formal features are related by the 
correlate semantic value (of our metalinguistic representation) of that formal 
transmission. We have now seen that given the minimum necessary for a normal 
deontic logic the General Form correctly transmits obligations to being in M฀Φ when 
M฀Δ are states you ought to be in. However, if we have different kinds of obligation 
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subsumed under the ‘O’ operator, then the derivations given would in some cases be 
little better than prolonged equivocations (for example, if the source of obligation in 
line 59 above was moral). So this formal expression of transmissivism commits one 
to univocality for ‘O’, which so far as our concerns go, amounts to asserting that the 
normativity of rationality must be intrinsically directive. Furthermore, since the 
General Form does not allow the derivation of spurious normativity, it would seem to 
get the rationalist out of the difficulty I posed for taking the normativity of rationality 
to be intrinsically directive. 
 8 Instrumentalism  
8.1 Can Broome eliminate correctness? 
The rationalist may well be pleased with where we have now reached, since he 
held that transmissivism is true and its truth implies that rationality is intrinsically 
directive. We saw that the latter seemed to commit him to spurious obligations and 
justified beliefs, but he seems now to have found a systematic way of avoiding that 
refutation. Not only can he now hold rationality to be intrinsically directive, but 
demand of me what need is there for distinguishing its normativity from directivity. 
It can be directive and work in harness with other directivity without difficulty. It 
might therefore be said that the whole notion of correctness normativity for 
rationality is falling back into the trap from which Broome saved us. For Broome’s 
normative requirement does not express a special correctness normativity of 
rationality, yet it expresses all normativity in evidence in the cases to which it 
applies. Distinguishing the normativity of rationality in terms of correctness is just a 
mistaken way of talking about what could and should be given entirely in terms of 
his normative requirements.  
In his cases of practical reasoning (1999:86 ff.), and perhaps quite generally, 
Broome subsumes the normativity of much of rationality into the normative 
requirement.  
To a large extent [rationality] consists in following normative 
requirements. (Broome 1999:98-9) 
 Broome’s ‘ought’, however,  is directive — as is clear from his explanation of why 
he has come round to agreeing with Moore’s view that ‘you can never know for 
certain what you ought to do’ (1999:93). His point is ‘that practical reasoning [may] 
require you to go sailing’ (1999:94) and yet ‘it does not follow that you ought to go 
sailing’(1999:94). 
The terminology here is treacherous. In our terms, you may be mistaken about 
what directive practical reasons you have, but on the basis of that mistake, correct 
practical reasoning requires you to sail. So Broome is contrasting what the rationality 
of practical reasoning requires with what directive practical reasons require.  
For the sake of argument we will consider a case in which practical reasoning 
requires you to go sailing but you ought not to, perhaps because you have some false 
beliefs which, were they true, would justify going sailing. 
The distinction Broome is making between the nature of the requirement of 
practical reasoning and the force of the ought is difficult to understand in Broome’s 
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terms. The problem is that Broome wants ‘ought’ to be univocal, as is clear from his 
animadversion to a ‘subjective ought’ (1999:94). 
people…say that, whatever you ought objectively to do —  and you do 
not know —  subjectively you ought to go sailing.…[this] is an 
unsatisfactory term (1999:94) 
We will see his reasons in the last section of this chapter, but Broome is saying that 
we should not understand practical reasoning requiring you to go sailing as being 
normative via a subjective ‘ought’. So far as the normativity of the situation goes, 
there is only the question of whether you objectively ought to go sailing.  
The consequence of his desire for univocality of ought is that there is no 
normativity left over to attach to sailing itself as a requirement of practical 
rationality. For the whole point of his normative requirement relation is that if p 
normatively requires q, the truth of p does not entail a detachable ‘q ought to be’, but 
can only do so if  p ought to be. This is how he avoids the spurious obligations which 
conditionals with detachable normative consequents seem to entail. 
We are considering a case where you ought not to go sailing, yet going sailing is a 
requirement of practical rationality. This means we need to avoid detaching ‘going 
sailing directively ought to be’ and we do avoid that. But, we also need to detach a 
normative conclusion: ‘going sailing is required by practical rationality’. Broome’s 
normative requirement won’t allow that, unless we made it bivocal.  
Take p to be the relevant considerations related to going sailing which normatively 
require going sailing, and q to be going sailing. Premiss 2 below expresses 
bivocality. Grounds for the truth of Premiss 3  could be, for example, that p includes 
that you want to go sailing, but whilst that want is practically rational given what you 
believe and desire, for some reason or other you ought not to have that want, and this 
is why sailing is rationally required but ought not to be.  
1. p normatively requires q  
2. (p normatively requires q) only if  (p directively requires q and p rationally 
requires q) 
3. not(p directively ought to be) and (p rationally ought to be)  
4. therefore q rationally ought to be 
So with bivocality we can detach that q rationally ought to be but we can’t detach 
that q directively ought to be, and that is the kind of situation Broome regards as 
possible.  
But if ‘ought’ is univocal, if the normative requirement relation is univocal, we 
can’t detach that q rationally ought to be whenever we can’t detach that q directively 
ought to be, and so Broome has no basis for the thought that going sailing could be 
rationally required even though it is not what ought to be.  
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Can Broome get round this problem by appealing to what makes the normative 
requirement and its logical factor inequivalent? The force of the normative 
requirement is from p, and not other things logically equivalent to p. That force can 
be felt by q because it is what p and not other things normatively requires. So sailing 
is rationally required, although being so does not permit the detachment of Oq given 
p. Such an answer, however, would amount to accepting that there is additional 
normativity in play, which is detachable given p.  
This example makes the essential point highly visible. Either some normativity (of 
some kind) attaches to going sailing or it doesn’t. If we read Broome accurately, it 
doesn’t, even though he needs it to if he is going to maintain the distinction between 
practical reasoning requiring you to go sailing and whether you directively ought to. 
I shall now elucidate the point more broadly. 
Broome’s terminology can make it sound as if there is something left over to be 
detached by speaking of the sailing being normatively required despite it not 
following that you ought to go sailing. Yet saying it is normatively required attaches 
no normativity to the sailing but merely expresses a relation that stands between your 
beliefs, probability assignments and going sailing. That he so intends is borne out by 
this passage: 
Instrumental reasoning does not lead to any detached normative 
conclusion for the tortoise, nor place him under any detached necessity. 
(1999:96) 
The problem now is, if there is no normativity whatsoever attached to the conclusion, 
what justifies the force of requirement in the following remark? 
The tortoise seems to assume he is therefore not placed under any 
requirement of rationality. But he is: rationality requires him to intend 
whatever he believes to be a necessary means to an end he intends. 
(1999:96) 
We can’t detach that the tortoise ought, directively, to take necessary means in the 
absence of the end being obliged, and we are agreed that that is how it should be. But 
in this passage Broome is asserting that the tortoise is placed under a requirement of 
rationality. What exactly is it that is required? Is the requirement monadic and 
applying just to the means, or is it relational and standing between the means and the 
ends? If it is the latter, how are we getting anywhere? In particular, how are we 
getting ourselves into a position to say, truthfully, that whilst we cannot be certain 
that it is what we ought, directively, to do, going sailing is rationally required?  
The problem we have here is that Broome’s normative requirement doesn’t justify 
detaching a monadic rational requirement, and that is how Broome intends it to be. 
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He intends to confine the  normativity to the relation.35 When he says that the means 
is normatively required, that sailing the boat is required by practical reason, he 
intends that his expression is merely one in which the other relational terms have 
been suppressed, rather than one in which rational requirement has been detached 
because of a relational requirement. 
Yet Broome needs to detach a rational requirement to intend the means, and 
elsewhere is implicitly doing so. Consider the import of his remark that ‘To a large 
extent [rationality] consists in following normative requirements’ (1999:98-9). I 
agree with him, but if rationality is to guide us to follow normative requirements we 
need to detach intending the means as a rational requirement, not merely leaving 
them as standing in the relation of normative requirement to beliefs and intentions. 
Otherwise his solution to the problem of deriving spurious obligations has succeeded 
too far. Not only have we eliminated those spurious obligations, but we have 
eliminated all guidance to action. If the price of avoiding spurious obligation is to 
find that there is no sense of ‘ought’ left to carry rational guidance, it is a price too 
high to pay. 
8.2 What is to be resolved 
We have been supposing for the sake of argument that the normativity of 
rationality is intrinsically directive. On that assumption, we face a problem. There are 
rational principles whose purpose is to guide our actions and beliefs. Reasoning with 
those principles seems to require detaching a consequent from a modal conditional in 
order to get from our beliefs and desires to conclusions about what we ought to do or 
believe. Formulating those principles as Kantian hypothetical imperatives, we found 
that what we took to be truths of rationality results in false beliefs and mere wishes 
entailing spurious justification of beliefs and spurious obligations. However, the 
General Form shows that for instrumental, practical and theoretical reasoning, 
formulating the relevant guiding norms as wide scope modal conditionals avoids that 
problem whilst allowing the derivation of genuine justified beliefs and obligations 
when someone is in mental states they ought to be in.  
Whilst the Broomian approach gets us out of one problem, it lands us in another. 
When formulated as wide scope modal conditionals, hypothetical imperatives fail to 
guide action as they are supposed to, namely, under the truth of their corresponding 
hypothesis. Korsgaard may regard this as a virtue, since she thinks instrumental 
principles intrinsically engage with the worthiness of ends. Yet as in Smith’s example 
(1994:134), there is a clear sense in which the heroin addict who attempts to relieve 
his craving by ingesting heroin is getting something rationally correct whilst the 
addict who starts gouging his arm with scissors is not. Are we really prepared to give 
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up the sense in which the principle of instrumental rationality guides action 
independently of the worthiness of the end?  
 Lying behind the General Form are the content principle and the Broomian 
thought. The Broomian thought doesn’t distinguish the normativity of rational 
guidance from directive normativity. This is deliberate, since he thinks there is only 
one ‘ought’. This would not be a problem if correct guidance and obligation (or other 
directivities) were always in line. But of course, the original problem was precisely 
that what was rationally correct needn’t be in line with obligation unless one was in 
the right mental states in the first place. Avoiding that problem led Broome to widen 
the scope of the normative operator. Unfortunately, it is the very same problem which 
requires us to allow for the possibility of sailing being rationally required when one 
ought not to sail. We have now seen that the purity of Broome’s solution can’t be 
maintained. It achieves too much because it eliminates the normativity of rational 
guidance of instrumental, practical and theoretical reasoning.  
So taking the normativity of rationality to be intrinsically directive faces a 
dilemma: if we retain the normativity of rational guidance, we find ourselves 
committed to spurious obligations and spuriously justified beliefs; if we avoid the 
latter whilst retaining only the ability to derive proper obligations, we lose the 
normativity of rational guidance. 
The claim by the rationalist was that transmissivism requires rationality to be 
intrinsically directive if it is to transmit obligation from worthy ends to their means. 
Assuming intrinsic directivity for rationality, the consequence of avoiding the 
problem of spurious obligation is achieved at the price of rational guidance. But that 
amounts to a partial defeat of the grounds for transmissivism. For surely part of its 
point is that when we reason about what to do or believe and come to conclusions 
about what is rationally correct for us, because of transmissivism we know that 
provided we believe and desire as we ought, what we have concluded to be rationally 
correct is additionally what we ought to do or believe. So if we lose the normativity 
of rational guidance and therefore cannot come to normative conclusions for 
ourselves, we have lost a significant way in which transmissivism appeared to 
express a truth about the way rationalty and directivity work in harness. 
Consequently, the rationalist inference from the truth of transmissivism to intrinsic 
directivity for those parts of rationality most obviously connected to transmissivism, 
instrumental rationality and the rationality of reason, is self defeating.  
 
So we need a solution which avoids the dilemma whilst retaining transmissivism, a 
solution which is consistent with instrumental rationality and reason guiding action 
and belief, which avoids spurious obligations and justifications of belief and which 
transmits directivity from ends to means. We need a solution which satisfies the 
following constraints: 
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Suppose being in mental states M฀Δ makes being in a mental state M฀Φ rationally 
correct. Then: 
1. Availing Rational Guidance: We should be able to derive at the meta-level, 
or reflectively, that being in M฀Δ entails that one is rationally required to be 
in M฀Φ. 
2. Avoiding Spurious Directivity: We should not be able to derive, at the 
meta-level, or reflectively, that being in M฀Δ entails that one ought to be in 
M฀Φ.  
3. Transmissivism: We should be able to derive at the meta-level, or 
reflectively, that if being in M฀Δ is being in mental states one ought to be in, 
then one ought to be in M฀Φ. 
 
In this chapter I will show how instrumentalism and the correctness-directivity 
distinction allows us to explain how all three constraints can be satisfied by an 
instrumentalist explanation of the relation of genuine directivity and rational 
guidance. I shall show that instrumentalism can explain transmissivism on the basis 
of composite directive principles, so explaining the sense in which the rationalist 
would be right in thinking that some principles about rationality involve directivity. I 
shall show how directivity remaining external (in certain senses) results in Avoiding 
Spurious Directivity being satisfied, and rational correctness remaining internal (in 
certain senses) results in Availing Rational Guidance being satisfied. The form of this 
will be most clearly shown in the last section, where I give the final version of the 
General Form, which version expresses both the normativity of rational correctness 
and the normativity of directivity. However, the general position does not depend on 
the truth of the General Form. The latter, if incorrect, is merely a failed account of 
the form of the relations which justify how instrumentalism satisfies these 
conditions. We shall therefore address the issue in broad before seeking to formulate 
it formally.  
8.3 Rational guidance and conclusions with normative content 
Consider Broome’s example of first personal reasoning. 
I shall open the wine 
In order for me to open the wine, I must fetch the corkscrew, 
so I shall fetch the corkscrew. (Broome 1999:88) 
We can also consider a case of theoretical reasoning. 
Yellowish light indicates a thunderstorm on the way 
The light looks yellowish 
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So a thunderstorm is on the way. 
We are inclined to say that if I believe that yellowish light indicates a thunderstorm 
on the way and I see that the light looks yellowish I should expect a thunderstorm; 
that if I intend to open the wine and believe to do so the corkscrew is necessary then 
I should fetch the corkscrew.  
Broome distinguishes the level of my reasoning (with contents as given in the 
examples) from what we say at a meta-level (such as in the last paragraph, as 
theoreticians, but also what we might reflectively say on pondering our own 
reasoning). If, as first order reasoners, it would be as correct for the conclusions to be 
normative, or if, as reflective reasoners, it would be as correct to construe the 
‘should’ as ‘have reason’ or ‘ought’, that is, if it would be correct to derive normative 
conclusions from non-normative premisses (for example, I conclude ‘I ought to 
expect a thunderstorm’), then for ‘ought’ to retain the same sense would require that 
theoretically we must derive the same normative conclusions, which amounts to the 
scope of the ‘ought’ being narrow. But that commits us to deriving spuriously 
normative conclusions about what they ought to do or believe when the person we 
are considering theoretically ought not to believe and want as they do. Therefore, 
since we do not want as theoreticians to derive normative conclusions from non-
normative premisses, we do not want reasoners to do so either. Hence Broome 
suggests we should avoid these problems by pointing to the typical absence of 
normativity from the contents of conclusions at the level of my first order reasoning, 
and widen the scope of the ‘ought’ at the meta-level, when this problem disappears.  
Whilst externally (7.5 above) we can come to conclusions about what someone 
ought to do, they could never reason to those conclusions for themselves whenever 
they didn’t know (and perhaps also know that they know) that they ought to believe 
and desire as they do. We come to those conclusions on the assumption that we know 
what they ought to believe and desire. They merely have beliefs about what they 
ought to believe and desire, and that gets encapsulated in the logical factor of the 
normative requirement as O(BO฀Φ฀→I฀Φ) (Broome 2001:181). In this example, the 
encapsulation means that unless they know (and perhaps also know that they know) 
they ought to believe they ought to ฀Φ  they cannot detach internally the required 
normative conclusions about what they ought to intend. 
Internally, I want to decide what I should do or believe. Whilst it is true that 
frequently my reasoning lacks normative content in the conclusions, when I think 
reflectively it frequently comes to have that content. I look again at the light, I think 
again, I decide ‘Yes. I should expect a thunderstorm’. Now that reflection may be at 
the meta-level, but that doesn’t remove or relativise the normativity of its content to 
my other beliefs, as Broome would have it be. Furthermore, we need the guidance 
that that normativity provides when part of the content of the conclusion.  
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It might be thought that the reflective reasoning amounted to deciding that I ought 
to believe my premisses, so I ought to believe my conclusion, and that pattern would 
fit in with Broome’s account and the transmission of obligation I showed earlier. 
However, whilst the reflection may go in that way, it need not. I may decide that I 
don’t know whether I ought to believe my premisses, nor do I know that I ought not, 
but I do believe them and so I should expect a thunderstorm. I think that reasoning 
would be quite correct. 
There is a clear distinction to be made between on the one hand whether I ought, 
directively, to intend the end, and so ought to intend the means, and on the other hand 
being able to appreciate that I do intend the end, and that therefore intending the 
means is rationally correct. I only need the latter normativity to guide my action 
rationally, but whether so acting will mean I do what I ought depends on the former 
normativity. The former directive normativity is less accessible not just because what 
matters is the truth rather than my belief about the truth, but also because of 
something formally parallel to the regress of justification in epistemology (and may 
amount to the regress of justification on some best opinion views of metaethics). 
Whether I ought to intend the end may in turn depend on a great many other 
questions of what ought to be, which may in turn depend on yet other questions; 
there may be a tree of dependencies which I am incapable of sorting out.  That 
intending the means is correct, however, is far more accessible to me precisely 
because it has nothing to do with the normative status of the end, but only on my 
knowing that I intend the end.36  
Or consider a case of theoretical reasoning. There is a clear distinction to be made 
between on the one hand whether my premisses are justified and so my conclusion is 
justified, and on the other hand being able to appreciate that since I do believe those 
premisses believing the conclusion is correct. In the former case we face the regress 
of justification, but not in the latter. I may not know that my conclusion is justified, 
but I do know that it is as correct as I can knowingly be at present. In this case, we 
would be in difficulty if we ended up saying the concluding belief was justified 
independently of whether its premisses were. But that is not what we end up saying. 
We mark only that the conclusion is correctly related to its premisses, that the 
premisses are believed and that therefore the conclusion has (ceteris paribus) rational 
correctness and is thereby rationally required. The ceteris paribus clause is fulfilled 
provided there is an absence of defeaters (undercutters, et cetera).  
These thoughts rely on a premiss that the correctness of certain rational relations is 
available internally. This could be attacked on the grounds that I no more know their 
correctness absent proper justification than I have the truth about the directivity in 
force available to me. The justificatory regress applies to my beliefs about the 
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inferential relations, more broadly, about the relations of rational correctness, so I 
may not be justified in thinking my conclusions correct.  
There are very considerable difficulties in explaining how internalists can account 
for knowledge of logic and relations of rational correctness generally ( as is evident 
from Boghossian’s single paper with multiple realisations: Boghossian 2000, 
Boghossian 2001 versus Wright, C. 2001, Boghossian 2003 versus Williamson 
2003). Externalists may have fewer problems. They may require only that the beliefs 
about the relations of rational correctness being used in the reflective reasoning by 
which I affirm ‘yes, I ought to expect a thunderstorm’ be true, or true and reliably 
based. Nevertheless, and perhaps more importantly, adhering to some rational 
relations is constitutive of being rational, and that adherence need not require 
knowing that they are indeed rational relations, but only knowing how to adhere to 
them and knowing that one is applying one’s know how correctly. For as Lewis 
Carroll made evident to us (1895), reasoning cannot work if we have the  rules of 
inference only as premisses. Nor does reasoning require them as premisses. Knowing 
that one is applying know how correctly, in this case, may not require knowing the 
propositions which justify why the outcome is correct, but only such things as that 
one is in a normal state, neither distracted, nor tired, nor incapable of concentrating, 
et cetera. That is to say, it may require only knowing that one is functioning 
normally. 
 
So what we wanted to explain is how it is possible to be guided by rational 
correctness without thereby having to conclude that anyone so guided is getting 
everything directively as it ought to be. The problem was that if deriving normative 
conclusions at the meta-level, or internally by reflection, was valid, we seemed to 
end up with contradictory conclusions. Because sailing was rationally correct given 
their internal state, they ought to go sailing. Because of the truth of the situation, they 
ought not. Broome’s solution avoided the contradiction at the cost of being able to 
explain the normativity of internal rational guidance. 
With the correctness-directivity distinction in play, we have an answer. Externally, 
we are concerned with the directive normative forces. They are what determine what 
properly ought to be done and we don’t want to find ourselves concluding that 
somebody reasoning correctly does what they ought when, for example they don’t 
desire what they ought. However, internally, we need not have the truth about those 
directive forces transparently available to us, any more than we have the truth of our 
beliefs transparently available, and that is why,  provided the correctness-directivity 
distinction is in play, we needn’t conclude that someone does what they ought just 
because they reason correctly.  
What we do have available internally is the correctness of certain rational 
relations, and on that basis we can explain how we can be guided by what is 
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rationally correct. Provided we distinguish the normativity of rational correctness 
from directivity, a reflective conclusion that we ought to needn’t contradict the fact 
that we ought not. So this is how we can be authoritative about what is rational so far 
as we know without being authoritative about what we ought to do. Finally, when we 
are in mental states we ought to be in, correctness and directivity work in harness. 
Doing what is rationally required will result in us doing what we directively ought.  
The reason this explanation works, when it doesn’t if normativity is single, is that 
we don’t mind someone internally drawing the normative conclusion that sailing is 
rationally correct since we don’t mind drawing that conclusion at the meta-level on 
their behalf. It was only if their drawing an internal normative conclusion required us 
to draw a directively normative conclusion at the meta-level that we were in trouble. 
But now we see that their correct reasoning need not require us to condone their 
mistakes about what they ought to do when they are not in the mental states they 
ought to be in. Furthermore, this fact weakens the problem of their knowledge of 
inferential relations. It doesn’t commit us to externalism, but it does seem that 
provided their conclusion is as a matter of fact rationally correct given their mental 
states, the explanation has some purchase. For if they are in fact correct, as 
theoreticians we are prepared to condone the normativity of their conclusion so far as 
rational correctness goes.  
What is not a problem is when they are wrong about the inferential relation 
between the premisses and the conclusion. The problem Broome wants to avoid was 
that in cases in which someone reasons correctly, at the meta-level we seemed to end 
up saying that somebody ought to do or believe something when they ought not—to 
end up saying they were right just because they thought they were. We don’t care 
about cases in which their reasoning is flawed, since those mistakes do not commit 
us to spurious directivity. For the same reason, we are not committed to judging them 
rationally correct when they are not just because they think they are.  
The position we are ending up at makes better sense than eliminating all 
normativity from the content of reasoning from non-normative premisses in order to 
avoid the spurious normativity. We can say that because he believed the moon was 
made of green cheese he had reason to believe moon rock makes a good snack, and 
because he wanted to steal the diamond he had reason to break the glass, and we can 
also say that despite believing the moon was made of green cheese he had no reason 
to believe moon rock makes a good snack, and despite wanting to steal the diamond 
he had no reason to break the glass, and the contradiction is dissolved because the 
normativity in the first case is  rational correctness and the second directivity. We can 
explain away the apparent contradictions by use of the distinction between the 
secondary, correctness, sense of ‘reason’ and its primary, directive, sense. They had 
reason so far as their rational motivators go, but not so far as their legitimate 
motivators go. 
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Consequently, we now see that Broome’s total elimination of internal normative 
conclusions was not needed. That is good, since as we saw, we could not afford that 
total elimination if we were to explain the availability of the normativity of internal 
rational guidance. Although the conclusions of my reasoning may lack normative 
content when my premisses lack such content, on reflection they may come to 
acquire normative content even whilst my premisses continue to lack it. On reflection 
I conclude that I ought to fetch the corkscrew or I have reason to expect thunder, just 
because I continue to intend to open the wine, or continue to think yellowish light 
indicates thunder. I have detached conclusions with normative content. The 
normative content of my conclusions is the normativity of sound reasoning.  
I think it is clear that, given the work in chapter 7, what we are saying covers not 
just instrumental reasoning, but practical and theoretical reasoning in general. Now, 
for a final conclusion, if the normativity of reasoning was directive, we would be 
back in the fix from which Broome saved us. For my reflective reasoning amounts to 
reasoning at the meta-level, so it would be objectionable if my reflective reasoning 
led to detachable directive normative content for the conclusions, since that would 
lead us to saying externally that I ought, directively, to do something when perhaps I 
ought not. Therefore the normativity of sound reasoning is not intrinsically directive.  
8.4 What to do 
 If on occasion the directive status of our mental states is available to us, we will 
be able to know the directive status of conclusions derived from them provided we 
are rational and so know what we ought, directively, to do. But that needn’t generally 
be the case. Since it is directivity that determines what ought to be done but 
internally we may have access only to what is rationally correct, we may not know 
what we ought to do. What should we do in such circumstances?  
For example, wanting a drink and believing reasonably that you have a glass of 
water in front of you, you have a reason to sip from the glass, even when, for 
example, unbeknownst to you the water is poisoned. One response to this kind of 
case is to distinguish what reasons you have from what reasons you think you have. 
That, I think, is correct for directivity, for your directive reasons. However, it does 
not account for the sense in which, since you cannot distinguish the two, you are on 
the one hand getting something rationally right, doing what you ought in some sense, 
if you respond to the reasons you think you have, and on the other hand, getting 
something wrong if you go against what you think the reasons are and instead 
accidentally and unknowingly go with what directive reasons you have. So in this 
sense, the rational motivators seem to provide reasons. If we now take these to be 
directive reasons, we find ourselves in the midst of contradictions. If we don’t, we 
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are left guessing at what to do. So what really should we do? What we ought or what 
we think we ought?  
This question is a variety of Ewing’s problem: 
It is a recognized principle of ethics that it is always our duty to do 
what we when considering sincerely think we ought to do, but suppose 
we are mistaken, then we by this principle ought to do something which 
is wrong and which therefore we ought not to do. Is not this a 
contradiction? It would be if we were not using two different senses of  
‘ought’.(1953:144-5) 
The approach I shall take is objectionable to those who think that distinguishing two 
‘oughts’ is multiplying distinctions beyond necessity. The difficulties I posed Broome 
may mean that univocal solutions of a certain kind are impossible, but I do not have 
the space to give a general rebuttal of such solutions. However, although the capacity 
for the correctness-directivity distinction to solve Ewing’s problem is some 
motivation for accepting it, the solution is not ad hoc since the distinction is not 
drawn only or mainly to solve this problem. Secondly, Ewing’s ‘ought’s are all 
directive, and that, rather than there being more than one of them, is the fact which 
causes the problems: 
if our conception of what one ought to do were itself divided, so that 
there is…the possibility that in one sense of ‘ought’ I ought to stay and 
in another I ought to go…the very point of figuring out what one ought 
to do would be undermined….The fact that we always have to act in 
one way, thereby closing off other options…gives rise to the ideal of a 
unified account of normativity….Dividing the normative domain… 
[means that] the unique sense of justifiability that we are after would be 
lost. (Piller 2003:§3) 
 
In the examples above, I conclude that I shall fetch the corkscrew or expect a 
thunderstorm because I see that so concluding is rationally required given my 
intentions and beliefs. But the requirement doesn’t stay conditional. It attaches to the 
conclusions themselves. What ought I to do? I ought to fetch the corkscrew. What 
ought I to believe? I ought to expect a thunderstorm. In so thinking, whilst I do not 
know whether that ‘ought’ is only a rational correctness or if it is directive as well,37 
nevertheless, I take it to be directive. Isn’t this an obnoxious equivocation? I don’t 
think so. 
Third personally and theoretically we can maintain a distinction between rational 
correctness and directivity, and see that sometimes it can be true in both senses that 
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 Perhaps I can also be sufficiently confused so as not to know even if my conclusion is 
rationally correct. 
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you ought to expect a thunderstorm, sometimes only in the rational sense (sometimes 
in neither). First personally, we make the distinction generally but because of the 
truth of transmissivism, in the particular case we take it that the rational requirement 
conveys to us the directive requirement we face; just as in general we appreciate that 
our beliefs and the world may be at variance but in the particular case what is 
believed is taken to convey to us how the world is.  
A belief represents the world as being a certain way, and however much we know 
that what we believe and how the world is may come apart, so long as we continue in 
that belief we cannot distinguish the world being that way from how it actually is, 
since we think the certain way is how it is. Nor (first personally) should we so 
distinguish. Beliefs play their role by being taken to represent the world as it is, and 
there is nothing to put in their place just because in some cases beliefs are mistaken.  
Likewise, when we conclude that we ought to fetch the corkscrew, if we think our 
beliefs and intentions are largely as they ought to be, because of the truth of 
transmissivism we think the force of that rational requirement is in line with a 
directive obligation.38 Internally, just as what we believe to be true is taken to be 
what is true, what we really ought to do is not distinguished from what we think we 
really ought to do. Nevertheless, the fact of there being a distinction between the 
rational correctness of our intention relative to our beliefs and the intention being the 
intention we directively ought to have is available to us.  
Now if at this point we just stopped at the thought that fetching the corkscrew was 
rationally correct we might still wonder whether to go ahead. Being rational, 
however, is in part having the possibility of responding to the world on the basis of 
whatever we take to be reasons, and for that reason the rational economy requires us 
to act on the basis of what we judge we ought to do. Of course, we might take 
wicked considerations to be reasons, and then being rational will result in us doing 
wicked things. But that is beside the point here. Since directive oughts need not 
appear (first personally) in any other way than as what we think we ought to do, this 
requirement of rationality will in certain circumstances result in us doing what we 
ought. For provided we are in states we directively ought to be in, then acting 
according to rational correctness will result in us doing what we directively ought to 
do.  
Nor can we but accidentally do better than this. Lacking some mystical intuition 
by which intentional states might be infallible, our intentional states represent as best 
they can to us our situation. We can possess infallibly neither the reasons we have 
nor the facts of the world, but must make do with our best representations of both. 
Doing what, so far as we can tell, we ought to, is our only non-accidental way of 
coming to do what we have reason to do. When things go well, and we are apprised 
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 Unless we are well placed and we’ve decided to do what we know we ought not. 
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of our reasons and of the facts, we’ll do the right thing. In this way can rational 
correctness be an instrument serving directivity.  
Consequently, instrumentalism can satisfy the requirements of Avoiding Spurious 
Directivity, Availing Rational Guidance and Transmissivism, answer the question of 
what to do, and explain why we ought to be rational. Once we detach rational 
correctness from directivity, we see the local correctness of rationality does not entail 
the spurious obligations and spuriously justified beliefs that it seemed to when we 
identified it as a kind of directivity. The normativity of rational guidance is restored 
to us without burdening us with the requirement that rational guidance gets it right 
directively. Given the right input, it will. But even when the directive status of the 
input is not available for internal inspection, we must still act. In general, acting as 
rationally required will amount to doing the best we can; when we are in the mental 
states we directively ought to be in, doing so will result in doing what we directively 
ought to; we can’t knowingly, deliberately and non-accidentally do better than this; 
so only in this way will we do what we ought in a way for which we can be 
responsible; we ought to be responsible for doing what we ought; therefore we ought 
to be rational. 
8.5 Confusing correctness and directivity 
In the explanation just given, normativity in our thoughts plays a dual role, and we 
frequently do not know whether a rational requirement is reflecting a directive 
requirement. Nevertheless, we now see that following rational requirements amounts 
to doing the best we can do non-accidentally and in a way for which we can be held 
responsible. Failure to appreciate that this fact is based in the truth of transmissivism 
is likely to lead to confusing rational correctness and directivity, and as a matter of 
fact much good and not much harm is done by people treating what they find to be a 
rational requirement as what they directively ought to do. That is to say, there is 
considerable utility in simply confusing rational and directive requirements.  
Because of its utility, the ambiguity pervades our normative vocabulary and causes 
some difficulties when we try to understand what is going on. Practically, however, 
these difficulties do not trouble us. Perhaps the greatest complexity in negotiating 
these ambiguities arises when we are considering responsibility and blame. For both 
one’s actual mental state and what is rationally correct relative to that state, but also 
what mental state one ought to be in (beliefs, desires, valuations one ought to have), 
come into the equation. Infallibility is not required. Rationality offers us only the best 
bet to do what we ought, and for this reason, its normativity cannot be directive, 
since directivity settles what is right. The directive ‘ought’ settles what you ought to 
do and the rational ‘ought’ settles what to do. If you are faced with a man about to 
shoot a gun at you, it is rationally correct to shoot him in self defence, but whether 
doing so is what you ought to do depends on whether he really has a gun, or instead 
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is pointing only a toy. I ought not to shoot the toy gun possessor, but whether I am to 
blame in shooting him depends a great deal on the circumstantially requirable 
warrant for my belief that he points a gun and not a toy. It is tragic that what is 
warrantable may lead a policemen to shoot the masquerader who mistakes him for 
another in fancy dress and points a toy gun, and also to leave standing the mummer 
who for once is waving a real gun and kills him. But we don’t need to get round 
these tragedies by torturing our terms until the rational ought yields up what is right. 
In both cases, it yielded the wrong action, but that is just a consequence of our 
fallible situation, a situation better understood by separation of rational and directive 
oughts and transmissivism. 
8.6 Problems for what ought to be believed 
In stating transmissivism I make use of the notion of mental states you ought to be 
in. For much of what I have said, this may amount to identifying what you ought to 
believe with the truth. I am not unhappy with that, but there are difficulties which can 
be raised. Perhaps what I ought to believe is what is rational to believe, what is 
rational to believe is what the evidence warrants and on this occasion what the 
evidence warrants is in fact false. In that case, it may well be that being in mental 
states that I ought to be in, and being rational, will not result in doing what I ought 
(because I have a false belief). So transmissivism is false.  
It seems to me that this problem can be answered by use of the correctness-
directivity distinction again. Of those things you have reason to know, what you 
ought, directively, to believe is the truth. However, the truth is not generally 
transparently available to us, whilst what is rational to believe is available (in 
principle), so the rationally correct to believe goes for what directively ought to be 
believed just as the rational to do goes for what directively ought to be done.  
Another problem is the nature of the normativity of justified belief. The rational 
correctness of justified belief cannot have narrow scope without us once more falling 
into a problem of spurious (correctness, in this case) normativity, in this case, 
spuriously justified beliefs. Whilst the person who thinks moon rock makes a good 
snack is believing rationally, because he believes that the moon is made of green 
cheese, he is not justified in the former belief unless justified in the latter.  
Again, I do not think this is a problem. I do not need to claim that the normativity 
of all rational correctness takes narrow scope. Sometimes the normativity of rational 
correctness takes wide scope, which is why there is the problem of the regress of 
justification. Our beliefs may be conditionally justified by other beliefs, but 
unjustified unless those other beliefs are themselves justified. Despite that fact, 
conditional justification means that the beliefs conditionally justified are rationally 
correct. Suppose you believe p and believe p฀→q. Then believing q is rationally 
correct even though it may be unjustified. The truth about justification determines 
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whether what is justified is to believe q or give up one of p and p฀→q. But you are 
getting something right if you come to believe q rather than ¬q or some totally 
irrelevant belief. So rationality requires, ceteris paribus, believing q. The force of the 
ceteris paribus is not that perhaps you are not justified in believing p or p฀→q, but just 
that there are no other available internal considerations which defeat either of them. I 
don’t think this amounts to a commitment to externalism about justification.   
There is no space here to investigate fully the various scopes of the varieties of 
rational correctness, so having pointed out this formal similarity between the scope 
of correctness normativity of justification for belief and the scope of directivity in 
general, I leave its further investigation for another occasion. 
8.7 True hypothetical imperatives 
We are now coming to the end of the trajectory which started in chapter 6, when 
we looked at problems for the hypothetical imperative and for conditionals 
expressing rational norms which had a similar form. As Broome remarks, that the 
scope of the modality in deontically modal conditionals may lead to non-
detachability of the consequent ‘is an elementary and widely recognised point, but 
also one that is widely ignored’ (1999:90). Why then have we persisted in believing 
narrow scope hypothetical imperatives to be true?  
There have been expressions of discomfort with the ought of hypothetical 
imperatives:  
the subtle problem of understanding hypothetical ‘oughts’…maybe 
they involve a pun on ‘ought’ (Papineau 1999: 19 & 18 fn. 3). 
But these discomforts have not led to drawing a systematic distinction allowing for a 
full explanation of the normativity of hypothetical oughts. We are now in a position 
to explain hypothetical imperatives properly.  
We saw that taking transmissivism to imply intrinsic directivity for rationality gets 
into a kind of self defeat. Nevertheless, transmissivism is true, and there must be 
principles concerned with the transmission of directivity by rational correctness. If 
the normativity of rationality is correctness alone, but it transmits directivity, 
principles of transmission will have to be composite directive norms. In effect, 
principles of transmission are among the principles to do with rationality’s 
servanthood to obligation. 
I contend that hypothetical imperatives are principles of transmission. They are not 
pure instrumental rational principles but principles which contain pure instrumental 
rational principles (in the way explained in 2.5 above). They are composite directive 
norms. When understood thus, we can see that the basis for the rationalist’s second 
win is a confusion of the directive normativity of transmission principles with the 
normativity of their contained rational principles.  
The reformulation of the hypothetical imperative in Broomian terms is: 
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O(I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀→I฀Ψ)  (฀η)  
In section 7.4 I discussed the objection that the General Form, O(M฀Δ฀→M฀Θ), can’t 
be right because the following would appear to be consistent with it.  That if one 
intended ฀Φ, believed MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) but didn’t intend ฀Ψ then one is at liberty to 
conform to the General Form by renouncing one’s belief rather than changing one’s 
intention.  
I rejected that criticism for two reasons. On the one hand, it should not be mistaken 
for another objection which would be valid, namely that if you ought to intend the 
end and you ought to believe MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) then, if you are in the irrational 
state, the failure to intend the means must change. The General Form is not 
vulnerable to that objection. For if you ought to intend the end and you ought to 
believe MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ), then the General Form suffices to derive that you ought 
to intend the means (as was shown in section 7.5). On the other hand, I pointed out 
that we should distinguish excluding the irrationality of 
I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ from which way you should restore rationality, and 
that it was quite correct for the General Form to be insufficient to determine which 
way. What I have claimed is that the General Form exhibits the relation of obligation 
to (much of) rationality, not that it exhibits rationality.  
However, I want now to return to this objection from a different angle. For I think 
this objection brings the following point into focus. The objection is based on 
thinking that the normative force of Broome’s normative requirement relation, and 
hence of the General Form, is supposed to subsume all the normativity in evidence, 
yet the normativity of rationality would seem to require intending the means whilst 
the General Form on its own does not. The point is that rationality is concerned with 
correct revision of mental states, and so merely intending the end and believing 
MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) should suffice to make intending the means the required revision 
of mental states.  
Now the point I made before still stands, that which of the seven states consistent 
with the conditional embedded in (฀η) is right may depend on more than just that I 
intend the end and believe MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ). But there are two different 
dependencies possible and they need not be consistent. Thinking that they must be 
consistent is what creates some of the difficulties of accounting for the normativity. 
One is a directive constraint based on the requirement of transmissivism and the 
other a correctness constraint of rationality.  
The directive constraint is the matter of what I ought to intend and believe, in the 
directive sense of ought. Which of intending the means, giving up intending the end, 
giving up the means-end belief is obliged depends on what the directive oughts of the 
situation really are. The General Form expresses directivity, and so it is correct that it 
alone doesn’t determine which states compatible with the embedded conditional are 
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those which would constitute the correct revision of the irrational state 
I฀Φ฀∧B(MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ))฀∧¬I฀Ψ.  
The directive constraint is not the end of the matter. Kant overstated it, but ceteris 
paribus, willing the end requires willing the believed necessary means. This is a 
constitutive constraint of rationality, since failing to will the means counts against the 
putative willing of the end. Consequently, in this sense, the normativity of rationality 
goes beyond that expressed by the General Form, which on its own does not 
determine the correct revision of the irrational state. It is a constraint of rationality 
that, ceteris paribus, intending the end and believing MeansEnd(฀Ψ,C,฀Φ) should lead 
to intending the means. The ceteris paribus clause can be fulfilled merely by the 
absence of additional internally available considerations which bear on the revision. 
On the basis of the rational constraint we find ourselves coming round to asserting a 
traditional hypothetical imperative: that if you intend the end then you ought (ceteris 
paribus) to intend the means; alternatively, if you intend the end then you have a 
defeasible reason to intend the means (and likewise for the cases of practical and 
theoretical reasoning).  
The cause of the confusion over the hypothetical imperative is that the scope of the 
directivity is wide whilst the scope of the rational correctness normativity is narrow. 
Hence our tendency to vacillate in how we understand the hypothetical imperative. 
The wide scope for directive normativity is justified by the fact that if you directively 
ought to intend the ends you directively ought to intend the means. The narrow scope 
for correctness normativity, in which you correctly ought to intend the means just 
because you do intend the ends, is justified because that is constitutively necessary if 
the rational economy is to function. Hence in full, the hypothetical imperative should 
be expressed as ‘you directively ought, if you want to ฀Φ then you rationally ought to 
฀Ψ’. Admittedly this is an ugly complication, but many a beautiful theory has died at 
the hand of the facts.  
Broome distinguished strict and slack normativities (all-things-considered and pro 
tanto), and diagnosed the instrumental principle as strict. I think only its rational 
ought is strict. Its directive ought may be either. Nevertheless, it is compatible with 
this account that the rational could be either as well.  
I asked why we have persisted in believing narrow scope hypothetical imperatives 
to be true despite our knowledge of their problems? The answer is now evident. 
When we justify why we employ the hypothetical imperative we focus on what is 
rationally correct, but when we justify why we should obey it we focus on its 
transmission of directivity from end to means. In either case we are inclined to ignore 
the other normativity in play.  
8.7 True hypothetical imperatives 
 
 
153
Kant’s hypothetical imperative 
We can now explain Kant’s hypothetical imperative and explain why the problems 
of scope remained unresolved alongside an acceptance that it is part of well grounded 
modern usage of the hypothetical-categorical distinction. It subsumes distinct issues.  
The scope issues persist because the hypothetical imperative subsumes a narrow 
scope rational requirement of coherence of action with beliefs and desires with a 
wide scope directive requirement for transmission of obligation from means to ends.  
Kant’s hypothetical-categorical distinction confounds the distinction between 
correctness and directivity, between the correctness normativity of rationality and 
directivity, with a distinction within directivity, between reasons relative to and 
independent of inclination. Because the hypothetical imperative is a composite 
directive norm with dual scope modality, failure to analyse that complexity will lead 
to precisely such a confusion. Kant’s contrast between imperatives of skill and 
categorical imperatives rely on the former distinction, and his contrast between 
imperatives of prudence and categorical imperatives rely on the latter distinction. 
Focusing on the hypothetical imperative’s correctness normativity will lead one to 
contrast the hypothetical and categorical in terms of the merely instrumental 
worthiness of means and worthiness of ends. Focusing on its directive normativity 
will lead one to contrast them in terms of reasons relative to and independent of 
inclination. In the latter debate, the issue is not about instrumental rationality at all. 
Someone who takes desires and interests to have pro tanto legitimacy is enunciating 
principles such as ‘if you want a drink you ought to have a drink’. This imperative is 
about the obligation of ends by desires, not of means by ends.  
Kant cannot resolve this problem within the terms of his practical philosophy. 
What is going on here is that Kant needs to have it both ways. He knows that 
attributing command and obligation to hypothetical imperatives ends up looking 
implausible, but for his grounding of ethics in rationality he must retain the 
instrumental and substantive principles expressed by hypothetical and the categorical 
imperatives as each a species of the genus rationality. Only the hypothetical 
imperative expresses uncontroversially a species of rationality. Grounding the 
hypothetical imperative along with the categorical imperative in a uniform account of 
principles of rationality helps to establish their congenericity. The principles of 
rationality are objective laws of willing (‘will is nothing but practical 
reason’(1785:412/76)), which latter are determined by what the perfectly rational 
being wills in response to objective necessity. Imperatives express the force of those 
laws of willing, those principles of rationality, to imperfectly rational beings, the 
force being obligation. Imperatives connect imperfectly rational beings to all 
principles of rationality. So Kant can’t back away from the force of command of 
hypothetical imperatives without undermining the connection between the 
imperfectly rational and the only principles of rationality on which there is general 
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agreement, the instrumental principles. Undermining that connection undermines the 
entire project, since the two-species-of-genus-rationality claim fails if the 
uncontroversial species of rationality (instrumental rationality) doesn’t fit the 
account. So the force of the hypothetical imperative, the necessitation for imperfectly 
rational beings, has to be fudged. 
8.8 A more complex General Form  
If at all possible, then, we need to construe the logical structure of the two 
normativities in reasoning. It is possible that the structure is too complex to allow of 
retaining any of Broome’s analysis. Nevertheless, we shall try.  
One of Broome’s main premisses is what I called earlier the Broomian thought, a 
thought of the pattern ‘if x is in mental states ฀Δ but not in mental state ฀Θ then x is not 
as he ought to be’ (e.g. ‘If you intend to open the wine, and believe that to do so you 
must fetch the corkscrew, you are definitely not entirely as you ought to be unless 
you intend to fetch the corkscrew.’ (Broome 1999:89)). Broome uses his thought to 
show that the relation between intending ends and intending means is strict rather 
than slack, and so is a requirement rather than recommendation. I shall now show 
that his normative requirement relation fuses the correctness of rationality with 
directivity, and then derive a more complex General Form which expresses both 
normativities. 
Consider these premisses:  
1. it is irrational to be in mental states M฀Δ whilst not being in mental state 
M฀Θ  
2. you ought not to be irrational in the way of 1.  
Clearly they are sufficient for the truth of the Broomian thought, and are probably 
stronger than necessary. They are sufficient to derive the logical factor of the relevant 
normative requirement. We can directly derive O¬(M฀Δ฀∧¬M฀Θ), which is equivalent 
to O(M฀Δ฀→M฀Θ). 
However, they are insufficient to justify the claim that M฀Δ normatively requires 
M฀Θ.  Broome’s normative requirement relation is stronger than its logical factor: 
‘[the requirement] is [the logical factor] with determination added, from left to right’ 
(Broome 1999:82)). So he wants it to be that M฀Δ requires M฀Θ, rather than some 
other transition, such as to ¬M฀Δ. But moving to the latter would be compatible with 
1 and 2, and hence they do not justify that M฀Δ normatively requires M฀Θ. Since 1 and 
2 are at least as strong as the Broomian thought, the Broomian thought is insufficient 
to justify that M฀Δ normatively requires M฀Θ. 
Broome needs the extra bit which rationality supplies, but which is not expressed 
in premiss 1. He needs that being in mental states ฀Δ requires a transition to being in 
mental states ฀Δ and ฀Θ as opposed to a transition to being in mental states ¬฀Δ and ¬฀Θ.  
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3. being in mental states M฀Δ rationally requires a transition to being in states 
M(฀Δ฀∧฀Θ). 
Finally, he needs being rational in that way to be what you ought to be. 
4. you ought to be rational in the way of 3. 
So in exploring premisses sufficient for the normative requirement relation to hold 
between M฀Δ and M฀Θ, I have now distinguished the correctness normativity of 
rationality in premisses 1 and 3 from directivity of premisses 2 and 4. The Broomian 
thought subsumed the distinct normativities of 1 and 2 in a single ‘ought’, and 
Broome’s normative requirement subsumes the distinct normativities of the pairs in a 
single ‘ought’.  
No doubt that would be a virtue if it could be maintained. However, we saw in 7.4 
that the directive normativity in play both is and should be insufficient to determine 
which of the seven possibilities consistent with M฀Δ฀→M฀Θ is the correct revision of 
the irrational state.  More importantly, we saw in 8.1 that keeping the normativity 
single could only be maintained at the cost of losing the normativity of rational 
guidance, losing the distinction between the correctness of what might be the 
deliverance of a piece of personal practical reasoning from what one directively 
ought to do (our example was that going sailing might be rationally required but not 
what you ought to do)— a cost too high to pay.  
In Broome’s original example of instrumental reasoning, the Broomian thought 
appeals to the strictness of the rational relation between means and ends. Here we 
would have to take the strictness from the rational relations between M฀Δ and M฀Θ. 
But now we have distinguished directivity from correctness, that rational strictness 
on its own does not ground the strictness of 2 and 4. Broome simply assumes that 
being rational is how you ought to be, which assumption will allow us to derive 
them. But we are concerned with whether, why and how being rational is how you 
ought to be.  
One answer that would fit the instrumental cases is that if you ought to intend the 
end then you ought to intend the means. As we saw before, Korsgaard goes so far as 
to suggest that only this conditional can be the real instrumental principle (Korsgaard 
1997), since merely intending the end cannot give rise to the normativity for the 
means which is derivable from the Kantian hypothetical imperative.  
An alternative is instrumentalism being true. This is not incompatible with the 
details of Korsgaard’s answer, but is incompatible with the spirit, since 
instrumentalism maintains a distinction between the instrumental principle as a 
principle of rationality, and that principle’s service to what ends ought to be pursued. 
Korsgaard holds the principle of instrumental rationality itself to be directive, 
instrumentalism locates the directivity external to rationality. Because the normative 
requirement has fused these two normativities it conceals the complexity of the 
relations between them.  
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Broome calls O(p฀→q) the logical factor of the normative requirement that p 
normatively requires q. But the use of a conditional is only justified if there is some 
rule of detachment. Transmissivism explains why this argument should be valid: 
M฀Δ rationally requires M฀Θ 
OM฀Δ 
Therefore OM฀Θ 
Its validity would suggest that detachment for the logical factor should be available 
on this basis, and we have seen that the K principle of KDL is sufficient for 
detachment of this conclusion given the logical factor and the second premiss. So 
transmissivism is a plausible origin for the inferential role of the logical factor. For 
these reasons I call it the directive factor. It could and should be generalised thus: 
D(p฀→q) where ‘D’ is a schematic letter to be replaced by operators for directive 
normative forces. This is true because transmissivism explains the validity of this 
argument:  
M฀Δ rationally requires M฀Θ 
DM฀Δ 
Therefore DM฀Θ 
If we completely generalise this to include strict and slack rational relations 
between ฀Δ and ฀Ψ, there will be some additional complexities. For example, this may 
mean that the strictness or slackness of the directivity in the conclusion must be the 
slackest of those in the rational requirements and that in the second premiss. I am not 
going to try to sort out these details. 
I claim there is another factor, the correctness factor, p฀→Cq, where ‘C’ is a 
schematic letter to be replaced by operators for correctness normativities of 
rationality. My grounds are that what Broome holds true of normative requirements 
requires premiss 3 above, that rationality is concerned with correct revision of mental 
states (for example, intending the end should suffice to make intending the means the 
required revision of mental states, ceteris paribus), and the arguments of the recent 
sections that the normativity of rational correctness should be derivable in our 
reasoning. Therefore the following inference is valid: 
M฀Δ rationally requires M฀Θ 
M฀Δ 
Therefore CM฀Θ 
The conclusion is that M฀Θ is rationally correct. Here is where we get our needed 
detached rational requirement whilst avoiding detaching a directively normative 
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conclusion. For that we need it to be also the case that OM฀Δ (and go by the directive 
factor).  
Here, too, we may have strictness and slackness in the force of the rational 
requirement. We find ‘C’ ranging over strict and slack rational requirements, then, 
and seem to find ourselves in possession of a rational ought distinct from the 
directive ought. It is the ought Kant sought, but could not consistently have, when he 
wanted the imperatives of skill and prudence to only recommend. The correctness 
normativity of rationality doesn’t presume to direct because it doesn’t presume to be 
starting from the right place. It simply offers what is available to fallible creatures, 
correct guidance which, when starting from the right place, will lead to ending up at 
the right place.  
The General Form, O(M฀Δ฀→M฀Θ), does not explicitly express the normativity of 
rationality, but expresses only directive normativity. The normativity of rationality is 
concealed within the truth of the embedded conditional. It is what makes that 
conditional true, but the conditional itself does not express the rational normativity.  
The reader will observe that premiss 1 above is quite general, subsuming all the 
difficulties of which sets of mental states M฀Δ make rational which other mental 
states M฀Θ, and so covers not just instrumental reasoning but also the practical and 
theoretical reasoning we subsumed in the General Form. Consequently, I think we 
can now re-write the General Form so as to express more fully the relation of 
rationality and normativity. When M฀Δ make M฀Θ rationally correct, then the General 
Form is D(M฀Δ฀→CM฀Θ). The earlier demonstrations of the virtues of the General 
Form carry straight over, and when one ought to be in M฀Δ then the rational 
correctness of M฀Θ is also obliged.  
This can sound wrong by sounding like it makes the rational correctness rather 
than the mental state ฀Θ obligatory. But the rational correctness, in the circumstances, 
consists in being in mental state ฀Θ. This can be accounted for by what I had to say in 
section 2.5 about the relation of composite directive norms to the correctness norms 
they contain. What a composite directness norm directs one to do is to conform to the 
correctness norm, so if the correctness norm says M฀Θ is correct, then the composite 
norm is directing one to M฀Θ. Hence D(CM฀Θ) says the correctness of M฀Θ is directed, 
so M฀Θ is directed, hence D(CM฀Θ)฀→DM฀Θ.  
We see here a formal expression of the self effacing quality of the correctness 
normativity of rationality in the presence of directivity, which is why the interaction 
of internal rationality and external directivity work in harness, but which leads to its 
distinctness from directivity being overlooked. This self effacing quality is what 
leads Broome to ambiguity over his stated rational requirements (whether they 
detach or not). Having eliminated the unwanted normativity from detaching in order 
to avoid giving rise to spurious obligations he doesn’t realise he has subsumed the 
hidden normativity of rationality, but later makes use of it anyway. I therefore think 
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the right way to understand Broome’s normative requirement is as a composite 
directive norm. For example, that ends normatively require means is the composite 
directive norm of instrumental rationality. 
Broome’s criticisms and the new General Form 
How does this notion stand up to the criticisms that Broome makes when rejecting 
a subjective ought distinct from a misdescribed normative requirement? He criticises 
a subjective ought for  
1. conceal[ing] the logical structure of the situation, because it does not make 
the ‘ought’ govern a conditional  
2. mak[ing] the ought relative…to the subject, whereas it should be relative to 
a fact…that imposes the normative requirement.  
3. if you have inconsistent beliefs or intentions….it may happen that 
some…normatively require you to see to something, and others 
normatively require you not to see to it. This is a comprehensible feature of 
your inconsistent condition. But it is not comprehensible to say you 
subjectively ought to see to something and also you subjectively ought not 
to see to it; this looks like a contradiction. (1999:94-5, my numbering) 
Taking them in order: 
1. I think we have now seen that the normative requirement itself conceals logical 
structure which Broome himself needs, the logical structure of the correctness factor 
of the normative requirement. 
2. The normativity that detaches from the correctness factor is not relative to the 
subject, but to the same mental state and other relata of the normative requirement as 
the directive ought which detaches when those relata are obliged. 
3. My account is incompatible with the kind of account that Broome wants to give, 
because he wants to exclude internal derivation of contradictory oughts when one is 
in an inconsistent state, and so wants to exclude introducing normativity in the 
conclusions of the contents of reasoning which reflect relations of that conclusion to 
its premisses. But because of my assertion of the existence of correctness factors of 
normative requirements, I am committed to precisely such introduced normativity. 
Suppose believing ฀Φ normatively requires believing ฀Ψ and believing ฀Θ normatively 
requires believing ¬฀Ψ, and suppose you believe both ฀Φ and ฀Θ. So we have 
B฀Φ฀→CB฀Ψ      B฀Φ  B฀Θ฀→CB¬฀Ψ      B฀Θ 
       CB฀Ψ    CB¬฀Ψ 
Broome will find this objectionable because the detachment of the normative 
conclusions leads to something that looks like a contradiction, that it is rationally 
correct for you to believe ฀Ψ and rationally correct for you the believe ¬฀Ψ.  
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First of all, it is not a requirement to believe a contradiction as it stands. We would 
need the principle CBx฀∧CBy฀→CB(x฀∧y)39 to be true in order to derive that it was 
rationally correct to believe ฀Ψ฀∧¬฀Ψ. But that principle is not in general correct.  
 ‘C’ is supposed to express the correctness normativity of rationality that indicates 
correct revision and so offers guidance, but guidance for fallible creatures, not gods. 
For those reasons the ideal logical relations which stand between propositions do not 
just carry straight over into truths of distribution of mental and rational operators 
over logical truths. So merely because x฀∧y฀→x฀∧y is logically true, it doesn’t follow 
that B(x฀∧y฀→x฀∧y)฀→ (Bx฀∧By฀→B(x฀∧y)) nor that CB(x฀∧y฀→x฀∧y)฀→ 
(CBx฀∧CBy฀→CB(x฀∧y)) are, and so even if B(x฀∧y฀→x฀∧y) or CB(x฀∧y฀→x฀∧y) is true, 
Bx฀∧By฀→B(x฀∧y) and CBx฀∧CBy฀→CB(x฀∧y) need not be. Furthermore, we know that 
Bx฀∧By฀→B(x฀∧y) is not true just because we have contradictory beliefs which we do 
not believe as contradictions.  
So one reason for thinking that CBx฀∧CBy฀→CB(x฀∧y) might be true fails. A reason 
for thinking it false would be if we could explain why CB฀Ψ฀∧CB¬฀Ψ฀∧¬CB(฀Ψ฀∧¬฀Ψ) 
might be true. Now clearly ¬CB(฀Ψ฀∧¬฀Ψ) is true, so if we can explain how 
CB฀Ψ฀∧CB¬฀Ψ could also be true we would be done. I suggest that CB฀Ψ฀∧CB¬฀Ψ can 
be true because of information that needs to be kept track of during belief revision, 
which is an iterative process engaged in by fallible rational creatures.  
The idealisation of what a person believes as being closed under logical (and 
inductive) consequence is a purely theoretical idealisation. Avoiding vacuity when 
revising belief in the face of a contradictory belief poses serious difficulties. For 
example, Alchourrón et al 1985 claim that the Levi identity is correct: 
฀Δ revised by adding ฀Φ = (฀Δ less everything implying ¬฀Φ) + ฀Φ 
This makes belief revision a contraction in which removal of what is in conflict with 
฀Φ is followed by adding ฀Φ and closing under logical consequence. That’s fine, so far 
as it goes, but it applies only posteriorly to what is crucially at issue, namely, if ฀Φ is 
contradicting what is in ฀Δ, should ฀Φ, or what conflicts with ฀Φ, persist? There is much 
more to say (Gillies and Pollock 2000 say much of it) but in general I do not think 
that completely idealised approaches to belief revision work. 
If we are specifying the actual extent of a person’s beliefs, we must include their 
occurrent beliefs and their dispositional beliefs, but need not include their 
dispositions to believe. So whilst CB฀Φ implies they have a disposition to believe ฀Φ 
(since were they to do the relevant reasoning they may come to believe ฀Φ), CBx฀→Bx 
is not true and therefore CBx฀∧CBy฀→Bx฀∧By is not true. Contradictory beliefs being 
correct for someone need not mean they have contradictory beliefs. Furthermore, if 
through having an inconsistent belief set, even if contradictory beliefs being correct 
                                                 
39
 In what follows, please take the variables to range over propositions or contents, and to be 
universally quantified over. 
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for them leads to them believing them individually, this need not mean they believe a 
contradiction, because Bx฀∧By฀→B(x฀∧y) is false. 
Consider a case of belief revision. For example, I believe my book is on the table 
but when I go and look I acquire a perceptual belief that the table has nothing on it. 
We don’t then believe a contradiction but revise our belief. In this case, of course, my 
previous belief is defeated immediately, but for the sake of an example, suppose the 
lighting conditions are very poor. Now I have a more complex problem, and part of 
the process of revising my belief is to be aware that both beliefs are correct yet they 
cannot be believed together, so I must back-track over their grounds, or do something 
to acquire further information.  
Why should I keep track of the correctness? Because if in fact one belief is merely 
believed by me but is not correct on the basis of other information that I have, whilst 
one is, then that would solve the problem immediately. The one merely believed is 
(or has become) ungrounded. In the daylight view of the table, the perceptual belief 
may defeat the belief that the book is on the table by defeating the beliefs which 
grounded my belief that it was on the table. Those grounding beliefs, if merely 
believed rather than being able to be supported further so I know they too are correct 
to believe, are defeated by my knowledge that the perceptual belief is correct. 
Consequently, the ground for the correctness of my belief that the book is on the 
table is removed, so that belief is no longer known to be correct, so is defeated by the 
perceptual belief  being known to be correct.  
In the murky view, the weakness of the sensory evidence may mean that the 
perceptual belief that the table is bare is not a full belief, and a belief which is not a 
full belief may be insufficient to defeat the grounds of beliefs which conflict with it. 
The sensory evidence may yet make the belief that the book is not on the table a 
correct belief. However, since the grounds for the belief that the book is on the table 
are undefeated by the perceptual belief, that belief is also correct. Hence each of 
these contradictory beliefs may be correct. The distinction between this case and the 
previous case shows why we would keep track of the correctness: because by doing 
so we distinguish when one contradictory belief defeats another immediately from 
when contradictory beliefs cannot simply defeat one another. They can’t do that 
when they are both remain correct, and knowing they are both correct, but can’t be 
correct together, that is, knowing that CB฀Ψ฀∧CB¬฀Ψ฀∧¬CB(฀Ψ฀∧¬฀Ψ), is what leads us to 
back-track over their grounds, obtain new evidence, or do other things to resolve the 
conflict.  
Consider, also, a simple case of explicit belief revision within episodes of 
theoretical reasoning. For example, a sequence of thoughts such as 
4. Fred is a tortoise 
5. If Fred is a tortoise he has fur 
6. Fred doesn’t have fur. 
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7. Fred is not a tortoise 
8. Fred is a tortoise 
9. It is not the case that if Fred is a tortoise he has fur. 
This seems like a possible sequence of entertainings of propositions which may 
occur when we figure something out. But as it stands, it doesn’t make much sense 
unless one allows some reflective processes to be accompanying it, which processes 
keep track of the status of rational correctness and the basis for that correctness. 
These are the processes which before step 9 must be noting that CTf฀∧C¬Tf฀∧¬C(Tf฀∧ 
¬Tf) and then backtracking to decide what to reject.  
It might be thought that the relevant information could be kept track of just in 
terms of non-normative conditionals rather than normative conclusions. For example, 
B(฀Φ฀→฀Ψ) ∧B฀Φ฀→B฀Ψ conflicting with B(฀Θ฀→฀Ψ) ∧B฀Θ฀→B¬฀Ψ.We have seen elsewhere 
that there are other roles played by the internal derivation of normative conclusions, 
so this is not a reason to reject the derivation of such conclusions. It is only an attack 
on whether such conclusions, when conflicting, can play, or need play, the role 
suggested here. Now certainly something must keep track of the grounds of the 
normative conclusions, for example, that CB฀Ψ because ฀Φ฀→฀Ψ and ฀Φ. But a reason it 
can’t all be done with such non-normative conditionals  is because they can’t 
distinguish the two perceptual cases just distinguished. We needed the normative 
conclusion about the perceptual belief in the first case to defeat the grounds for the 
conflicting belief and fail to do so in the second case. But so far as these non-
normative conditionals go, there is no difference.  
 Let us consider a practical case. Suppose intending ฀Φ normatively requires 
intending ฀Ψ and intending ฀Θ normatively requires intending ¬฀Ψ, and suppose you 
intend both ฀Φ and ฀Θ. So we have 
I฀Φ฀→CI฀Ψ      I฀Φ  I฀Θ฀→CI¬฀Ψ      I฀Θ 
       CI฀Ψ    CI¬฀Ψ 
Once more, this leads to something that looks like a contradiction, that it is 
rationally correct for you to intend ฀Ψ and rationally correct for you to intend ¬฀Ψ. 
Once more, this is not a requirement to intend a contradiction, which would require 
the principle CIx฀∧CIy฀→CI(x฀∧y). I suggest that this situation is also as it should be; 
indeed that it is entirely recognisable. Not only are contradictory actions desired by 
us, but they are each correct for us, yet not compatible, so we must back-track. 
I think a reason we are inclined to think CIx฀∧CIy฀→CI(x฀∧y) is true, and so to think 
that these cases end up as commitments to the correctness of an intention to a 
contradiction in action, is to do with the self effacement of rational correctness in the 
face of directivity. In the cases in which one ought to be in the relevant states, say 
OI฀Φ, we can supplement the first derivation: 
I฀Φ฀→CI฀Ψ      I฀Φ    OI฀Φ    O(I฀Φ฀→I฀Ψ)   
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   OCI฀Ψ 
Because directivity determines what ought to be done, when the ought is all things 
considered the oughts cannot conflict. Since such oughts cannot conflict, we are 
inclined to think that OCIx฀∧OCIy฀→OI(x฀∧y) is true, and this conditional is also 
derivable in KDL from O-dist-฀∧ and the principle of the self effacement of rational 
correctness (DCx฀→Dx). Consequently, were we able to derive OCI¬฀Ψ as well, this 
would lead us to derive an obligation to intend the contradiction ฀Ψ฀∧¬฀Ψ. 
Consequently, since OI฀Φ is true, OI฀Θ cannot be, and so the second derivation can’t 
be similarly supplemented to derive a contradiction. 
So because OCIx฀∧OCIy฀→OI(x฀∧y) is true, we are inclined to think that 
CIx฀∧CIy฀→CI(x฀∧y) must also be true. But it does not follow. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, there is a perfectly good reason why it should not. Since rational creatures are 
fallible, rational correctness will allow for this by being defeasible, something we are 
quite familiar with. Among those defeaters can be internal indications of 
inconsistency which will be available when reflection leads to states such as 
CI฀Ψ฀∧CI¬฀Ψ and CB฀Ψ฀∧CB¬฀Ψ. The normativity in these defeaters is ineliminable, 
since merely intending or believing inconsistently could be a transitory aberration. It 
requires appreciating that each conjunct of the near inconsistency is rationally correct 
for me to appreciate that something is amiss in my web of motivations and beliefs, 
and to thereby provoke me to back-track into that web.  
 
I concede that this reply to Broome’s third objection may not be fully satisfactory, 
if only because it omits much needed detail. Nevertheless, I think something like it 
must be correct. There must be ways of reflectively indicating to oneself that some 
beliefs and plans are correct for one, rationally embedded in one’s general web of 
belief and plans, and also of allowing for distinguishing embedded from accidental 
inconsistency.  I’m not suggesting that what I have said is anything more than the 
beginning of an account of the role of rational correctness information in belief and 
plan revision. I am intending only to make plausible that keeping track of rational 
correctness is sometimes a necessary part in order to undermine the Broomian 
criticism. I have done this by illustrating how internal appreciation of rational 
correctness may play a role and why, therefore, reflective derivation of normative 
conclusions of correctness may be part of reasoning. Much more needs to be said, 
especially about how correctness information feeds in to defeat and undercutting, and 
how it plays its role in explicit reasoning. Here is not the place to say it. 
8.9 Summary 
The argument against the rationalist’s second win has extended over several 
chapters, and has two aspects: in the first I embarrass the rationalist and in the second 
I show that the rationalist argument against the instrumentalist fails. The rationalist 
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claims that transmissivism requires rationality to be intrinsically directive. I showed 
that taking the normativity of instrumental rationality and reason to be intrinsically 
directive confronts a dilemma. If the logical form of the relevant principles takes 
narrow scope modality then we can have transmissivism and the normativity of 
rational guidance, but at the cost of finding ourselves committed to endorsing 
spurious obligations and spuriously justified beliefs. If it takes wide scope we can 
have transmissivism whilst avoiding spurious directivity, but at the cost of the 
normativity of rational guidance. I say the rationalist cannot satisfactorily avoid this 
dilemma.  
The rationalist says that rationality’s normativity being correctness alone is 
insufficient for action to acquire the needed directivity: insufficient to explain what 
to do, why we ought to be instrumentally rational and how reason can oblige us by its 
conclusions. I argued that the instrumentalist can give an account which is a 
sufficient explanation, and which also avoids the dilemma. First personally, when we 
reason that we ought to ฀Φ  we know that either ฀Φ is only rationally correct or that it 
is also directed. Although first personally we cannot necessarily distinguish these 
disjuncts, we know that transmissivism implies that doing what is rationally correct 
is doing what we ought, provided we are largely as we ought to be regarding this 
issue. There is no other way of deliberately doing what we ought in a way for which 
we can be responsible. Therefore we ought to be rational. Third personally, however, 
we can distinguish these disjuncts, just as we can distinguish belief and world, and 
do not want to find ourselves having to directively endorse a first personal 
conclusion when it is incorrect. Consequently transmissive principles such as the 
hypothetical imperative require a dual modality and dual scope if they are to explain 
(without implying spurious directivity) both the correct transmission of directivity 
and the correct first personal availability of rational guidance, and their working in 
harness when we are as we ought to be. The correctness-directivity distinction allows 
us to make sense of such principles. I acknowledge that whether these truths have 
been adequately captured in the final version of the General Form is up for argument, 
but enough has been done to refute the second win. 
 9 Rationality and Human Perfection 
9.1 Rationalism 
We have now finished with the direct development and defence of 
instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is compatible with many standard metaethical 
positions. In short, it is compatible with anything which locates the source of 
directivity in something other than rationality itself. Clearly, Humeanism is where 
instrumentalism finds its natural home, and also where my use of ‘instrumentalism’ 
and the standard use unite. For if one is a non-cognitivist about directivity then 
directivity’s concern with rationality of belief and action is entirely instrumental. 
Contrast this with the moral realist, whose concern with rational belief includes 
rational beliefs about directive normative facts, which beliefs ought to motivate. In 
this case, rational belief is not playing a purely instrumental role relative to the 
person’s ends, but is required for having the proper ends. The Humean, on the other 
hand,  accounts for directivity in terms of relations to non-cognitive mental states of 
persons: their desires, valuations and passions. Hume himself grounded directivity on 
our states of approbation towards what is useful and agreeable in ourselves and 
others, our disapprobation towards what is not, and found our reason to be moral in 
our need to approve ourselves and be worthy of the approbation of others. I 
explained earlier (3.7 above) why the instrumentalist is entitled to make use of the 
notion of thin directive rationality and to speak of directive reasons within practical 
reason without thereby committing himself to rationalism. Even the Humean can 
speak in these terms if he wishes. 
Along the way, I have shown that if the intrinsic normativity of rationality is only 
correctness the first win for rationalism must fail, and that the assumption required 
by the second win faces an intractable dilemma. We now turn to addressing the third 
win: that a rationalist metaethic is true therefore rationality must be in part 
intrinsically directive.  
Whether Hobbes is a moral sceptic or not, contrary to Hume, he is avowedly a 
kind of rationalist about directivity. The interest in self-preservation, shared by all, 
provides universal reasons and justifies giving away the right of nature to the 
sovereign. Hobbes’ basic idea, to show some degree of coextensionality of morality 
and rational self-interest, has been exploited by philosophers such as Baier (1958) 
and Gauthier (1986) in their development of a rationalist metaethics.  
Moralities are systems of principles whose acceptance by everyone as 
overruling the dictates of self-interest is in the interest of everyone 
alike, though following the rules of a morality is not of course identical 
with following self-interest. (Baier 1970:437) 
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But Hobbesian rationalism does not locate directivity intrinsically to rationality 
itself, but as intrinsic to the common interests of persons. Morality is roughly what 
rational reflection on interests that are explanatorily prior to morality would 
recommend. (I say roughly because Hobbesian rationalism frequently has difficulties 
explaining why free riding is not rational.)  
There is a clear sense in which such approaches could be represented as taking the 
rational motivators of desire and interest to be the legitimate motivators, so to be a 
kind of rationalism after all. It could be said that this amounts to a concession that the 
normativity of rationality is not purely correctness. 
Now if all the rationalist means by rationality being intrinsically directive is that 
the basis of ethics is the instrumentally rational pursuit of desire and self interest, 
then in all important matters he and the instrumentalist have settled their difference 
on instrumentalist terms. If rationalism is not to collapse into instrumentalism the 
rationalist cannot appeal to the particularities of states or persons, but assert that it is 
something in the nature of rationality itself which makes directivity intrinsic to 
rationality. There are two main approaches that take such a line: Aristotelean, based 
on Aristotle’s view that what is best for man is to fulfil his ergon as a rational being; 
Kantian, based on the thought that grounding principles of morality can be shown to 
be principles of rational agency. In this chapter we will address the Aristotelean 
approach and in the next the Kantian.  
9.2 Perfectionist rationalism 
The approach to rationalism with roots in Aristoteleanism is one in which rationality 
is held to be a kind of human perfection, and is for that reason intrinsically directive. 
We might call this perfectionist rationalism.  
Some varieties of Aristoteleanism are likely to be compatible with 
instrumentalism. For example, in Foot’s neo-Aristoteleanism, moral terms involve 
determinate substantive conditions. ‘The man who has the virtue of justice is not 
ready to do certain things.’ (1958-9:100). The man who lacks the desire to be just 
lacks the rational motivation to behave in certain ways. The man who has that desire 
has the rational motivators he ought to have. But he is not, for Foot, more rational 
than the unjust man. However, for the sensibility Aristoteleanism of McDowell and 
Wiggins, compatibility with instrumentalism is fading.  ‘Distinctive of 
Aristoteleanism’ is the ‘recognitional view of the relation between value and 
practical reason’. Reasons are grounded in the fact that ‘the role of the faculty of 
practical reason is to recognise whether an action is valuable, where the action’s 
being valuable is constituted independently of rational choice’ (Cullity and Gaut 
1997:4). Nevertheless, one might hold that acquiring the sensibility adequate to 
recognising value is a characteristic perfection of human rational capacities, in the 
widest sense. That is to say, what distinguishes human persons from animals is that 
9.2 Perfectionist rationalism 
 
 
166
their rational capacities have these kinds of emergent possibility, and having such 
emergent possibilities is what allows for distinctive kinds of human action and life. 
Although there is no simple sense in which immorality is a kind of irrationality, 
nevertheless there is an intimacy in the relations of the emergent properties of virtue 
and value and the rational capacities which underwrite them. Directivity is thereby 
grounded in fulfilling the ergon of a rational being, which happens to be a richer and 
more various matter than the instrumentalist is willing to acknowledge. 
For our concerns, we would need more explanation of why the emergence of virtue 
should make rationality intrinsically directive. Aristoteleans may set out in a similar 
manner to the Kantian who intends to ground morality in rationality: 
Aristotle, for example, thought that he could reach a characterization of 
the end for man via the following steps: the end for man is the 
fulfilment of man’s function (ergon); the function of man is the optimal 
exercise of that capacity which distinguishes him from other kinds of 
creature; that capacity is reason or rationality. (Grice 2001:4) 
But they are probably less worried about whether it can be carried through entirely in 
those terms. They are inclined to think about the variety and richness of lives 
possible for creatures with our rational capacities, and to move on to drawing on a 
range of ethically thick notions of character which they do not intend to ground as 
requirements of rationality. As a consequence, whilst concerned with human 
perfection, they are not much concerned with the problem of arguing for perfectionist 
rationalism, and the threat they present to instrumentalism is for that reason 
somewhat tangential.  
I have selected three ways in which perfectionist rationalism might be advanced. 
First, I shall discuss what I call Aristotelean rationalism, which is based on Aristotle’s 
view that what is best for man is to fulfil his ergon as a rational being. Secondly, I 
shall discuss the suggestion that rational beings as such are intrinsically valuable. 
Third, whilst virtues are among possible human perfections, I shall not be addressing 
virtue ethics itself, since it is not clear to me that virtues in general are kinds of 
rational perfection or are requirements of rationality. It is, of course, possible to 
regard Aristotle’s concern with virtue as a concern with a constituent of eudaemonia, 
thereby grounding virtue in the ergon as a rational being. But that possibility is dealt 
with in discussing Aristotelean rationalism. I shall instead focus on a region of virtue 
that is indisputably bound up with rationality: epistemic virtue. Being epistemically 
virtuous would seem to constitute a kind of rational perfection. The question is 
whether the virtue is intrinsic or extrinsic to the epistemic rationality involved. 
I will not settle these matters here. We are at the place where the dispute between 
instrumentalism and rationalism joins wider disputes. Nor do I pretend to have 
covered a significant range of potential perfectionist rationalisms. I will have merely 
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outlined how some part of the dispute may go between instrumentalism and 
perfectionist rationalism. 
9.3 Aristotelean rationalism 
We start with perfectionist rationalism grounded on Aristotle’s view that what is 
best for man is to fulfil his ergon as a rational being. If we examine the detail of what 
Aristotle himself says, we find him embarking on the search for the good of man by 
accepting that ‘happiness is the chief good’, which is yet ‘a platitude’. In seeking a 
‘clearer account’ (1097a/12) he applies his argument from function:   
the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a 
rational principle…and the function of a good man to be the good and 
noble performance of these…human good turns out to be activity of the 
soul exhibiting excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in 
accordance with the best and most complete. (1098a/13-14) 
Only much later, in the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics, do we find out what 
the best and most complete excellence for man is. In N.E. Book X chapters 6, 7 & 8 
Aristotle explains why happiness is the fulfilment of man’s distinct proper function, 
which is the contemplation of truth. Happiness is activity ‘of the best thing in us’, 
whatever it is, and perfect happiness will be ‘activity…in accordance with its proper 
virtue’ (1177a/263). We determine that best thing thus: 
that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant 
for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best 
and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man. This life 
[the contemplation of truth] therefore is also the happiest. (1178a/266) 
Contemplation of truth is superior to exercise of moral virtues because ‘being 
connected with the passions also, the moral virtues must belong to our composite 
nature’, that is to say, our being a rational being with a body. But having a body is 
not distinctive of humans, since it is shared with other animals, so such excellencies 
are not purely activities of a soul which follows a rational principle. Whereas ‘the 
excellence of the reason is a thing apart’ (1178a/266). The moral virtues, for their 
exercise, need many things, whereas ‘the man who is contemplating the truth needs 
no such thing[s]’ (1178a/267). Hence the contemplation of truth is the best and most 
complete exercise of our distinctive function. Furthermore ‘happiness extends just so 
far as contemplation does….Happiness, therefore, must be some form of 
contemplation’ (1178b/268). 
In the end, then, insofar as Aristotle is basing his directive notions in proper 
function, he is basing it in the proper function of reason, which he sees as being the 
contemplation of truth. We considered before whether truth on its own could entail 
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directivity for true or rational belief, and concluded it could not, so Aristotle’s 
position, insofar as it is an argument for rationalism, falls to those earlier arguments. 
There is a further point to make about the last indented quotation, since it 
illustrates a characteristic ambiguity. The immediate appeal of the first remark 
depends on taking ‘proper’ with directive normativity and yet its application to get 
directivity for reason requires it to be taken with correctness normativity. But taken 
with correctness normativity, the first remark loses its flavour of analyticity and 
instead becomes an enunciation of an ethical principle, that fulfilling one’s proper 
function (ergon) is best. Since Aristotle takes it that having identified what is best 
one has identified what ought to be done, this amounts to taking the correctness 
normativity of proper function to entail directivity. The question then is what is the 
ground for the truth of that principle. Aristotle assumes it to be true, but once one has 
queried, as I have, whether proper function on its own is directive, and shown cases 
in which it is not, we no longer see it as being obviously true. We need an account of 
why this proper function is directive.  
This point is not of purely historical significance. In her recent John Locke 
lectures, Korsgaard puts forward an explanation of normativity in terms of the self 
constitution of rational agents by their actions. She intends to explain the necessity of 
practical reason thus: 
The normative standards to which a thing’s teleological organization 
give rise are what I will call “constitutive standards,” standards that 
apply to a thing simply in virtue of its being the kind of thing that it 
is….I am going to be arguing that the principles of practical reason are 
constitutive standards of actions, and therefore, of us. (2002:I.20-21) 
This is what explains their normativity. (2002:II.1) 
Call the principle that the proper function of rationality is directive the Ergon is 
Directive principle. Korsgaard thinks that having got so far, she will have got far 
enough, and that amounts to assuming Ergon is Directive as a premiss. The worry, 
though, is that the Kantian rationalist is always tempted to work from both ends 
towards the middle, to grant directivity to rational motivators and join them up 
unclearly to undeniably legitimate motivators.  
That is why we should not grant them Ergon is Directive as a principle. If the 
Kantian rationalist establishes their case they do not need it as a premiss and if they 
take it as a premiss it cannot help establish their case. For if Korsgaard shows that 
full-bloodedly ethical principles such as the Kantian categorical imperative count 
among principles of practical reason that are constitutive of action, that suffices for 
the rationalist case. It amounts to showing that legitimate motivators are among the 
rational motivators to which you are already committed as a consequence of being a 
rational creature. A rationalist who succeeds so far is entitled to simply claim that 
Ergon is directive. On the other hand, if Ergon is Directive is used to claim 
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legitimacy for principles constitutive of action whatever they are, it is in danger of 
legitimating too much. Hence we need further characterisation of rationality which 
doesn’t question beggingly exclude the illegitimate. That is to return us once more to 
the requirement to justify thick substantive rationality. 
It is possible that there are other and better arguments for Aristotelean rationalism. 
The kind of understanding of Aristotelean virtue which McDowell (1979) puts 
forward looks as if it might be of service. Fulfilling the ergon of a rational being 
requires the enculturation into a second nature, constituted by the possession of 
certain concepts which enables one to appreciate and inhabit the moral point of view 
and to act morally. Once one has crossed the threshold and possesses an extensive 
enough set of moral concepts to be a virtuous person of minimum degree, failing to 
apply them properly and failing to be motivated by one’s application of them will be 
a kind of irrationality. Consequently for those who possess the minimal set of 
concepts there is a clear sense in which directivity is internal to rationality. 
Furthermore, since the person is supposed not only to make the relevant judgements, 
but those judgements themselves are motivations, the kind of irrationality here is not 
the kind which I suggested was compatible with instrumentalism, namely 
irrationality of belief in objective valuational fact. The internalism of motivation used 
by McDowell, and the fact that the judgements may be impossible to make or even 
appreciate from a view external to the virtuous view, tends to ground the directivity 
in the rationality of concept application. It seems that this could go one of three 
ways. Firstly, the grounding is a disguised recognitional externalism, which will 
therefore be compatible with instrumentalism. Secondly, it amounts to proper 
functioning. Thirdly, it amounts to a disguised constructivism.  
 Since the derivation of directivity from proper function alone is fallacious, the 
general Ergon is Directive principle is false. Aristotelean rationalism must instead 
appeal to something of the particular proper function of a rational being to supply 
directivity. Much of what I said in the chapter on constitutive rationality and on 
proper function rationality would bear against any such arguments. In the absence of 
awareness of the correctness-directivity distinction the problem with deriving 
directivity from proper function has not been addressed by Aristoteleans. 
Furthermore, ethicists who align themselves with an Aristotelean approach have on 
the whole made use of his teleological principles and his concern with virtues rather 
than his use of the ergon of a rational being.  Consequently I haven’t found 
Aristoteleans putting forward positions which I could interpret in a straightforward 
manner as arguments in favour of rationalism. For this reason, we now move on. In 
doing so I concede that I am setting aside rather than addressing what might be made 
of McDowell’s account along the lines of proper function.  
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9.4 Intrinsic value of persons 
The thought that persons are intrinsically valuable seems correct. The problem is 
that if we take this to mean that their mere existence as rational being has intrinsic 
value, without any consideration for the quality of their lives, it has objectionable 
entailments. But taking it in that manner is what is required for rationalism.  
We might start by asking whether the universe would be a better place if suddenly 
another earth came into existence with identical counterparts to us. In other words, 
would a sudden doubling of persons be an improvement? It is not obvious that it 
would. But if persons as such were intrinsically valuable then surely more is better. 
Indeed, even the addition of persons undergoing immense suffering would be an 
improvement — but that can’t be right.  
Perhaps this is too extreme a case to be fair. It may rely on the false premisses that 
the value of rational beings as such must be comparable with other goods, and if it 
can be outweighed by other considerations it cannot be intrinsically valuable. We 
should instead take the intrinsic value of persons as giving only a pro tanto reason for 
thinking that more is better, and require only some minimal quality of life. Provided 
such conditions are met, more persons is better and so there is an intrinsic directivity 
to rationality.  
It turns out that to give a principled defence of this suggestion is surprisingly 
difficult. The limitations of our existing moral intuitions in the face of questions 
about whether more people is itself a good or bad thing, and the difficulties in 
thinking clearly about the questions that arise, have been evident since Parfit 
explored them at length in part IV of Reasons and Persons. From the thought that 
more persons are better provided the sum of goods is increased Parfit derives  
The repugnant conclusion: For any possible population of at least ten 
billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some 
much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are 
equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are 
barely worth living. (1987:388) 
Arrhenius  has recently concluded that ‘none of the population axiologies in the 
literature [stand] up to scrutiny’ (2000:210). In his own work he finds that in 
considering how to axiologically compare ‘different sized populations’(2000:212) on 
the basis of various combinations of ‘intutively appealing and logically weak 
adequacy conditions for an acceptable population theory’, it proves impossible ‘to 
find a theory that satisfies all of these conditions’ (2000:ii). Included among these 
conditions are principles that attempt as weakly as possible to include some notion of 
more persons being better provided minimal quality of life conditions are met.  
So despite its having some intuitive appeal we don’t have a satisfactory account of 
more persons being better, and this must cast some doubt on whether persons as such 
are intrinsically valuable. Additionally, the case of suffering points to the fact that 
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value is intrinsic to the life lived by persons and that this may be what lies behind the 
thought that persons are intrinsically valuable. It cannot be doubted that we look at 
the world and ourselves in wonder, and many things, perhaps our rationality 
included, we value for themselves rather than instrumentally. In this sense we might 
call them intrinsically valuable. But the case of suffering shows that whilst we may 
wonder at there being rational capacities and find them to be intrinsically valuable 
we do not regard suffering as mitigated in some way by that value — as if it could be 
somewhat regrettable but somehow good if there were some suffering going on 
rather than no experiencing at all. Quite the contrary. First of all, we would be 
entirely content if the intrinsic value of rationality could be realised without any 
suffering at all. Secondly, whilst on balance some suffering may be worth putting up 
with, we are prepared to prefer the cessation or suppression of the rationality of some 
beings to their continued suffering, as our killing of pets in great pain shows, and 
also our willingness to keep unconscious (should they wish) people who are both 
terminally ill and in unrelievable agony when conscious. 
Contrast the attempt to support perfectionist rationalism on the basis of intrinsic 
value for persons purely as such with the far more plausible position of perfectionism 
of action. Not everything which serves an end is of purely instrumental value, and 
some things are intrinsically valuable because they are of service, or because of the 
way they are of service. ‘Good action itself is its end’ (Aristotle 1989:1140b/143). 
While the end aimed at is partially constitutive of the rightness of what is done, the 
directivity of purposefulness is not derivative from the end. Rather, perfection in 
action is a package of a proper end of action pursued in a rightful way. ‘To be 
good…[is] to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the 
right motive, and in the right way’  (Aristotle 1989:1109a/45).  
I think the contrast plays in favour of the plausibility of perfectionism that is not 
perfectionist rationalism. Aristotle appeals to ethically thick notions when discussing 
right action manifesting virtuous character. They are the kind of notions we have to 
appeal to when we might wish to explain how some lives could be worth living 
despite suffering. Even if we think that lives being valuable grants intrinsic worth to 
the existence of rational being as such, the notions to which we must appeal in 
making such an argument are richer than can be got from rationality alone.  
9.5 Epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues  
Concepts of epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues are required if we are to 
have a full understanding of knowledge. In the midst of some philosophical  use of 
such concepts (perhaps especially within social epistemology) it may be impossible 
always to distinguish the elements that are sourced in correctness norms of belief and 
the elements sourced in directive norms. This may lead us to think that the 
correctness norms of belief entail directivity.  
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Earlier I developed the notion of composite directive norms: directive norms 
which contain the content of correctness norms. I now extend that notion with the 
notions of composite epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues, which are duties, 
virtues and responsibilities to adhere to correct epistemic norms but for which the 
directivity of the duty, virtue or responsibility is not got from the correctness of the 
epistemic norms.  
I maintain that the ethics of belief (in the broadest sense) can properly be 
understood in terms of composite epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues and 
composite epistemic norms. By definition, composite epistemic duties, 
responsibilities and virtues do not threaten my position, since the directivity is 
external to the correctness of the epistemic norms involved. My claim is that it is not 
truth conducivity alone which makes epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues the 
duties, responsibilities and virtues they are, but truth conducivity plus practical 
concerns.  
Epistemic duties and responsibilities 
It is easy to confuse and mislocate kinds of normativity. Consider the ambiguity in 
locutions such as ‘driving responsibilities’ and ‘driving duties’. When speaking of 
driving duties, ‘duty’ need not be being used directively, but rather as a way of 
referring to those things one must do if one is to drive the car, and those things are 
matters of proper function. On the other hand, when one has a duty to drive one’s 
aunt to see her husband in hospital, ‘duty’ is used directively. The driving is just a 
way of fulfilling an ordinary duty, and the derivative duty to drive her is not a special 
kind of duty. The driving duties are just those things you must do to fulfil your duty 
to her, and they are a matter of moving the car correctly. If we wish to we can say 
that there is a composite directive duty to drive the car correctly, where the 
directivity is got from your duty to your aunt and the content of the duty, driving the 
car correctly, is got from the correctness norms of proper driving. So talk of driving 
responsibilities is not a matter of correct driving giving rise to responsibilities of a 
special kind, the driving kind, but rather, that as a driver there are ways of fulfilling 
one’s ordinary responsibilities through driving correctly. The locution can be 
misleading because sometimes it is used to speak of correct driving itself and 
sometimes of the duty to drive correctly, and this may lead us to mislocate the 
directivity as originating in proper functions when it originates in duties of care.  
We may likewise be inclined to mistake what is going on when speaking of 
epistemic responsibilities or duties because of the inconsistency in the locutions of 
duties and responsibilities just illustrated. An epistemic duty need not be a special 
kind of duty imposed by the correctness of truth conducivity. Speaking of epistemic 
duties may be no more than a way of speaking of proper function, of correctness 
norms of belief, and as such is without directive force. Alternatively, an epistemic 
duty may be no more than a way of fulfilling an ordinary duty which happens to 
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require a concern with the truth in order to be fulfilled. Being epistemically 
responsible in such cases is an ordinary way of being responsible which happens to 
be concerned with epistemic matters. The sense in which there is an epistemic duty is 
purely instrumental.  
There are cases in which the content of the duty is centrally an epistemic concern, 
and for this reason the epistemic duty doesn’t seem so purely an instrumental matter. 
It doesn’t seem wrong to speak of the epistemic duties of a physician, in which we 
have a usage that blends the ethical and epistemological concerns. Due to the 
complexity and extent of medical knowledge, to be a physician would seem to incur 
epistemic responsibilities, and to offer opportunities to be epistemically virtuous. 
Nevertheless, the duty to diagnose an illness correctly arises in part because correct 
diagnosis is usually a necessary condition for correct treatment. Thus the normativity 
of the correct diagnosis and correct treatment is not the source of the duty to 
correctly diagnose and treat, rather, the directive normativity of the duty of care is the 
source. 
There are cases in which the duty is closely bound up with epistemic concerns. 
Standard ethical duties such as honesty and sincerity are connected with truth 
conducivity more intimately than your duty to your aunt is connected with driving 
correctly. There is also a kind of holding oneself responsible to the truth, and in this 
sense being epistemically responsible could be a matter of conducting an 
investigation carefully and thoroughly, guarding against mistakes, not sparing one’s 
efforts but working hard to find out what is true. Being epistemically responsible 
could further require careful and thorough conveyance of what one believes or has 
found out, conveyance of the strength of the evidence for one’s beliefs, guarding 
against misleading exposition, not sparing one’s efforts but working hard to provide 
others with the truth they need in a form which they can make use of. Both of these 
ways of being responsible could be undertaken collectively rather than individually, 
as for example when undertaken by the members of a discipline, such as physicists, 
or even philosophers.  
So there is a range of kinds of epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues. The 
normativity can be purely the correctness normativity of belief, or it can be an 
obvious example of composite normativity, in which the directivity is external to the 
correctness of belief. There are kinds in which ‘epistemic’ is doing more work than 
in those analogous to the driving duties example, perhaps the example of the 
epistemic duties of a physician are among them, and kinds in which the truth-
conducive and ethical concerns are deeply intertwined. Finally, there are what I 
called responsibilities to the truth that seem almost purely epistemic. As we move 
along this range it seems more plausible that the directivity of the duty is derived 
from the correctness normativity of belief. Nevertheless, that is what I deny. We are 
misled by our locutions and the fact that in enacting epistemic duties it may be 
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difficult to separate the components that originate in truth conducivity from those 
that originate elsewhere.  
Strictly speaking, I don’t think truth conducivity suffices to impose any 
responsibilities. The problem, once again, is that the distinction between trivial and 
significant truths is not an epistemic distinction. If there could be purely epistemic 
responsibilities they would apply as much to the pursuit of trivial truth as to 
significant truth. But that doesn’t seem right. Suppose we  were investigating how 
many grains of sand had gone into the construction of a slab in one’s patio. Insofar as 
we construed ‘responsibility’ as merely aiming at the truth, one might call oneself 
epistemically responsible. But suppose one were a brilliant microbiologist who might 
instead have found a cure for a disease. In that case one might be called grossly 
epistemically irresponsible for wasting time on useless triviality.   
What work, though, is the word ‘epistemically’ doing in the latter characterisation? 
Misleading work, perhaps. Is finding out the wrong truths, wrong for the reason that 
other truths were needed and it was your duty to meet that need, properly described 
as epistemic irresponsibility? That expression would seem better to fit cases in which 
there was a significant truth to find out and, for example, you went about it sloppily, 
getting the wrong answer or getting the right answer but in such a way that no one 
could rely on your answer. In the case of the microbiologist, the irresponsibility was 
more a matter of choosing to pursue the wrong epistemic project. Which epistemic 
projects to pursue is not an epistemic matter (except instrumentally, when in order to 
know this we must find out that). 
So perhaps this was just the wrong kind of example because it is about not 
epistemic responsibility at all. Knowing how many grains of sand is a sound 
epistemic duty, which is merely outweighed by the duty to find the cure. Better 
examples are the individual and collective responsibilities to the truth described 
above, the responsibilities for careful pursuit and transmission of truth. For example, 
the duty not to waste time trying to establish a strong premise in an argument when 
only a weak one is required.  
When we consider these examples, keeping in mind the problem of trivial truth, as 
we increasingly exclude anything but a pure responsibility to truth, so the sense of 
there being a real responsibility drains out. For example, unless the argument itself 
matters, then it doesn’t matter what the thinker is doing, except that he perhaps ought 
to be concerned with something that does matter. The notion of not wasting time on 
too strong a premiss as a purely epistemic responsibility is too thin to do any work of 
a normatively directive kind. It is irrelevant to determining what to do unless the 
argument itself matters. Calling it a pure epistemic responsibility is just a misleading 
way of speaking of a kind of epistemic correctness, which in the right circumstances 
is a correctness which should be followed. These circumstances are broad, they 
certainly could include the thinker just caring about the argument, but they are not 
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themselves purely epistemic. On the other hand, the correctness epistemic norms 
alone are sufficient to ground the purely epistemic criticism we might wish to make 
of this thinker. So the combination of directive insignificance and epistemic 
incorrectness captures the kinds of legitimate criticism we might wish to make. We 
do not need in addition a directive purely epistemic norm because there is not some 
further criticism we might make of this thinker. 
So the problem is, if the directivity is of a purely epistemic kind, then it should be 
evident when we consider these cases purely in terms of their epistemic features. But 
when we do so, when we exclude all considerations other than their purely epistemic 
nature, we cease to discern the force of a determinant of what to do. But if that is the 
case, since duties and responsibilities are practical matters, there are no purely 
epistemic duties and responsibilities.  
For these reasons, the pure directive epistemicist must appeal to cases which are 
not purely epistemic, yet in which some intrinsically directive consideration appears 
to have some epistemic weight. For example  
it has been suggested that one has a duty to believe certain things, to 
believe, for instance, that one’s friends, associates, or loved ones are in 
various ways upstanding….In such cases, one is sometimes held to owe 
someone the benefit of the doubt, the most charitable belief. (Heil 
1983:759)  
The suggestion is that in the case of judging the character of friends one has a duty to 
weigh evidence differently from its pure truth-conducive weight. It seems very 
plausible that one resists the evidence against a friend until it is overwhelming, and 
only then should one’s opinion change, and also that this is not merely a matter of 
caution in the face of scurrilous gossip.  
My answer is that in general we are willing to go along with weaker evidence than 
we should about people we don’t know or don’t like, and this skews our assessment 
of this case. In the case of friends we care more about them and for that reason care 
more about the truth of whether they truly are as may have been asserted to their 
detriment, and so only then do we pay attention properly to the weight of evidence. 
Moreover, we have a great deal more evidence about our friends to weigh against the 
negative evidence. So it need not be a matter of giving them the benefit of the doubt 
at all. In the other cases we may care more about entertainment or exercising our 
prejudices, and for that reason are derelict in our epistemic duty. We do have such a 
duty because the respect owed to others obliges us to believe of them in accordance 
with the evidence.  
I think that answer works, but let me concede that if there is a duty to judge friends 
charitably against the evidence, then this would be a counter-example to my claim 
that notions of pure epistemic duties are too thin to do any directive work. Such a 
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duty would  clearly amount to granting an intrinsically directive concern a legitimate 
epistemic weight.  
In the meantime, my position is that epistemic responsibility should be understood 
in terms of significant truths, questions for which getting the right answer is 
important, so making careful pursuit of the truth by methods that are truth-conducive 
a responsibility of the enquirer. The significance of whether p is independent of the 
truth of p, on pain of the problem of trivial truth. Certainly, there are some questions 
we care about just for the sake of knowing the truth about them, but that does not 
detract from the point I am making (for the reasons I gave when discussing intrinsic 
value for truth). The directivity of epistemic responsibility so construed comes not 
from the epistemological concern with correctness or otherwise of believing p, but 
from the significance of whether p. In this sense we can speak of epistemic 
responsibility, but it remains clear that the directivity of responsibility is got from the 
significance had by a truth rather than from the truth itself, and so is not sourced in 
the epistemic norms of correct belief concerned with truth conducivity. This, then, is 
how norms of epistemic responsibility would be composite norms. They are a 
combination of the directivity from the significance of whether p with the norms of 
epistemic correctness relevant to determining the truth of p.  
It might be thought that this amounts to there being no epistemic duties and 
responsibilities properly so called, for example, that telling the truth is not in any 
sense an epistemic duty. I don’t think I am committed to such radicalism. Frequently 
the significance of the truth conducivity is intricately connected with those things 
that impart directivity. Consequently, composite epistemic duties have a degree of 
independence that allows them to conflict with other kinds of duties just because of 
their relation to truth, just as, for example, legal duties may conflict with moral 
duties. The general duty to tell the truth may conflict with what is better on an 
occasion and that need not simply erase the truth telling duty. That suffices to make 
them epistemic duties properly so called, despite their composite normative nature. 
Epistemic virtue 
Insofar as it is possible to be epistemically virtuous I say the directivity is external 
to the normativity of correct belief and for this reason say epistemic virtues are 
composite. Epistemic virtue has the same relation as other virtues to standard ethical 
obligations whilst its particular content is supplied by epistemic correctness norms. 
For example, the significance of reliable information sharing imposes a duty to 
adhere to the correctness norms of testimony, and a settled disposition to so adhere 
could be an epistemic virtue worthy of praise.  
One therefore needs to distinguish, for example, being 
praised for believing the truth upon good reasons and blamed for not 
doing so (Zagzebski 1999:95) 
9.5 Epistemic duties, responsibilities and virtues 
 
 
177
from certain ways of construing, for example, 
knowledge is cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of 
intellectual virtue. (Zagzebski 1999:109) 
In the former, there is no difficulty distinguishing the correctness of the grounds of 
the belief as a matter of truth conducivity from ethical reasons which make correct 
belief praiseworthy. In the latter, what starts as an analogy can drift into a confusion 
of the two.  
I certainly think we need some notion of intellectual virtue. Perhaps such notions 
are needed to characterise fully what it is, for example, to be someone worth relying 
on, and how testimony is a source of knowledge. My concern, though, is that the 
notion of intellectual virtue, indeed the notions of epistemic duty, virtue and 
responsibility quite generally, are well situated to muddle correctness and directivity 
rather than to articulate the complex relations between them.  
The notion of composite epistemic virtue is not what virtue epistemicists are after. 
On some accounts virtue epistemology is presented as supplementing a deficiency in 
reliabilism. Reliabilism may be in part a matter of settled dispositions to believe, and 
whilst virtues are also settled dispositions, epistemic virtues must be more than 
settled dispositions to believe. They must be dispositions that are virtues. 
Additionally, virtue epistemicists want the virtue of epistemic virtue to be 
intrinsically epistemic, and not extrinsic as it would be, for example, were its source 
ethical virtues concerned with epistemological matters, such as the virtues of honesty 
and sincerity. Let’s call this notion intrinsic epistemic virtue. 
At first sight intrinsic epistemic virtue is a threat to my position, since in general 
virtues are character traits one ought, directively, to have, so one ought to be 
epistemically virtuous. Failing to mark the correctness-directivity distinction means 
that virtue epistemicists are not on the whole considering the nature of the 
normativity of the epistemic virtues they are connecting up with truth-conducive 
requirements. If virtue epistemicists intend epistemic virtue to be intrinsically 
directive, I think they are mistaken.  
For Zagzebski, even the non-virtuous can have knowledge just by committing an 
act of intellectual virtue. 
An act of intellectual virtue A is one that arises from the motivational 
component of an intellectual virtue A, is an act that persons with virtue 
A characteristically do in those circumstances, and is successful in 
reaching the truth because of these other features of the act. (Zagzebski 
1999:108) 
Such an act is ‘an act that gets everything right…that is good in every 
respect’(Zagzebski 1999:108). The ground for this account must be her account of 
persons with intellectual virtue. The problem here is that Zagzebski ‘aims to give a 
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unified account of the morality of believing as well as of acting’ (Zagzebski 
1999:105). This leads her to ‘argue that intellectual virtues are best treated as forms 
of moral virtue’ (Zagzebski 1999:115). So far as my concerns go, this amounts to 
blankly asserting the directivity of epistemic virtue without showing that the 
correctness of a belief (construed in terms of acts of intellectual virtue) is 
intrinsically directive. 
Virtue epistemicists claim that the analogy between epistemic and ethical virtues is 
more than mere analogy because the evaluative notions (praise, blame and 
responsibility, and the senses of worthiness and nobility of person) that apply in both 
cases are the same, yet independently sourced.  I think this support for their position 
fails because examples virtue epistemicists give of similarity can be best accounted 
for by composite notions of epistemic virtue.  
Consider two examples from Zagzebski. First, her remark that ‘an act of the virtue 
of originality is praiseworthy in the same way that acts of supreme generosity are 
praiseworthy’ (1999:111, my emphasis). The spark in originality is the glimmer of 
wide ranging significance. The temptation here is just to mistake our valuing of new 
ideas which dramatically increase opportunities for new knowledge for a directivity 
intrinsic to the knowledge. The sparkle of new and wide significance is our 
projection, if only in our excitement at the prospect of new understanding.  
Now in one sense being original may mean being new in a worthwhile way. But in 
this sense, the directivity of praiseworthiness has been built into the meaning of 
originality. Therefore, if Zagzebski is to be asserting that the epistemic virtue of 
originality is intrinsically directive, we must take it that ‘originality’ means just 
‘new’. But in this sense, originality is only praiseworthy if it brings us an unexpected 
and valuable truth; mere originality is often worthless. Consider the dross of the 
patent office. Even setting aside impracticality and falsehood, what remains that is 
both true and genuinely new is often uninterestingly new, even stupidly new, its 
originality stultifying rather than inspiring. In some such cases, so far from 
provoking praise, it may rather provoke blame. Contrast generosity, which even if it 
fails at its aim may yet be praiseworthy.  
Insofar as these cases are really cases of being praiseworthy in the same way, the 
directivity implicit in the praise of originality is coming from the value of the truth 
aimed at, and perhaps the costs borne by the person who did the work, and seems to 
have little to do with epistemic concerns. But that returns us to a composite notion of 
epistemic virtue.  
Second example: 
Stunning intellectual discoveries yield knowledge [in] a way that needs 
to be captured by any acceptable definition of the knowing state. Such 
knowledge is not merely the result of reliable processes or properly 
functioning faculties or epistemic procedures that have no flaw, as 
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some epistemologists have suggested. They are the result of epistemic 
activities that go well beyond the nondefective. They are, in fact, 
exceptionally laudatory [sic]. The concept of an intellectual virtue is 
well suited to the purpose of identifying knowledge in cases of this 
sort.…truly stellar intellectual achievements [have] goodness…close to 
the noble. (Zagzebski 1999:110-1)  
There is much that could be argued about here: whether there is a substantial 
qualitative difference between the way stunning intellectual discoveries yield 
knowledge and more mundane discoveries do; the failure to consider the reasons for 
which we judge stunning discoveries to be exceptionally laudable – are they not the 
same as for any outstanding achievement? In which case the praise is not linked to 
the epistemology in the way needed by the virtue epistemicist. But the main thing of 
interest to us here is that once more the normativity of the evaluative notions in play 
is only directive when we take those notions independently of the truth-conducive 
concerns. The nobility is better explained in terms of the hard work and persistence 
in the face of adversity and initial failure, the difficulty that had to be overcome to 
discover it, the value of the truth discovered, and our admiration of extraordinary 
human achievement of all kinds, which includes admiration of intellectual ingenuity 
and imagination. But the latter is an aesthetic appreciation, an appreciation of 
intellectual grace, and not originating in epistemic concerns. Contrast a 
mathematician who produces two theorems, both after equally great effort, both of 
great beauty, with proofs that are ingenious and imaginative, but in one case the 
proof was got by inspiration and the other by churning through all possible proof 
approaches until one worked. We may regard the former as a greater intellectual 
achievement because we value inspiration, perhaps because it is more rare, but 
epistemically, both are equally stellar achievements.  
In both of Zagzebski’s cases, once one analyses the sources of the evaluations they 
turn out to be independent of norms of epistemic correctness and so insofar as these 
cases can be regarded as cases of epistemic virtue it is as cases of composite 
epistemic virtue. There is nothing left over to be an intrinsic epistemic virtue. 
 
I cannot here deal as fully as perhaps I should with the resources the virtue 
epistemologists could bring to bear in aid of their intrinsic epistemic virtues being 
directive. My strategy to oppose such arguments would be to continue to try to divide 
and conquer, to show that when they appeal to plausible directive forces it is 
explicable as being sourced externally, and when they focus on epistemic concerns 
the normativity remains that of the correctness of belief. Since virtue epistemicists 
have not discussed the correctness-directivity distinction I am not going to try to pre-
empt that debate. My main purpose in discussing virtue epistemology has been to 
indicate that insofar as directivity seems to be implicit in the whole approach, 
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examination of some of their examples shows the source of the implicit directivity to 
be independent of the epistemic norms, and so analysable in terms of composite 
epistemic virtue. Suppose, however, that some notion of epistemic virtue does the 
best epistemological job. Either it is a virtue in the standard sense or it is a virtue sui 
generis. Standard senses can be explained away compositely and virtue sui generis 
cannot just be assumed, but must be shown, to be directive. The analogy with ethical 
virtue is not a demonstration.  My argument will then be that doing the best 
epistemological job amounts to explaining truth conducivity, and so on pain of the 
trivial truth problem, the normativity of the sui generis virtue cannot be directive. 
Similar points could be made were the best epistemological job to turn out to be 
conceived in terms of epistemic duties and responsibilities, or epistemic 
consequentialism.  
 10 Kantian Rationalism 
10.1 Universalism about reasons 
On the instrumentalist side are Humeans and Hobbesians and on the rationalist 
side Kantians and Aristoteleans. All four are universalist about reasons, in the sense 
that they think relevantly similar agents have similar reasons. The differences are in 
what gets counted as relevant similarity, which cannot be characterised simply in 
terms of agent relativity versus agent neutrality (contra, for example, Korsgaard 
1996:221) since all may agree that all agents should care especially for their own 
children. Rather 
the Kantian and the Aristotelean…hold that there are normative reasons 
that apply to us in virtue of the nature of free rational agency and of 
specifically human nature, respectively —independently of our 
contingent motivational natures (Cullity and Gaut 1997:4)  
Whilst Kant himself rigorously excludes inclination from reason’s domain, a modern 
Kantian will allow that the satisfaction of desires still counts in some way towards 
what the reasons are, and so the reasons depend in some way on contingent 
motivational natures. The universality the Kantian is after is not simply a matter of 
independence from inclination, although for brevity discussions often proceed in 
those terms, but of a certain kind of independence from inclination.  
Kant’s characterisation of the relevant universality by way of the Categorical 
Imperative is sometimes called ‘legislative universalism’ (Cullity and Gaut 1997:5).  
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law’ (Kant 1785:421/84). 
 So the kind of independence from inclination required is that whenever the person 
acts on an inclination they can will that everyone should act on that inclination as a 
matter of law. Only inclinations which can be acted on in that way provide reasons. 
By contrast, whilst the Humean agent accepts that others with the same inclinations 
have the same reasons as he, he may prefer that they don’t act on theirs. When that is 
the case, the Kantian will deny what the Humean affirms: that these last kinds of 
inclinations provide reasons. Instrumentalists think that rational motivators are 
correctness reasons which need have no legitimacy, whilst Kantian rationalists think 
that motivators that are not legitimate are not really rational motivators. Hence can 
they disagree about whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. 
To point up the distinction between the Humean and Kantian notion of the 
universality of reasons, I introduce the character of the rational free rider, who obeys 
whatever rational requirements there are and accepts that reasons are universal in the 
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sense that similarly located agents have similar reasons, only he prefers that others 
not act on theirs if it be to his cost. The Kantian must show to him that rationality 
requires more: it requires that he also prefer others to act on their reasons, for that is 
an implication of the categorical imperative. So, for example, although Korsgaard 
thinks that ‘when you will a maxim you must take it to be universal’ (2002:II.24) 
implies the categorical imperative, the rational free rider makes it clear that it does 
not. 
10.2 Kantian rationalism 
Kant himself was alive to the distinction I make between thin and thick substantive 
rationality. The rationalists he criticises for their dogmatism in ethics are precisely 
those who declare that certain ends are rational, without justifying what it is about 
those ends and about rationality that makes them rational. Nevertheless, when I say 
that we are owed an account of rationality itself that justifies the thick directive use 
of ‘rationality’, Kant may reject that demand if it amounts to demanding more than 
we can know of rationality itself. He may claim that we can know that there is the 
categorical imperative and that it is a requirement of reason. But when I ask of Kant 
how it is that rationality itself commands, this may amount to asking ‘how pure 
reason can be practical’. And Kant’s reply is that ‘all human reason is totally 
incapable of explaining this’  (1785:461/121). That would require acquaintance with 
the intelligible world, which we cannot have. Whilst 
the Idea of a purely intelligible world, as a whole of all intelligences to 
which we ourselves belong as rational beings…remains always a 
serviceable and permitted Idea for the purposes of a rational belief, all 
knowledge ends at its boundary. (1785:462/122, my emphasis) 
We cannot get further than this:  
the practical use of reason with respect to freedom leads… only to the 
absolute necessity of the laws of action for a rational being as such. 
(1785:463/123) 
We can be ‘conscious of its necessity’, but cannot have 
insight into the necessity…of what ought to happen, except on the basis 
of a condition (1785:463/123) 
Since reason cannot complete the regress of conditions, and yet it has knowledge of 
necessity, reason is compelled to assume the existence of ‘the unconditionally 
necessary…without any means of making it comprehensible’. Hence 
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reason as such…cannot make comprehensible the absolute necessity of 
an unconditional practical law. (1785:463/123) 40 
Consequently Kant may diagnose my instrumentalism as a consequence of trying 
to press a question beyond where it can reasonably be asked. Instead I ought to 
remain content with what we can grasp, and what we can grasp is not a substantial 
account of rationality but a critique of reason, based on our conception of ourselves 
as agents.  
Kant’s arguments here are deeply embedded in his metaphysical programme and 
for that reason I shall not attempt to rebut this argument. I remark only that here is 
one place where Kant’s earlier two species of the genus rationality claim bears fruit. 
It is uncontroversial that we have knowledge of the necessity of instrumental 
rationality, and so even if we have continuing reservations about whether we have 
knowledge of the necessity of practical rationality, the former knowledge will 
encourage us to accept the crucial premiss that we have some knowledge of the 
necessity of what ought to happen.  
Korsgaard also acknowledges the burden to justify the use of thick notions of 
directive rationality: 
The argument about whether prudence or the greater good has any 
special rational authority…will have to be made in terms of 
a…metaphysical argument about just what reason does, what its scope 
is, and what sorts of operation, procedure, and judgment are rational. 
This argument will usually consist in an attempt to arrive at a general 
notion of reason by discovering features or characteristics that 
theoretical and practical reason share; such characteristic features as 
universality, sufficiency, timelessness, impersonality, or authority will 
be appealed to. (1986:16-17) 
We have already seen that universality is not sufficient for rationalism. The 
rationality of prudence being directive is just a variety of Hobbesian rationalism. 
What would be sufficient for rationalism would be to show that certain moral 
requirements are requirements of rationality. That is precisely what Kantians propose 
to show, and show in a way incompatible with Hobbesian or Humean explanations of 
reasons to be moral, since  
the Kantian supposes that there are operations of practical reason which 
yield conclusions about actions and which do not involve discerning 
relations between passions…and those actions. (Korsgaard 1986:8) 
In broader terms, rationality itself determines the broad constraints on what ought to 
be done, which constraints are explanatorily prior to the particularities of persons, 
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such as their interests and desires. Vindication of such claims would entail the truth 
of rationalism, both in the sense that morality is grounded in rationality, but also in 
my sense of the word. 
Whether such claims can be vindicated has been, of course, a matter of substantial, 
deep and prolonged philosophical disagreement. We can now see that the dispute 
between (my) instrumentalism and (my) rationalism is part of that broader dispute, a 
dispute which has been conducted over centuries and in many books. For this reason 
I cannot vindicate instrumentalism here by showing that rationalist arguments fail in 
general.  
Significant varieties of Kantian arguments are discernible: 1. Arguments from 
necessary conditions under which we act, particularly our conception of ourselves as 
acting under freedom, and the link this may have with autonomy; 2. Rationalist (in 
the standard sense) justifications of why we should be moral; 3. Derivation of moral 
requirements from principles that are arguably pure principles of rationality; 4. 
Arguments from the nature of practical reasons; 5. Arguments that practical reasons 
are analogous to theoretical reasons. No doubt there are other varieties, and I am not 
attempting to give a catalogue. I shall discuss examples of each of these types of 
arguments. Some I shall try to refute; in others my discussion serves only to delineate 
further the disagreement between instrumentalism and rationalism.  
10.3 Acting under freedom 
In the first two chapters of Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant 
endeavours to show that the Categorical Imperative underlies our ordinary moral 
judgements. This, however, is a mere conditional achievement. ‘In order to prove 
that morality is no mere phantom of the brain [we must show that] the categorical 
imperative, and with it the autonomy of the will, is true and is absolutely necessary 
as an a priori principle’ (Kant 1785:445/106).  
Kant holds that agency is fundamental to reason in general just because the 
possibility of knowing depends on distinguishing between ‘merely subjective [and] 
objective sequences of perceptions [which] cannot be based on any direct 
apprehension of objective time’ (O'Neill 1989:62), but is a matter of distinguishing 
within our experiences those sequences which are within and without our control. 
Significantly, even if we cannot ‘demonstrate freedom as something actual in 
ourselves and in human nature’,  rational agency presupposes freedom. 
Consequently, ‘every being who cannot act except under the Idea of freedom is by 
this alone—from a practical point of view— really free’(1785:448/108). Agency 
involves the exercise of the will and ‘will is a kind of causality belonging to living 
beings so far as they are rational’. So the will is free yet a cause, and hence ‘Freedom 
would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of 
determination by alien causes’(Kant 1785:446/107).  Whatever is a cause is so under 
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some law, yet if the will was governed by a law external to itself it would not be free, 
therefore to reconcile its freedom and causal power it must be governed by a law it 
gives itself. Hence the will is constitutively autonomous.  
What else then can freedom of will be but autonomy — that is, the 
property which will has of being a law to itself? The proposition ‘Will 
is in all its actions a law to itself’ expresses, however, only the principle 
of acting on no maxim other than the one which can have for its object 
itself as at the same time a universal law.  (1785:447/107) 
 Hence we arrive at the categorical imperative.  
That is the central argument, and the ensuing arguments of the chapter are to do 
with showing how the use of what Kant calls the positive concept of freedom in the 
argument means that we have gone beyond mere analysis of the concept of freedom 
to establish the needed ‘synthetic proposition, namely: “An absolutely good will is 
one whose maxim can always have as its content itself considered as a universal 
law”’ (1785:447/108).  
Much attention has been focused on the premiss that causal laws are general laws. 
Korsgaard (1996:226 ff.) has defended it on the grounds that we can’t distinguish 
causality in the absence of regularity. So we couldn’t tell that someone was acting, as 
opposed to there being mere bodily motions going on, unless their behaviour had 
certain consistencies, and so fell under general laws of action. More crucially, unless 
I can distinguish between ‘my causing the action and some desire or impulse that is 
‘in me’ causing my body to act’  then  
there would be no identifiable difference between my acting and an 
assortment of first order impulses being causally effective in or through 
my body. And then there would be no self - no mind - no me - who is 
the one who does the act. (Korsgaard 1996:228) 
Searle thinks this defence fails because an epistemic requirement for identifying a 
cause need not be ‘an ontological requirement on the very existence of 
causation’(2001:154). That point on its own addresses the third personal claim, but 
doesn’t answer her claim about the nature of the self being something above and 
beyond the ‘mere’ first order impulses, constructed by reflective choosing on the 
basis of general principles. Searle rejects the claim that ‘acting on principle is 
somehow constitutive of the self’ (2001:156), but doesn’t address her argument to 
that effect. Nevertheless, whilst there is some sense in which choosing is partly a 
matter of choosing who you are, and choosing consistently constructs an intelligible 
persona, what is not so clear is that choosing erratically, or following impulse, 
amounts to having no self. It would appear, however, that Korsgaard needs this to be 
true. 
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Nevertheless, Kantian arguments based on our conception of acting under the idea 
of freedom appeal to significant intuitions which cannot be brushed aside. What 
remains in dispute is just how far this premiss can get one. Searle himself, despite 
criticising Korsgaard, thinks that the premiss leads to the possibility for humans ‘to 
create and be motivated to act on desire-independent reasons’ (2001:212). Korsgaard 
defends Kant’s argument because she wants to appeal to properties of our reflective 
consciousness and the necessity of choosing of practical identities if we are to be 
ourselves at all. In both cases, if the position can be maintained there would appear to 
be distinctive kinds of rational success which the rationalist might claim to be the 
source of directivity. 
10.4 Why be moral? 
It appears to be a principle of rationality that to fail to respond to reasons is to be 
irrational. Earlier I suggested that the development of the concept of normativity and 
of normative force was partly in order to have a notion which applied generally and 
non-specifically to the force of all kinds of consideration that come into play in 
deciding what to do. One of the reasons for its development in this way was the 
rejection of morality as the overriding  consideration, and the consequent need for 
the congress of the various kinds of considerations, now taken on their own terms 
and not as proxy, to be understood. Hence the notion of normative force, the force 
had by the various kinds of considerations in their own right, the balance of which 
determines what to do. Subsequent to my making the correctness-directivity 
distinction, I have identified normative force (and its grounds) as directivity.  
Now there is a danger of equivocation on what is meant by ‘reasons’. For the point 
of the notion of directive normativity is to allow all the various kinds of 
considerations to be reasons which jointly settle what to do. But allowing in so much, 
one is renouncing the sense in which what the reasons are is determined by what 
rationality is, or in which reasons as such are the requirements of rationality. Rather, 
in attributing directive normativity to the various kinds of considerations and calling 
them reasons one is engaged in thin directive rationality. The temptation is to confuse 
a reason as a consideration which has directive normativity with a reason as a 
requirement of rationality, to confuse a legitimate motivator with a rational 
motivator.  
Because of these two different types of reasons there are two entirely different 
senses in which reasons settle conclusively what you ought to do. Reasons as 
directively normative considerations settle conclusively what you ought to do 
because they were introduced with this sense precisely to conceptualise this job. But 
whether requirements of rationality even determine what to do is controversial, and is 
the very question at issue. In the account given in chapter 7, what rationality supplied 
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in this way may be only your best bet on what your directive reasons were, a bet 
which would win provided you were well situated. 
Given the stipulation of directive normative considerations as reasons, the 
principle that it is irrational to fail to respond to reasons is no longer true without 
qualification. The correctness-directivity distinction applies to reasons, and separates 
the question of the irrationality of failing to respond to reasons from what settles 
what ought to be done. Failing to respond to correctness reasons is irrational. 
Directive reasons settle what ought to be done. Whether failing to respond to 
directive reasons is irrational depends on whether and how their directivity is sourced 
in rationality.  
Failing to mark the distinction between directive considerations and requirements 
of rationality may lead to stipulating reasons as being both what settles what properly 
ought to be done and as what is given by rationality. It is an additional step to show 
that directive considerations are also requirements of rationality and requires some 
independent specification of rationality, or at least, of how rationality gives rise to 
reasons.  
 
Darwall discusses why we should be moral and decides that the question amounts 
to asking whether  
considerations that present themselves as reasons from within the moral 
point of view, indeed as uniquely overriding reasons, really are 
reasons.…In asking the question, we step back from that way of 
thinking and ask whether the considerations treated as reasons within it 
are so in fact….we ask whether they are unqualified reasons. 
(1990:258) 
Having introducing the notion of unqualified reasons in this way, we must wonder 
how this stands in relation to the ambiguity just discussed. Is Darwall going to 
stipulate these unqualified reasons as settling what properly ought to be done? In that 
case he is using the notion of directive normative considerations and can’t claim this 
as being a matter of rationality itself as finally authoritative of what to do whilst 
thinking he has grounded a thick substantive account of rationality. For he has done 
nothing to show that what he is calling the unqualified reasons have been got from 
rationality. So we need an independent account of rationality and reasons which 
doesn’t ignore the crucial distinction between taking reasons to be just whatever it is 
that settles what you ought to do and reasons as requirements of rationality. Merely 
claiming these two to be identical only gets you thin directive rationality. If on the 
other hand Darwall is going to stipulate these unqualified reasons as being 
requirements of rationality, then we will need to see how we get the moral principles 
from rationality alone, and also how requirements of rationality have the directive 
normative force adequate for settling what ought to be done.  
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Darwall’s approach is evident in his earlier book: 
It is part of the very idea of the Rational Normative System that its 
norms are finally authoritative in settling questions of what to 
do.…With respect to any other norms we may sensibly ask why (that is, 
for what reason) we should do what they require of us. Only with 
respect to those norms in terms of which reasons are themselves 
understood, conceived as such, can we not meaningfully ask why we 
should follow them. (1990:215-16)  
This amounts to an attempt to weld directive considerations and rational 
requirements together. Of course, that is what the Kantian intends to prove in the end. 
But at the beginning, we might have some worries about a stipulation that 
requirements of rationality are finally authoritative in settling what to do. Suppose 
what the Rational Normative System dictated was wicked. Would we still think it 
authoritative?  
Could Darwall make something of a distinction between settling what to do and 
settling what properly ought to be done— saying that the RNS settles only the former 
and he is showing how what it determines is congruent with the latter? I think the 
final sentence makes clear that by setting up the RNS as the final arbiter in this way, 
settling what to do in its terms just is settling what properly ought to be done. But of 
course, in that case we have just reached an articulation of reasons as directive 
normative considerations. So I think we have to take it that the Rational Normative 
System is the system of directive considerations. But since the legitimacy of the 
system of directive considerations is stipulative, it is not going to help the Kantian 
rationalist because we have simply returned to thin substantive rationality.  
I think we see here something characteristically worrying about Kantian 
rationalism. Rationality is taken to be primitively determinative of what to do and of 
what properly should be done, without addressing the threat posed by Euthyphro 
arguments. Of course, Darwall wants it to be that being rational is what you properly 
ought to do, and that so doing is being  moral, hence justifying why you ought to be 
moral. He thinks there is a happy harmony between what rationality demands and 
morality, so that a Euthyphro argument gets no bite, because rationality could not 
demand immorality. But that is just to assume that requirements of rationality, 
whatever they are, give us the directive normative considerations, which is the very 
question at issue.  
Setting that issue aside, should Darwall’s argument show that reasons for being 
moral can be grounded in requirements which are uncontroversially requirements of 
rationality, for example, can be derived from such requirements without additional 
ethical premisses, he will have succeeded in proving rationalism (in both my sense 
and the standard sense). The argument of  Darwall’s paper takes as premisses that 
‘there is such a thing as unqualified justification with full normative 
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force’(1990:261) and what he calls autonomist internalism. The conclusion aimed at 
is that ‘moral demands [are] unqualifiedly (and overridingly) justifying in this way’ 
(1990:261). 
Autonomist internalism includes internalism about reasons: 
p  is a reason for S to do A if, and only if, were S to consider p in the 
right way he would be given some motivation to do A. (1990:261). 
Autonomist because whatever the reasons are they must satisfy the condition that 
‘a free rational agent can only be bound by constraints emanating from his own will’ 
(1990:263). Because ‘autonomy consists in the self-critical questioning of standards 
by which to live in search of unqualifiedly justifying ones’ (1990:263) whatever one 
takes to be a reason, one should still be able to step back and view it critically. 
Consequently Darwall rejects what he calls deflationist versions of autonomous 
reasons because for each there is an inherent limit to the capacity to step back 
critically. For example, Falk’s agent (1986) can ask himself why should he do what is 
in his interest, ‘but cannot sensibly raise, “why should I do what I will want most 
when fully informed and mindful of what I  know?”’ (1990:264).  
Now the move here can be objected to, and where we are about to end up has been 
satirised by Blackburn in his account of the Kantian Captain bringing order to an 
unruly Humean crew (2000:243ff.). Some deflationists, at least, need not accept the 
claim that only the Captain can step back critically in an unlimited way. As 
Blackburn points out, we do not have to make our desires the object of deliberation 
for them to play their role. 
The deliberative stance is actually one of surveying the surroundings — 
the situation of choice and the salient features. And this survey is done 
in the light of our concerns, represented by the crew [the 
desires]….When we desire, aspects of the situation present themselves 
as affective or attracting: we may say that desires look beyond 
themselves, just as perceptions do. (2000:254-5) 
But this does not prevent us stepping back from our finding the situation affective or 
attracting and considering our attitudes in the very same way. Only this stepping 
back does not require the stepping away that Darwall thinks it must be.  
The self is no more passive when our concerns are contending for a 
controlling say in our direction, than a parliament is passive when it 
debates a law. It is only on the model that debars desires and 
inclinations, however cautious, however prudent and refined, from any 
part in constituting the self that we seem passive in the face of them. 
(2000:251) 
We need not step away from all our attitudes to step back self critically; rather, 
backing away from some is backing into others. We more strongly inhabit some 
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attitudes and consider how those backed away continue to strike us. So however 
secure an attitude towards the situation, this deflationist is not committed to self 
critical consideration being terminated in its face. 
Darwall concludes that a reason must be  
something that can grip us as someone who can raise the very question 
we are raising. And this suggests a standpoint from which we can grasp 
our question. We wonder what grips us from the standpoint of an agent 
driven to raise our very question. And autonomist internalism should 
answer: what we would grip from that standpoint. (1990:264-65) 
We now approach the main point that I wish to make in this section, which turns on 
the fact that internalism is about what would grip an agent and Darwall has slid to 
what an agent would grip. What Darwall is saying is that given that reasons motivate 
when considered in the right way, he thinks we are driven to conclude that the right 
way is correct deliberation from the standpoint of an agent who asks after 
unqualified justification. The part in italics is what goes beyond, for example, 
Williams’ internalism, for whom, the ‘right way’ only amounts to knowing and 
vividly entertaining all the relevant facts and reasoning correctly about the relations 
of those facts, in the light of one’s motivational set. So, substituting in Darwall’s 
earlier definition: 
p  is a reason for S to do A if, and only if, were S to consider p by use 
of correct deliberation whilst occupying the standpoint of an agent who 
asks after unqualified justification he would be given some motivation 
to do A.  
 Darwall now makes his key move, an argument for a variety of Categorical 
Imperative. The very next sentence states 
Since we seek norms to guide any such agent, we must ask: what norms 
would we will for all from that point of view? (1990:265) 
This is a complete non-sequitur, merely insinuated by the preceding slide from 
passive to active use of the verb ‘to grip’. He is pursuing an internalist derivation of 
the substance of the reasons. As my substitution into his definition makes clear, the 
consequence of conjoining his internalism about reasons with his thoughts about 
autonomous asking after unqualified justification is that reasons (the unqualified 
justifiers) are whatever would, as a matter of fact, motivate an agent who is 
occupying the reflective standpoint. However, instead of considering what would 
motivate any such agent he has substituted the question of what norms we would 
‘will for all from that point of view’. In other words, not what such agents would be 
motivated by but what we would want all such agents to be motivated by. But that is 
a completely different question! It has broken the chain of his argument that links it 
to his internalist characterisation of reasons as things got from rationality and 
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insinuates a variety of the very thing which was to be proved: the categorical 
imperative.  
It might be objected that  thinking of what we would want all agents to be 
motivated by is a way of determining what we count as requirements of reason. That 
is all very well, so far as it goes. But the dialectical task which the rationalist is 
engaged upon is to get from the mere universality of reasons to it being a rational 
requirement to will that all should follow those reasons. For that is what distinguishes 
the Kantian notion of the universality of reasons from the Humean. This substitution 
amounts to begging the very question at issue. For example, our rational free rider 
will not be persuaded to prefer that others act on their reasons by being asked what 
he would want all agents to be motivated by, since he wants them to be motivated by 
their reasons only if it is not at his cost.  
Here, then, is where I think the ambiguity discussed above has been exploited. 
Suddenly, by this substitution, by considering what we would want agents to be 
motivated by instead of what they would be motivated by, we have abandoned 
reasons as requirements of rationality and in its place taken reasons to be the 
directively normative considerations which properly determine what ought to be 
done. The argument is a fallacy of equivocation. 
10.5 Moral requirements are rational requirements 
We have seen why Darwall’s attempt to show moral considerations to be reasons 
as given by autonomous internalism does not succeed in proving rationalism. On the 
whole, presenting the argument in precisely those terms has been abandoned as 
positions have been developed in which even if it succeeded, it would not in any case 
suffice for Kantian rationalism about morality. For example, for McDowell, morality 
requires not just rationality, but possession of the right concepts as well (McDowell 
1979). Anyone who has conceptual capacities sufficient to grant them perceptual 
insight into moral features will face moral considerations as reasons, and failure to 
respond to those reasons will be a kind of irrationality. However, for anyone who 
lacks those conceptual capacities, the moral considerations are not reasons they could 
entertain. So unless possession of the relevant concepts is a requirement of 
rationality, their failure to respond would not be irrationality.  
Consequently, the Kantian must show us that some moral requirements are 
requirements of rationality. A recent and very influential argument to the effect is that 
given by Smith (1994).  There he is arguing for rationalism as a conceptual claim: 
Conceptual truth: If agents are morally required to ฀Φ in circumstances 
C then there is a requirement of rationality or reason for all agents to ฀Φ 
in circumstances C. (1994:65) 
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It seems to me that his argument has been successfully refuted by Noordhof (1999), 
and for that reason I am not going to discuss Smith. Instead I am going to consider 
another very influential argument, that given by Darwall in his earlier book.  
Darwall concedes that neither ‘the universality of rational principles’ nor 
‘Gauthier’s requirement that rational principles be self supporting’41 ((1983:218) is 
sufficient for Kantianism. Darwall intends to derive a stronger requirement, the 
requirement of 
universal impartial self-support,…. [It is] a requirement of any 
principle that could be a norm of the Rational Normative System that it 
would be rational according to it to choose all agents to act on it, when 
this choice is made from an impartial standpoint  (1983:219) 
which will then be interpreted in a Rawlsian manner.  
Darwall’s argument is in two halves. The first half  is based on the first part of 
being an ISIS: ‘an agent who is internally self-identified as subject to rational norms’ 
(1983:214). His second half conjoins the conclusion of the first with the second part 
of being an ISIS: a self critical subject who asks ‘whether what we suppose to be 
reasons really are’(1983:217) to argue to the requirement of universal impartial self 
support. I think the first half fails, and that is what I shall concentrate on. 
 
[Gap so that the following argument is all on one page.]
                                                 
41
 ‘whether it would be rational according to a given principle to choose to act on it’ 
(Darwall 1983:219) 
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The first premiss expresses Darwall’s internalism  
1. An ISIS is motivated to act on a rational norm by his judgment that it is a 
rational norm…. (1983:222) 
2. suppose…that an ISIS…judges P…to be a rational principle….(1983:225) 
3.  [hence the ISIS desires] that he act on P….(1&2) (1983:225)  
[That sounds like merely personal motivation, but]  
4. What explains the ISIS's desire that he act on P is his judgment that P  is a 
principle on which all agents ought rationally to act [i.e. a rational norm]. 
(1983:225) 
5. the judgment that a principle is a rational one is…made from an impersonal, 
rather than the agent's own personal, standpoint. It properly concerns the 
agent himself only as one agent among others, all of whom are subject to 
rational norms. (1983:225)  
6.  [So the ISIS] is motivated from an impersonal standpoint. (1983:225) 
7. [therefore] Any motivation he has, as an ISIS, for preferring that he act on P  
will be impersonal. (1983:225) 
8. [therefore] He will be motivated to prefer that he, qua rational agent, act on P. 
(1983:225) 
9. Consequently, he will have the very same motivation to prefer that any agent 
act on P, indeed, that all do so. (1983:226) 
10.  [therefore] he prefers from the impartial standpoint of an arbitrary rational 
agent that all agents act on P. (1983:226) 
What this argument achieves, if successful, is a step beyond the universality of 
reasons. Prior to this, our rational free rider prefers that others not act on their 
reasons if it be to his cost. If he accepts this argument, he will accept that the latter 
preference is irrational. As a rational being, he is committed to preferring that they 
act on their reasons too—yet more, that he promote whatever they have reason to 
pursue, since 10 means he prefers that all agents act on whatever reasons there are, 
including himself. So if I have a reason to eat, he has a reason to help me do so. If it 
succeeds, then, this first half of the argument achieves a great deal. Can our rational 
free rider evade this argument? 
The Humean will, of course, reject premiss 1, since the judgement here is a pure 
cognitive state. Without this premiss the entire argument will fall, since the Humean 
will deny that there is some acceptable mixed state judgement which will licence the 
later claims that the motivation is impersonal in the relevant sense. If the judgement 
does motivate, and so is a mixed state, it will be because the motivational states 
referred to in the content of the norm are already possessed by the judging agent and 
have become part of the judging state. Although the Humean has a sense of 
impersonal motivational states as other regarding motivational states, that is not the 
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sense of impersonal motivation required by Darwall, and since the Humean denies 
motivation from merely intellectual recognition of being one rational agent among 
others, the route to the conclusion will be blocked. 
Setting that aside, the argument is clear up to step 4. I think from then on the 
justification of each step is murky. Considerable weight is placed on the notion of an 
impersonal or impartial standpoint and in judging or being motivated from such 
standpoints. There is at least one sense of being motivated by judgements from an 
impersonal standpoint which amounts to being already committed to a significant 
moral position. For example, being committed to acting according to one’s 
judgement of the general good without special regard for one’s own good. Whilst we 
can afford the use of what we might call simply impersonal notions, we cannot afford 
such ethically impersonal notions to be used as inferential licences in the course of 
the argument without begging the question. I don’t know whether there is a 
distinction to be made between judging from a simple impersonal standpoint and 
judging. However, whether judging commits one to judging from an ethically 
impersonal standpoint is the entire issue. We shall consider some general problems 
with these notions shortly, but first I want to outline their role in inadequacies in the 
argument which lie on its surface.  
In 4, the judgement could be said to be impersonal only in the sense that its content 
doesn’t refer to any particular person. One could equally well say that the judgement 
was general, because its content quantified over all persons. In 5, however, having a 
judgement whose content is impersonal has been equated with or taken to imply that 
the judgement is made from an impersonal standpoint. Now if this is mere facon de 
parler we need not object. It is just an odd way of drawing attention to the agent 
appreciating the universality of reasons. But clearly, such appreciation by the agent 
in 4 does not require ethically impersonal judgement. Nor does appreciating in 5 that 
the principle applies to ‘the agent himself only as one agent among others, all of 
whom are subject to rational norms’. Surely all it requires is that the agent reasons 
correctly. 
However, when we see what use is made of impersonality of standpoint later in the 
argument, the use of ‘judgement from impersonal standpoint’ in 5 is not a mere facon 
de parler, but a step which is either question begging if not justified, or an 
equivocation. What would justify this step is if judging the fact of something being a 
rational norm requires judging impersonally in the sense of impersonal judgement 
that the rationalist wants. That is to say, that to recognise a rational norm requires 
recognising that it would be chosen from an impersonal standpoint as what all agents 
should act on. But that is the conclusion we are heading for, so it can't be used to 
license this step. 
By the time we get to 8, the claim is that his desire to act on P, first derived in 3, is 
not personal but impersonal. How did we get there? The judgement that P is a 
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rational norm was made from an impersonal standpoint, and that judgement 
motivated his desire, so at 6 we have that he is motivated from an impersonal 
standpoint. 7 concludes that  ‘Any motivation…for preferring that he act on P will be 
impersonal’. There is an ambiguity in ‘motivation’ between motivator, which here is 
his judgement, and what is motivated by that motivator, his desire. Presumably it is 
supposed to mean ‘desire’ in 7, since otherwise 7 repeats 6. So we are being told that 
his desire that he act on P is an impersonal desire. That doesn’t sound plausible. 
It is not clear why being motivated from an impersonal standpoint must make the 
motivation itself impersonal. Furthermore, we run into serious difficulties if it does. 
How could such a desire be his desire that he act on P, which is the desire in 3 which 
is supposed to be being explicated (for that is the desire which was motivated by his 
judgement that P is a rational norm)? Impersonal desires make no mention of 
particular people, whereas presumably the content of his desire that he act on P 
mentions him. Darwall is going to have difficulties if he is going to assert that the 
content of the ISIS’s desire doesn’t contain a particular person, since clearly it 
contains him. So we might very well reject the claim that motivation from an 
impersonal standpoint makes the desire impersonal.  
Perhaps we should take Darwall to be stipulating that  impersonality of desires is 
not to do with their content, but is rather a matter of the standpoint from which they 
have been motivated. Darwall gets round the implausibility of this by representing 
the ISIS’s desire that he act on the principle as a desire that he, merely as one agent 
among others, so act (8). The ISIS’s desire is a way of having a kind of detached yet 
motivational regard of himself, a motivation for himself yes, but not especially for 
himself—just for anyone, really, of whom he merely happens to be the one. 
This is surely very strained. The kinds of de se attitudes we can have towards 
ourselves are complex, but it is unlikely that our desires about ourselves can be of 
ourselves under an aspect in this kind of way. Perhaps beliefs can, but for desire and 
intention to do their jobs, this kind of detachment is going to have to be avoided on 
pain of undermining their link with action. Nevertheless, those who are anti-Humean 
about motivation (as Darwall is, since that is what premiss 1 amounts to) may for 
that reason find themselves persuaded that there can be such desires. On the other 
hand, were Darwall to be stipulating this peculiar kind of impersonal desire, 
Darwall’s use of it in the argument would be dangerously equivocal, since very 
shortly we find him returning to its standard use: ‘The preference they motivate is, 
therefore, the impersonal one that all agents act on P.’ (1983:226). 
Can Darwall avoid these problems by appealing to motivated desires additional to 
that mentioned in 3, some of  which, because the motivation is from an impersonal 
standpoint, are genuinely impersonal desires that all agents act on P? That would 
certainly help him, and what he says in 9 makes it clear that he has in mind such an 
additional, genuinely impersonal motivated desire. But it amounts to begging the 
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question. What he has in his internalist premiss (1 in the argument) is only that the 
ISIS is motivated to act on P, a motivation directed at himself. What Darwall needs 
is that the agent desires all to act on P, that is to say, that the agent has motivation or 
preference directed at all agents; but that is not in his premisses. Whether being 
motivated by the judgement from an impersonal standpoint that P is a rational norm 
results in the impersonal desire that all should act on P is exactly what this part of the 
argument is supposed to establish. So even if we granted Darwall the possibility of 
additional motivated impersonal desires, it is a possibility which the very steps we 
are concerned with, 6-9,  are supposed to establish, and so can’t be used to license 
those steps.  
So what justifies the manoeuvring through the peculiar blending of the agent’s 
desire directed to himself as a desire only for himself-qua-rational-agent to a desire 
for all agents? As far as I can tell, nothing. Rather, in justifying the step from 8 to 9, 
Darwall retreats to an example which just begs the same question. 
If an ISIS judges that all agents ought rationally to maximize their 
individual utility, he will be motivated by that judgement to prefer that 
he, as an agent, maximise his utility. But since the judgment is itself 
impersonal, any motivation it can provide will also be impersonal. 
Consequently, it will also motivate his preferring that all agents 
maximize their individual utility. (1983:226) 
Now we have seen the problems with the claim that impersonal judgement causes 
impersonal desire, this seems to be nothing more than the fallacy of like causing like. 
Alternatively, there is a tacit story about the way internalist motivation works: the 
ISIS is motivated to desire all agents to act on it, and recognising that he is an agent, 
is then motivated to act himself. But that is presenting a motivational story which 
cannot be got out of his internalist premiss. The internalist premiss tells us that 
judging P a rational norm will motivate an ISIS to act on it. This story is question 
begging because the ISIS being motivated to desire all agents to act on P is the 
conclusion being argued for.  
Darwall apparently finds it incredible that anything else should be the case: 
But if what justifies and motivates an ISIS's preference that he act on P 
is (his judgment) that P is a principle on which all agents ought 
rationally to act, how can that judgment, taken by itself, motivate a 
preference simply for his acting on P? It could do so only if the 
judgment were essentially a judgment about his own conduct, made 
from his own standpoint. Since it is not, and since the Judgment itself 
motivates the ISIS's preference that he act on P, it motivates equally his 
preferring that all agents do so. (1983:227) 
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Our rational free rider has no difficulty in answering the question differently and 
without  saying that his judgement is only about his own conduct. That is his stock in 
trade: he recognises that others have similar reasons to him, but he prefer they not act 
on theirs when it is to his cost. With respect to the example in the previous quotation, 
he acknowledges that all ought to maximise utility, but he prefers that others don’t if 
it reduces his utility. Until we have it explained to us why rationality requires him to 
prefer for all what he prefers for himself, we have not got anywhere. So we need to 
have explained what it is about judging impersonally which commits the rational free 
rider in this way. Judging simply impersonally, even if necessary for judging that P is 
a rational norm, doesn’t get us this far. What exactly is it about the judgement that all 
agents ought to act on P that is supposed to motivate a desire that all act on P? 
Without an answer from Darwall, this argument collapses. My suspicion, of course, 
is that the argument makes surreptitious appeal to a notion of ethical impersonality.  
So the argument is seriously flawed. It must be admitted, however, that it has 
prima facie cogency, and I think this is because of the surreptitious appeal just 
mentioned and because of the murkiness of the notion of an impersonal standpoint.  
As I understand it, a standpoint (perspective, or point of view) is a metaphor with a 
thin and thick usage. The thin usage is when it stands for a set of propositions, 
perhaps a theory, within which or from which or in the light of which some other 
proposition is considered, explained or evaluated. In this sense, an impersonal 
standpoint would presumably be a collection of propositions whose content did not 
contain any particular persons.  
The thick usage stands for a collection of beliefs and desires which are capable of 
being held by a single person, perhaps combined with a collection of circumstances 
and a life history, within which or from which or in the light of which certain other 
beliefs,  desires and circumstances are considered, explained or evaluated. So in the 
thick usage we may be talking of what could be (a meaningful part or the entirety of) 
the life state at a time of a real person. By ‘meaningful part’ I mean a part that has 
coherent relevance, for example, their knowledge and experience of family life. 
In the thick usage there is a crucial ambiguity between whether one is speaking of 
a standpoint as inhabited, which is a matter of having the beliefs and being motivated 
by the desires, and or whether one is abstracting to what can be entertained as an 
intellectual appreciation of the standpoint.  
An impersonal standpoint is an idealisation. It is not something that could be 
occupied by a person because people are incapable of having entirely impersonal 
propositional attitudes, so by the time we reach an impersonal standpoint it is not a 
standpoint of people in general, but no standpoint at all. Consequently, it is an 
abstraction, and can only be addressed by the intellectual entertainment of a 
collection of impersonal beliefs and impersonal desires.  
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There isn’t a unique impersonal standpoint, since removing beliefs and desires 
(circumstances and life history) whose content makes reference to particular persons 
will still leave many distinct collections of beliefs and desires with sufficient content 
to cast an evaluative light. Even if you stipulate common possession of all true 
beliefs of a given wide extent, it is the diversity of impersonal desires which prevents 
uniqueness. If you start stipulating which impersonal desires are to belong to the 
impersonal standpoint you are importing moral judgements, which amounts to 
question begging in this argument. But if you don’t so stipulate, what is to prevent 
the standpoint of the rational agent qua rational to include the impersonal desire that 
all rational agents should suffer horribly? 
Of course, an impersonal standpoint with benevolent or moral impersonal desires, 
perhaps accompanied by typical indexical personal desires, is the kind of thing we 
frequently appeal to. But that is just a heuristic device for conducting an argument 
over what ought to be done and can’t be presupposed here.  
By the conclusion the impersonal standpoint has been equated with an ‘impartial 
standpoint of an arbitrary rational agent’. This is not justified if it is supposed to be 
proper use of the concept of impartiality rather than stipulative redefinition. Unlike 
impersonality, impartiality is a property of a person. Given some particular people, 
anyone who is not partial between those people has an impartial standpoint relative 
to them. But clearly such a standpoint is not impersonal, since being impartial 
depends on the impartial person having a particular life state (beliefs, desires, 
circumstances, life history) which bears a certain relation to the life states of the 
other people, namely, being such as to leave one without partiality between them. 
The substance of impartiality depends on being a particular person and therefore 
depends on occupying a personal standpoint. If we now seek to idealise the notion by 
removing all partialities do we have a person left to occupy the impartial standpoint? 
If we do, we cannot have reached an impersonal standpoint. If we don’t we are no 
longer concerned with impartiality properly so-called, because partiality and 
impartiality are a matter of our actual motivations, not of intellectually entertained 
motivations, and hence of being subject to, or at least feeling the force of, those 
motivations. The mere intellectual entertainment of impersonal desires, the 
appreciation of what such desires motivate, is not feeling the force of such desires. 
So to occupy an impartial standpoint properly so-called requires being motivated by 
purely impersonal desires, not merely thinking about desires. Although intellectually 
we can set aside the content of our motivations and entertain in their place the 
contents of purely impersonal motivations, we cannot set aside our motivations and 
replace them with  purely impersonal motivations.  
Now this notion of an impartial standpoint, of a motivated standpoint, but 
motivated purely impersonally, is a version of Kant’s perfectly rational being. No 
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doubt it is where Darwall would like to end up, but ending up there requires more 
than simply equating it with an impersonal standpoint.  
Darwall has offered us the ISIS who ‘identifies fundamentally with the standpoint 
of a subject of rational norms and is motivated from that standpoint to act on them’ 
(1983:228). His argument is supposed to show that ‘the standpoint of the rational 
agent qua rational’ amounts to his impartial standpoint. The ISIS is supposed to be a 
possible person, and so his standpoint is supposed to be inhabitable. Even if the 
argument could be shown to be valid in virtue of the nature of the impersonal 
standpoints appealed to during its course, the impartial standpoint it arrives at is not 
something which can be inhabited. Preferring from an  impartial standpoint is not 
something an ISIS could possibly do. But in that case, Darwall’s conclusion must be 
false.  
10.6 The nature of practical reasons 
In The Possibility of Altruism Nagel intends to establish that altruism is a ‘rational 
requirement on action’ (1970:3) by considering certain formal restrictions on the 
nature of reasons and our conception of ourselves as one agent among others. He 
thinks that, on pain of solipsism, practical judgements made from personal and 
impersonal standpoints must have the same motivational content, and this cannot be 
the case for ‘a practical principle which applies only to oneself’ (1970:108). 
Adhering to a principle which indexes the motivational content to the particular 
person one is, is what he calls ‘practical solipsism, because it is an inability to draw 
fully-fledged practical conclusions about impersonally viewed situations’ (1970:114). 
This means that the structure of practical judgements must be this: 
any judgment from the personal standpoint, whether about [myself] or 
about others, or not about anyone at all, is committed to two further 
judgements: (a) an impersonal judgment to the same effect about the 
same situation and characters; (b) a basic personal statement saying 
who, in the impersonally described scene, [I am]. (1970:102) 
So for example, the content of my personal practical judgement that I should eat 
must amount to the combined contents of ‘persons in situation C ought to be fed’ and 
‘I am that person’ (demonstrating to myself which of those persons I am).  
This requirement applies to practical judgements from both personal and 
impersonal standpoints. Judgements about reasons that motivate me have 
motivational content. Since the content of first personal judgements is complex in the 
way illustrated, and since judgements of the form ‘I am that person’ have no content 
that could on its own motivate, the motivational content must be in the general part 
of the judgement. But that just means that I am motivated by the general facts rather 
than by it being me to whom they  apply. What is changed by knowing the identity 
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facts is only what exactly I am motivated to do (from my knowledge of what that 
person in the impersonally described scene should do).  
When I judge that Joe is hungry, on pain of making different judgements from 
personal and impersonal standpoints, since he is motivated by his judgement that he 
is hungry I must likewise be motivated by his being hungry. So if anyone has a 
reason to do something I have a reason to promote them doing it. The reason that it is 
supposed to be on pain of practical solipsism is this. Internalism means that judging 
one has a reason will normally result in being motivated. Furthermore, Nagel rejects 
Humeanism about motivation, so the judgements that motivate can be taken to be 
pure cognitive states. Suppose Joe judges that his being hungry is a reason to eat, but 
Joe’s reason is not a reason for me in any sense at all. Then since he is motivated but 
I am not, his judgement and my judgement must be different (for if they were the 
same I would be motivated). But that difference cannot be accounted for by the 
difference in the judgement of identity facts, for judgements of identity facts (I am 
Joe, I am Fred) cannot motivate. Hence it must be some other difference in 
judgement. Consequently this amounts to there being a difference in judgements of 
substance from the personal and impersonal standpoints, and that amounts to a kind 
of solipsism. Since these are judgements of reasons which are motivating, it amounts 
to practical solipsism.  
Consequently, if one rejects practical solipsism then one is committed to accepting 
that whenever anyone has a reason to promote their own interests everyone else has a 
reason to promote them too, and this fact follows from the nature of reasons. Hence 
altruism is a requirement of rationality. 
 
Nagel’s argument is not one which a Humean has to accept, since one of the 
premisses, ‘there may in principle be motivation without motivating desires’ (Nagel 
1970:32),  is a denial of the Humean premiss about motivation.  Nagel’s point, a fair 
one, is that the fact of ‘a desire under[lying] every act’ (Nagel 1970:29)  is not itself 
sufficient for the Humean’s case, since if belief alone can motivate, it may cause the 
relevant desire. So the Humean who takes that fact to prove his case is begging the 
question at issue. Of course, pointing this out does not itself refute the Humean 
premiss. Conceding that motivated desires are not reasons for themselves need not be 
a problem for the Humean if they can be eventually grounded in unmotivated desire.  
Nagel gives some argument in favour of some desires being motivated by belief 
alone, but only subsequent to its use as a criticism of Humeanism. He claims that the 
Humean cannot satisfactorily explain the nature of prudential motivation. 
Consequently, to rebut the criticism the Humean need only provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the relevant phenomena to which Nagel appeals.  
Nagel says desire based reasons cannot satisfy the formal requirements of 
prudential reasons. The source of the failure is that ‘this view denies the possibility 
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of motivational action at a distance, whether over time or between 
persons’(1970:27). Nagel poses three problems: ‘I may now desire for the future 
something which I shall not and do not expect to desire then’(1970:39); I may expect 
to desire something in the future which I do not desire now; my present desires give 
me reasons which may ensure ‘the failure of my future rational attempts’ (1970:40) 
to satisfy the expected future desire. In each case, Nagel thinks the expected future 
desires provide reasons which the Humean cannot but should countenance. I set aside 
the distinctions an expressivist Humean might wish to draw between desire based 
reasons and those reasons consequent on the attitudes which he thinks constitute the 
ground of directive normativity. For him too, it is the present attitudes which ground 
the reasons, and merely expected future attitudes do not. 
Whether desire based reasons can satisfy our intuitions about prudential reasons is 
an issue much discussed. The Humean will accept that expected future desires cannot 
motivate present desires, but is unlikely to concede defeat to that point. Once the 
relation of present desires, tense and time is got straight, I find that either the present 
reasons putatively supplied by expected future desires are explainable in terms of 
present desire, or the pressure to think there are present reasons which can only be 
got from the expected future desires evaporates, when the three problems he poses 
also evaporate (for a variety of reasons). For example, the Humean need not accept 
that all expected future desires do constitute reasons. Prudential desires can be 
explained as motivated desires, but motivated by a combination of unmotivated 
transient desires in the past with memory of painful unsatisfaction and knowledge of 
my responsibility for being in that situation and knowledge of what I might have 
done to avoid it. Parfit investigates in considerable detail whether the Desire-
Fulfilment Theorist (who does ‘what will best fulfil his desires, throughout his life’ 
(1987:149)) is really better off than the Present-Aim Theorist (who does ‘what will 
best achieve his present aims’ (1987:92)) and comes down in favour of the latter.  
On the other hand, we have Hollis launching a telling satire against Present Aim 
theories by exploiting Hume’s remark that ‘A trivial good may… produce a desire 
superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment’ 
(1777/1975b:2.3.3 /417). Hollis uses confrontation between the prudential Ant and 
profligate Grasshopper to suggest that Humean reasons amount to a kind of 
subjection to the strongest transient desire: 
replied the Grasshopper ‘…to be rational is to do what one most values 
at the time and I value present delight above its cost in future sorrow’ 
(1987:60)  
Grasshopper is consequently someone for whom a poison that is immediately 
blissful but shortly agony must be drunk, but for whom the antidote is useless 
because ‘it makes [his] present distress far worse, even though it works rapidly 
thereafter’(Hollis 1987:60).  
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Parfit offers examples which support Nagel’s premiss with considerable intuitive 
cogency: 
suppose I help someone in need. My reason for helping this person is 
not that I want to do so, but that he needs help….my reason for reading 
a book is not that I want to do so, but that the book is witty….my 
reason is not my desire but the respect in which what I am doing is 
worth doing, or the respect in which my aim is desirable (Parfit 
1987:121) 
The Humean will reply that the cogency is based on oversimplification and 
misdescription of desire. Desires don’t have to be consulted to be operational; rather, 
desire directs you outwards towards the world, directs you to being drawn to the 
person’s need, drawn by the book’s wit. He accounts for the existence of motivated 
desires with his account of the acquisition of new desires in general. We have many 
unmotivated basic desires, and the combinatorial possibilities of constitutive 
satisfactions of those desires are explored by a process both feelingful and 
deliberative, by trials, and by the feedback of how the trials go and how their going 
felt. Consequently, motivated desires are not motivated solely by the prospect 
desired, but are motivated because the prospect fits in with, perhaps offers a new 
kind of, constitutive satisfaction for already present desires. That complex relation 
between the prospect and the present desires is what motivates the new desire.  
 
So Humeans about motivation will reject Nagel’s premiss even if they accept the 
validity of the argument. Darwall, on the other hand, thinks there is a flaw in the 
argument itself: ‘it trades on an ambiguity in the idea that personal practical 
judgment has motivational content’ (1983:125). Nagel’s argument turned on the 
thought that avoiding practical solipsism requires an impersonal practical judgement 
about oneself to have the same motivational content as the personal judgement. But 
must the motivation be 
part of what one judges? Or is it, rather, part of one's judging: namely, 
the attitude that one normally has when one judges that there is reason 
for one to do A? Nagel's argument requires that it be part of what one 
judges, part of its content. This is what must change with one's 
perspective if one cannot hold true the very same things about 
oneself.(1983:127-8) 
But why should not the motivation be the result of judging rather than part of what is 
judged? If it is the former, then the congruence between personal and impersonal 
judgement of one’s subjective reasons can be maintained, since in the impersonal 
judgement, the additional fact of knowing who one is need no longer contain 
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motivational content, but need only itself cause the motivation. For this reason 
Darwall concludes that the ‘argument commits…a fallacy of ambiguity’ (1983:129). 
10.7 Analogy of practical and theoretical reasons 
We now turn to the strategy of claiming that there is a significant analogy or 
congruence between theoretical and practical reason. I am going to consider an 
argument from Velleman, and show why it doesn’t succeed. 
Rational belief is belief that arises from successful theoretical reasoning. 
Theoretical reason has the formal aim of believing on the basis of reasons to believe. 
Reasons to believe are conducive of rational belief. A circle which leaves us wanting 
a substantive aim for theoretical reason before it can be virtuous. This is easily given, 
because we have a substantive account of theoretical reasons and can explain their 
influence on believers. Because belief has a constitutive aim, namely, truth, truth-
conducive considerations are the substance of reasons to believe. Theoretical reasons 
influence believers because, truth being a constitutive aim of belief, caring about the 
truth of belief is partially constitutive of being a believer. Indifference to truth 
doesn’t so much leave one with randomly true and false beliefs, as with no beliefs at 
all.  
Rational action is action that arises from successful practical reasoning. Practical 
reason has the formal aim of acting on the basis of reasons to act. Practical reasons 
are conducive of rational action. A circle which leaves us similarly in want of a 
substantive aim of practical reason. Classically, this was furnished by taking 
goodness to be the aim of action, whence the explanation can continue somewhat as 
for theoretical reason. Hence a plausible congruence between practical and 
theoretical reason. Only in this case we can’t explain the influence of practical 
reasons similarly because it is not clear the goodness is a constitutive aim of action 
and so goodness doesn’t seem to be partially constitutive of being an agent. 
Indifference to goodness may mean you do good and bad acts randomly, and needn’t 
mean you don’t act.  
The classical account is an account of thin directive rationality: acting contrary to 
the Good is asserted as acting contrary to reason just because the Good is taken to be 
what practical reason must aim at, but without an explanation of why rationality 
makes that the case. So this kind of congruence is not available to the Kantian, who 
wants the proper aim of practical reason to be given by rationality alone. But when 
one asks, for example, why prudence or altruism is justified as a proper aim of 
practical reason, whilst demanding that the answer be given purely in terms of 
rationality itself, rather than by appealing to the interests and motivations of rational 
agents, it is clear that one has placed the very greatest difficulties in the path of 
anyone trying to provide the justification.  
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For that reason, Velleman abjures such a strategy. Instead, he seeks a full analogy 
with theoretical reason, claiming that a substantive account of practical reasons can 
be got from a constitutive aim of action and consequently that practical reasons 
influence agents because caring about the aim is partially constitutive of being an 
agent. Hence he gains the explanatory virtue of internal reasons, the plausibility of 
relating practical reasons to inclinations of agents, whilst avoiding relativization of 
reasons to the varied inclinations of agents.  
Since having the constitutive aim of action is necessary in order to be an agent, 
which in turn is necessary in order to have ends, Velleman says it cannot itself be an 
end. Since the aim is what makes the difference between unintentional yet goal 
directed behaviour, such as reflexive catching of a dropped glass, and full-blooded 
action, it is ‘simply the aim of being in conscious control of one’s behaviour’. 
Velleman concludes that the constitutive aim of action is autonomy, and that 
consequently the substance of practical reasons will be that they are considerations 
which have ‘relevance to our autonomy’ (1996:193). He then sketches how this is 
supposed to work. 
Conscious control of behaviour is a matter of ‘having a controlling consciousness 
of one’s behaviour, a guiding awareness of what one is doing….directive rather than 
receptive knowledge’. Directive knowledge42 is acceptance of ‘a proposition in such 
a way as to make it true’ (1996:194). It is ‘the state of intending to act’ (1996:195, fn. 
55), a cognitive state, and should be distinguished from the conative state of 
acceptance of a proposition as to be made true. Directive knowledge is possible so 
long as one has an inclination ‘to do what one accepts that one will do’(1996:195), 
that is, the inclination to consciously control your behaviour. Autonomy thereby 
serves as the constitutive aim of action in this way:  
 
[Gap so that the following argument is all on one page.] 
                                                 
42
 His expression, and not necessarily related to my use of ‘directive’. 
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1. Actions are done by agents and only agents. 
2. Action is consciously controlled behaviour, as opposed to reflexive 
behaviour. 
3. Doing what you intend is doing what you accept you will do. 
4. What you do out of such acceptance is done ‘in and out of a knowledge of 
what you are doing’ (1996:196). 
5.  and hence is consciously controlled. 
6. Therefore doing what you intend is the difference between being an agent 
and being a non-agent with reflexive behaviour. (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
7. So the inclination required to do what you intend is an inclination that 
makes you an agent. (6) 
8. It is also an inclination to conscious control of behaviour (3, 4, 5) 
9. Therefore the inclination to autonomy is the inclination which makes you 
an agent. (7, 8) 
10. ‘A full-blooded action is therefore behaviour that manifests your inclination 
toward autonomy, just as a belief is a cognitive attitude that manifests your 
inclination toward the truth.’ (1996:196) 
The inclination to autonomy ‘mediates the influence of your reasons for acting’. A 
merely reflexive reaching to catch a dropped glass is motivated by desire and belief 
alone, and is not action. Action is rational, so when desire and belief motivate 
catching the glass, they do not exert the influence of reason. The influence of reason 
is present when conscious control is exercised over the catching. Your reason is not 
your desire to save the glass, but ‘your recognition of that desire’. It is a reason 
because 
it forms a potentially guiding awareness of what you would be doing in 
extending your hand. The awareness that you want to save the glass, 
and that extending your hand would save it, puts you in a position to 
frame a piece of directive knowledge— “I’m extending my hand in 
order to save the glass”—a proposition that you can now make true by 
accepting it. (1996:198) 
Hence the rational influence of desire based reasons comes not from the desire but 
from their capacity to engage the inclination toward autonomy. Presumably other 
considerations independent of desire could engage the same capacity. But being a 
reason is being something that engages the inclination which makes one an agent. So 
there could be practical reasons independent of the desires that distinguish you from 
other agents. 
 
Velleman concluded that the constitutive aim of action is autonomy. A suitably 
thick notion of autonomy as a constitutive aim of action would make autonomy an 
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intrinsic directive requirement of rationality and make autonomous action a kind of 
rational success which possesses intrinsic directivity. Clearly, that would suffice to 
prove rationalism. However, Dworkin (1988:6) has pointed out that autonomy has 
been equated with at least twelve distinct conceptions. We need to see what the 
substance of Velleman’s autonomy is. Velleman says that he is offering us a ‘sketch 
of how…a full account of autonomy [and] its role as the constitutive goal of 
action…might be developed’ beginning with ‘the conception of autonomy as 
conscious control over one’s behaviour’ (1996:193). This, and the fact that he thanks 
Korsgaard for daring him to ‘express this thought’ (1996:193, fn. 50), suggests that 
he would like to be understood in terms of a thick notion, which we hope to derive 
from a very thin notion of autonomy. It is not clear to me that the notion of autonomy 
has been shown to get any thicker by the end of his argument, so I don’t think this 
aspect of his project even begins to help the rationalist. 
Nevertheless, the thinness of his notion of autonomy has its virtues, since the 
conscious control of behaviour is clearly a rational requirement of the higher reaches 
of rational agency available to those with reflective consciousness. If his account of 
practical reasons based on that notion of autonomy is genuinely analogous to 
theoretical reason, then practical reasons are independent of inclinations that differ 
across agents and their influence is explained in terms of what distinguishes agents 
and non-agents. Consequently their directivity can’t be accounted for in Humean 
terms but only in terms of rationality itself, thereby proving rationalism. 
One caveat, however: Velleman offers an account of a part of the rational 
economy, practical reason, in terms of what is necessary for behaviour to be under 
conscious control, and claims to be showing us how this gets us a substantive 
account of practical reasons. I regard practical reason and practical reasons as 
involving distinct normativities, since practical reason is a rational faculty which can 
function well or ill, and so is a matter of correctness normativity, whilst practical 
reasons have directive normativity. So I am not going to accept an account of how 
practical reason takes considerations to be reasons to be an adequate explanation of 
what makes something a practical reason (if by a practical reason is meant something 
with directive normativity). That won’t do on its own, because a realist can hold that 
the practical reasons are objective and whatever view one takes of rationality, reasons 
are in part what they are because of being capable of being taken as reasons by 
practical reason. So showing how reasons might be independent of differentiating 
inclination and showing an internal relation of practical reasons to practical reason 
won’t suffice on its own. What is needed to prove rationalism is that the way reasons 
are internally related to practical reason should amount to it being rationality itself 
which determines what the practical reasons are and that they are objective. In 
Velleman’s case, this means he must make good on the claim that the substance of 
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practical reasons is given by the relevance of considerations to autonomy. This is 
where I think he fails.  
 
Velleman doesn’t spell out in any detail what practical reasons are on his account, 
although he does give an example which we will consider shortly. I shall determine 
what he is committed to on the basis of the analogy he is pursuing. The constitutive 
aim of action is supposed to determine the substance of practical  reasons 
analogously to the way the constitutive aim of belief does in the case of theoretical 
reason. Likewise, the single inclination to autonomy which distinguishes agents from 
non-agents is analogous to the single inclination to care about the truth which 
distinguishes believers from non-believers (in the relevant sense). Let us trace the 
analogy from the originating thought by which Velleman gains the explanatory virtue 
of internal reasons: ‘things count as reasons for someone only if he is inclined to care 
about them’. (1996:180). Let’s formulate this necessary condition on reasons as a 
schema  
R is a reason for A to ฀Φ only if A is inclined to care whether ฀Φ-ing 
achieves the constitutive aim of ฀Φ-ing 
The general point behind this is that if the relevant inclination to care is constitutive 
of being a believer or an agent, then we can see why the reasons apply to all 
believers or agents. The plausibility of this schema is easily shown. For belief and its 
constitutive aim we get: 
Truth-conducive considerations are a reason for A to believe ฀Φ only if 
A is inclined to care whether believing ฀Φ is believing the truth. 
Success in purpose is an (instrumental) aim of each particular action, giving us an 
instrumental principle: 
Success-conducive considerations are a reason for A to do ฀Φ only if A 
is inclined to care about whether doing ฀Φ achieves success. 
Likewise, the classical notion of aiming at the good, give us a teleological principle:  
Goodness-conducive considerations are a reason for A to do ฀Φ only if A 
is inclined to care about whether doing ฀Φ achieves goodness. 
We can see in these cases a plausible analogy between conditions on theoretical and 
practical reasons. Velleman’s constitutive aim of action is autonomy, by which he 
means the conscious control of behaviour, which gives us: 
Conscious-control-of-behaviour-conducive considerations are a reason 
for A to do ฀Φ only if A is inclined to care whether doing ฀Φ is achieving 
the conscious control of behaviour. 
I think we can fairly hold Velleman committed to the corresponding bi-conditional. 
Left-to-right: For Velleman, since agents do so care (for if they don’t they are not 
10.7 Analogy of practical and theoretical reasons 
 
 
208
agents), the consequent is necessarily true, so the conditional is true. Right-to-left: 
Implied by his earlier remarks: 
all reasons for acting are features of a single kind, whose influence 
depends on a single inclination (1996:180)  
and  
considerations will turn out to qualify as reasons…by virtue of their 
relevance to our autonomy  (1996:193).  
So for Velleman, conscious-control-of-behaviour-conducive considerations are the 
practical reasons. Obviously this is going to let in some rather odd practical reasons, 
but let that pass. For that is the least of the problems here.  
The picture we have is something like this: 
Base level: The contribution of motives is at this level. Desire plus 
belief gives behaviour which is merely reflexive if nothing else is going 
on.  
Supervisory level: The contribution of reasons is at this level. Practical 
reason exercises control over the base level when in addition to the 
base level, reasons lead to the formation of directive knowledge 
(acceptances so as to make true, intentions) which in turn brings about 
the behaviour, which being ‘performed in and out of knowledge of 
what you are doing’ (1996:199) is full-blooded action.  
The inclination to autonomy makes this work because to be a reason is to engage this 
inclination, and the same inclination is the inclination to do what one has accepted 
one will do (to do what one intends), for doing what one has accepted one will do is 
what it is to behave under conscious control.   
This gives Velleman what he wants, namely, that reasons are not relative to 
inclinations that differentiate agents and furthermore, that reasons may be other than 
desire based because considerations other than desires might engage the inclination 
to autonomy. To be a reason requires only to be such as to ‘engage your inclination 
toward autonomy’ (1996:199), to ‘put you in a position to frame a piece of directive 
knowledge’ (1996:198), to ‘provide potentially directive knowledge’ (1996:199) i.e. 
to be possibly intended. But if that is all reasons give, do they give you enough? If 
reasons only present items as things that you might accept so as to make true, whilst 
that is certainly presenting possible items for consciously controlled behaviour, they 
seem only to give you what is doable, not what ought to be done.  
The example Velleman gives of a reason is  ‘your recognition of your desire’ 
(1996:198). That sounds straightforward enough: surely the content of the desire is 
the what-to-do. But why is your recognition a reason to do it? I don’t think Velleman 
gives a satisfactory answer. What he says is  
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Your awareness of the desire thus presents the behaviour of extending 
your hand in a form prepared for your conscious control, as a potential 
object of your directive grasp. It presents the behaviour, if you will, as 
fit for (en)action, given the constitutive aim of action, just as theoretical 
reasons present a proposition as fit for belief, given the constitutive aim 
of belief. (1996:198) 
Certainly, having something presented as ‘a potential object of your directive grasp’  
(1996:198) is a necessary precondition of the exercise of practical reason (as 
Velleman is painting practical reason). But practical reasons offer us the other sense 
of fit for enaction, the sense of being something that ought to be done. This passage 
travels ambiguously from your recognition presenting the behaviour as doable to 
your recognition being a recognition of what should be done. It achieves it by 
ambiguating on ‘fit for (en)action’, which moves from meaning doable to 
normatively directive in virtue of the analogy.  
Of course, Velleman is trying to bring these two things, practical reasons and 
conscious control, together, but he needs conscious-control-of-behaviour-conducive 
considerations to work as practical reasons. If conscious-control-of-behaviour-
conducive considerations are to be practical reasons they should give indication of 
what ought to be done, not merely how to be in conscious control of behaviour. Let 
us contrast theoretical and practical reason in a table. 
 
 Theoretical reason Practical reason 
Formal aim to believe on the basis of reasons to act on the basis of reasons 
Substantive aim to believe on the basis of truth-
conducive considerations 
to act on the basis of conscious-
control-of-behaviour-conducive 
considerations 
Why, given the 
relevant inclination, do 
they count as reasons? 
because truth-conducive 
considerations ‘probabilify the 
truth of a belief’ (1996:181) 
          
                        ? 
How does influence of 
reason occur? 
inclination to believe what is 
true makes one a believer 
inclination to consciously 
control behaviour makes one an 
agent 
 
Velleman must fill in the empty box with something like ‘because conscious-
control-of-behaviour-conducive considerations foster autonomy’, which sounds good 
if one reads ‘autonomy’ thickly, but a thick reading hasn’t been earnt. All we have is 
that such considerations foster the conscious control of behaviour.  
In the case of theoretical reason, the constitutive aim of belief being truth allows 
one to characterise the substance of theoretical reasons as being truth-conducive and 
when one has determined which beliefs have truth-conducive considerations in their 
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favour one has determined what to believe. This makes sense just because truth 
conducivity is an indicator of whether the belief is achieving its aim.  
But this story doesn't work in the case of action whose constitutive aim is 
conscious control, since conscious-control-of-behaviour-conducive considerations 
don’t discriminate between behaviours beyond indicating which ones are capable of 
conscious control. But practical reasons are supposed to tell us what to do, not stop at 
what is doable. Theoretical reasons which did this little would do no more than 
specify what states are potentially informational, which I suppose would be 
equivalent to specifying what is believable in the weakest sense, namely, what beliefs 
(taken individually) are logically consistent.  
The difficulty seems to be to do with the way in which truth is a constitutive aim 
of belief versus the way conscious control is a constitutive aim of action. Truth is a 
constitutive aim because for a belief to be a belief it must be held as true. Truth is a 
constitutive aim because being held as true doesn’t make true. Consequently truth is 
kind of success for belief.  
In the case of action of the kind with which Velleman is concerned (i.e. not mere 
reflexive behaviour), the constitutive aim, conscious control, is always achieved. 
There is no action as if consciously controlled, for which conscious control may be 
some further achievement. There is just action, which is consciously controlled. So 
conscious control is not a kind of success for action. Calling it an aim of action is 
misleading. Consequently, it is no surprise that conscious-control-of-behaviour-
conducive considerations can’t get beyond what is doable to what should be done, 
just because all they are concerned with is the constitution of action as action 
opposed to non-action.  
I therefore think we should conclude that Velleman achieves no more than giving 
an account of practical reason as a reflective supervisory capacity. Velleman’s notion 
of autonomy may give us some part of the constitution of higher rational agency. But 
there is something missing, and that something is the substance of practical reasons, 
the very thing he set out to supply. 
Clark (2001:581) makes a similar criticism: ‘Velleman’s view makes it impossible 
to criticise any fully intentional action as being contrary to the weight of reasons’. 
Velleman seems to concede the point in the introduction to his book, although he 
doesn’t make it clear exactly how much he is giving up.43  We see now it must all be 
given up. He retreats to: 
Autonomous action is activity regulated by that reflective 
understanding, which constitutes the agent's rationale, or reason—the 
reason for which the action is performed, and whose role as its basis is 
what makes it an action rather than a mere activity. (2000:30) 
                                                 
43
 Given this concession, it is odd that the paper is still cited in the Kantian cause. 
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The worry here is that we seem to be back inside the circle mentioned earlier, only 
lacking precisely what the paper we are discussing sought to provide. If Velleman 
concedes this much, we now lack a substantive notion of what a reason is, and so 
lack a substantive aim for practical reason, leaving us with the merely formal aim of 
acting for reasons.  
 
Summing up, Velleman proposes that ‘all reasons for acting are features of a single 
kind, whose influence depends on a single inclination’ (1996:180). Furthermore, 
considerations will turn out to qualify as reasons …in Kantian fashion 
…by virtue of their relevance to our autonomy rather than their 
relevance to our interests or our good. (1996:193) 
We have seen that the notion of autonomy in play is not thick enough to help the 
rationalist just in virtue of being a constitutive aim of action. However, the account 
of practical reasons, if successful, would help the rationalist. Velleman’s proposal is 
that reasons are reasons because they engage the inclination to autonomy —to 
consciously control behaviour—but in his paper he doesn’t spell out what it is to do 
that. On the basis of the analogy he invokes, and on the basis of his examples, it is 
fair to take his practical reasons to be conscious-control-of-behaviour-conducive 
considerations. Unfortunately, so long as we understand a reason as a conscious-
control-of-behaviour-conducive consideration we only get as far as doable, and if 
that is as far as we get it is not far enough. Providing true beliefs about what is 
doable is a role for reason that Hume would accept. So the strategy of thin autonomy 
as a constitutive aim fails because it does not give us a substantive account of  
practical reasons. Consequently Velleman has not provided the rationalist with an 
argument. 
 11 Conclusion 
The argument for instrumentalism as originally set out depended crucially on the 
first three premisses.  
1. Normativity has two distinct kinds: correctness and directivity. (Premiss) 
2. Obligations as such are directive. (Premiss) 
3. The normativity of rationality as such is correctness. (Premiss) 
I think the first has to be accepted. The third premiss is the main bone of contention 
between instrumentalism and rationalism.  
My direct arguments for the third premiss extended over six chapters. The first 
element, in chapter 3, was that the normativity evident in my characterisation of 
rationality is solely correctness. The second element, in chapters 4 and 5, was my 
defence to direct objections to the normativity of rationality being correctness. The 
third element, the work of chapters 6 to 8, was to show that taking instrumental 
rationality and reason to have intrinsic directivity confronts a serious difficulty which 
can be resolved by taking their normativity to be correctness alone. The upshot of the 
third element was my general explanation of the relation of rationality and 
directivity, of how rationality is a servant of obligation and of why, therefore, we 
ought to be rational. 
The rationalist had three main kinds of objection to the third premiss, the three 
wins for rationalism:  
1. Rational requirements oblige. 
2. Transmission of obligation from ends to means and in reasoning requires 
rationality to be intrinsically obliging.  
3. A rationalist metaethic of some kind is true. 
There was also the fourth objection: that the second premiss is false because 
obligations are merely systems of rules or natural functional facts whose intrinsic 
normativity is therefore only correctness.  
Only two of these objections have been unconditionally refuted. The fourth 
objection was seen off in chapter 4 by the fact that both Foot and Railton maintain a 
distinction between the rational and the legitimate. The point that refutes the second 
win for rationalism is the dilemma of spurious obligation versus loss of rational 
guidance, solved by composite directive norms to do with the transmission of 
directivity from ends to means (8.7).  
The point that refutes the first win for rationalism was the claim that rational 
motivators are correctness reasons alone whilst legitimate motivators are directive 
reasons, and that it is not a requirement of rationality that a person’s rational 
motivators should line up with their legitimate motivators (3.8). Consequently the 
first win is question begging or equivocal. But the question begging can be 
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eliminated if a rationalist metaethics (or a rationalist account of directivity in 
general) can be shown to be true. For example, were it to turn out that the principles 
of correct reasoning imply ethical principles. 
However successful the positive programme of chapters 2 to 8, I have conceded 
that a refutation of the third win is not possible here. The approaches available to the 
rationalist appeal to significant intuitions and offer the rationalist significant 
argumentative resources. I have expounded them very briefly and inadequately, 
offering what I hope are some characteristic examples. I am painfully aware that I 
have addressed only a small fragment of the rationalist resources. Even if my 
criticisms are successful, they are but a scratch on the rationalist project. To further 
vindicate the negative programme of instrumentalism would require a comprehensive 
and painstaking consideration of the wide variety of support Aristotelean and Kantian 
thoughts can offer the rationalist. Yet even such a consideration would not settle the 
matter. So I shall have to rest content if I have succeeded in articulating clearly the 
doctrine of instrumentalism, showing it to be compatible with Humean, Hobbesian 
and some realist metaethics, and illustrating, as I think I have, some faults of the 
rationalist enterprise.  
Perhaps the major fault is the assumption that rational correctness alone implies 
directivity, a variety of what I called earlier the basic mistake. I think I have shown 
that this assumption can no longer be maintained, and that certain issues are much 
clearer on rejecting this error, irrespective of which position we wish to take on the 
directivity of rationality in general. In particular, the ethics of belief benefits from 
rejecting this error and making use of the correctness-directivity distinction. 
Rejecting the basic mistake bears most strongly on Aristotelean rationalism 
formulated in terms of proper function. However, the Aristotelean can undoubtedly 
appeal to a wider notion of perfectionist rationalism and may thereby find his way 
round dependence on the Ergon is Directive principle. As we have seen, the 
correctness-directivity distinction also places some pressure on Kantian rationalism. 
Beyond that, though, the argument quickly turns to the general argument between 
Kantians and Humeans.  
 
At the beginning I raised the questions of whether and why we ought to be 
rational, and suggested that there were two kinds of answer: instrumentalist and 
rationalist. The debate between (my) instrumentalists and (my) rationalists is part of 
the wider debate between on the one hand Humeans and some Hobbesians, and on 
the other hand Kantians and some Aristoteleans. Whilst the correctness-directivity 
distinction will not disappear, how it should be understood does in the end depend on 
the truth in that wider debate. In the meantime, instrumentalism gives a particularly 
clear picture of how directivity and the correctness normativity of rationality are 
related. Once we detach rational correctness from directivity, the normativity of 
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rational guidance is restored to us without burdening us with the requirement that 
rational guidance gets it right directively. Given the right input, it will. But even 
when the directive status of the input is not available for internal inspection, we still 
must act. In general, acting as rationally required will amount to doing the best we 
can; when we are in the mental states we directively ought to be in, doing so will 
result in doing what we directively ought to; we can’t knowingly, deliberately and 
non-accidentally do better than this; so only in this way will we do what we ought in 
a way for which we can be responsible; we ought to be responsible for doing what 
we ought; therefore we ought to be rational. 
When I raised the questions of whether and why we ought to be rational I 
discussed briefly a sceptical challenge and a challenge of triviality. The answer to our 
original sceptic can now be completed. We saw that being the kind of thing which 
can be a sceptic commits him to a certain minimal degree of rationality, since without 
it his vocalisations are not utterances and so cannot issue a sceptical challenge. I 
conceded that he may remain sceptical about being rational beyond that degree. We 
now see that if he maintains that scepticism he is, in effect, a closet rationalist, 
demanding that rationality prescribe itself. But rationality does not prescribe itself, 
nor need it. The reason he ought to be rational is because only so will he knowingly 
do what he ought. He may remain a sceptic, but only if he shifts from being a sceptic 
about rationality to being a moral sceptic.  
The challenge of triviality was that there need not be second order reasons to be 
rational, just the first order reasons to do whatever they dictate. We see now that this 
answer is essentially correct so far as it goes, but also that its terminology obscures 
the dispute which has occupied us in this thesis. Our original questions can be 
understood as a question about legitimate motivators or about rational motivators, 
about directive reasons or about correctness reasons. It is trivially true that you ought 
to do what the directive reasons dictate, but not trivially true that you ought to do 
what the correctness reasons dictate. The challenge of triviality conflates these two in 
a characteristic conflation of directivity and rationality. Once distinguished, the need 
for a substantial answer returns. I have offered one such answer, an answer that is 
compatible with any non-rationalist ethics. 
There is one final remark I want to make. Once we cease to conflate directivity 
and rationality it is clear that in addition to a need for an answer to our original 
question, we need also an explanation of the grounds of directivity. In the end, the 
reason I reject rationalism is that I think it must give the wrong kind of answer. If one 
wants explanations of the force of directivity that are not essentially mystifying, they 
must be grounded in what does move us. I think that means that explanations of 
directivity must be grounded in our passional nature. Rationalists either mistakenly 
think that we are otherwise moved or find ways of letting our passional nature in the 
back door. ‘It is the most familiar fact of human life that the world contains entities 
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that can tell us what to do and make us do it’ (Korsgaard 1996:166). Korsgaard’s 
witty answer to Mackie’s argument from queerness is true, but of no help to her 
rationalism. Our sceptical toddler who often does what he is told, does so out of love; 
his passionate engagement with his parents, especially his beaming in the warmth of 
their proud approbation and angry despair in the chill of their ashamed 
disapprobation, is his route into that part of our sentimental life which philosophers 
call our ethical life. So whilst the instrumentalism for which I have argued is 
compatible with a range of ethical approaches, I argue for it in defence of Hume’s 
opinion that ‘reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions’ 
(1739/1978:2.3.3/415). 
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